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NOTE
OPENING THE DOOR TO RACE-BASED REAL ESTATE
MARKETING: SOUTH-SUBURBAN HOUSING CENTER v.
GREATER SOUTH SUBURBAN BOARD OF REALTORS
For our primary target we have chosen housing . . . . [W]e shall cease to
be accomplices to a housing system of discrimination, segregation and deg-
radation. We shall begin to act as if Chicago were an open city.
-Martin Luther King, Jr., July 10, 19661
INTRODUCTION
Despite Dr. King's emphatic pronouncement over one quarter of a
century ago, most communities in the Chicago metropolitan area
have not responded in kind; the doors to integrated housing are
often closed. Congress enacted the Fair Housing Act of 19681 with
the dual purposes of ending discriminatory housing practices and
promoting integrated housing. Enforcement of the Act's specific
prohibitions has successfully combatted many overtly discriminatory
housing practices.". However, pervasive, subtle discrimination still
1. BRIAN J. L. BERRY, THE OPEN HOUSING QUESTION; RACE AND HOUSING IN CHICAGO, 1966-
1976, at xix (1979) (quoting Dr. King during an open housing rally in Chicago).
2. John E. Farley, Segregation in 1980: How Segregated Are America's Metropolitan Areas?,
in DIVIDED NEIGHBORHOODS, CHANGING PATTERNS OF RACIAL SEGREGATION 100 (Gary A.
Tobin ed., 1987) [hereinafter DIVIDED NEIGHBORHOODS] (stating that segregation levels in Chi-
cago did not decline at all between 1970-1980); John F. Kain, Housing Market Discrimination
and Black Suburbanization in the 1980s, in DIVIDED NEIGHBORHOODS, supra, at 68, 77 (noting
intense segregation in the Chicago suburbs as of 1980; only 23 had black populations over 10%,
and 162 had black populations under 3%). Nineteen-ninety census figures for the Chicago metro-
politan area show that many communities have experienced growth in their minority populations.
However, the largest increases were in suburbs that already had substantial minority populations.
See. Chicagoland Census Report (Cook County), CHI. TRIB., Feb. 13, 1991, § 1, at 8 (giving
population breakdown by race of every Chicago metropolitan community for the years 1980 and
1990).
3. Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 81 (Title VIII) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-
3631 (1988)).
4. Gary A. Tobin, Preface to DIVIDED NEIGHBORHOODS, supra note 2, at 8 (stating that real-
tors rarely openly refuse to show blacks homes in certain neighborhoods, and that federally subsi-
dized housing is no longer sanctioned to be racially segregated).
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exists, and most open housing programs have not altered the racial
prejudice that contributes to the segregative norm. The result is that
integrated housing is often merely a transition from all-white segre-
gation to all-black resegregation.5
In an effort to stem the resegregative trend in many communities,
local governmental agencies and private open housing programs
have embarked on a controversial course; they use race-conscious
tactics to help promote the Fair Housing Act's goal of achieving
stable, integrated housing.6 Examples of these strategies include es-
tablishing racial quotas in certain housing projects or neighbor-
hoods," establishing financial incentive programs that reward per-
sons moving to areas where their race is underrepresented,8 and
marketing properties in a way designed to attract potential custom-
ers of a race that is underrepresented in the community.9 These tac-
tics have shown promise in maintaining integration, but opponents
of these measures assert that the programs often discriminate
against minorities by denying them housing or making it "otherwise
unavailable" in violation of the Fair Housing Act.1° South-Subur-
ban Housing Center v. Greater South Suburban Board of Real-
tors'1 examines the legality of one such plan, in which a realtor
made special marketing and advertising efforts to predominantly
white audiences in an effort to attract them to properties that would
otherwise primarily attract black customers. The decision by the
Seventh Circuit in that case illustrates the difficulty courts have in
analyzing the legality of race-conscious housing integration pro-
grams. South Suburban-Housing Center also addresses an issue of
first impression-whether the responding actions of a real estate or-
ganization opposed to race-conscious programs are legal under the
5. Kermit J. Lind, Maintaining Residential Integration: Municipal Practices and Law, 31
CLEVE. ST. L. REV. 603, 608 (1982) (stating that in the past, interracial neighborhoods were
viewed not as a legitimate part of the system, but as an area in a state of pathological transition).
6. See infra notes 245-353 and accompanying text (discussing the legality of various race-
conscious techniques used to achieve or maintain housing integration).
7. See infra notes 245-82 and accompanying text (discussing in detail the legal problems ra-
cial occupancy quotas create under the Fair Housing Act).
8. See infra notes 283-304 and accompanying text (discussing various pro-integration incen-
tives and their legality under the Fair Housing Act).
9. See infra notes 305-53 and accompanying text (discussing the widely varying techniques of
affirmative marketing and their legality under the Fair Housing Act).
10. See infra note 37 (discussing the § 3604(a) prohibition against practices that deny or make
housing "otherwise unavailable" on the basis of race); infra notes 135, 312 (discussing accusations
that race-conscious programs constitute reverse steering in violation of the Fair Housing Act).
I1. 935 F.2d 868 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 971 (1992).
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Fair Housing Act. In particular, South-Suburban Housing Center
addresses whether a realtor association that disagrees with race-con-
scious tactics on philosophical grounds may refuse to list properties
marketed that way in its multiple listing service.
In South-Suburban Housing Center, the Seventh Circuit held
that affirmative marketing of real estate, whereby a broker directs
additional advertising towards one racially identifiable group in an
effort to promote integration, does not violate the Fair Housing
Act.12 It also held that private parties could not be compelled to
adopt race conscious programs, and that a private party does not
have to cooperate with the special outreach efforts of others. 3 Thus,
the Seventh Circuit concluded that a multiple listing service that
philosophically disagreed with affirmative action programs could
deny access to properties marketed that way. 4
This Note analyzes the Seventh Circuit's reasoning in support of
its decision. The Note begins by reviewing the legal parameters gov-
erning the use of race-conscious housing programs under the Fair
Housing Act, with an emphasis on affirmative action efforts within
the Chicago metropolitan area. It also reviews the development of
the Title VIII standard of review of challenged housing activities,
which borrows heavily from Title VII precedent, and discusses how
it has been applied to different types of race-conscious programs,
both public and private. The Note then critically examines the Sev-
enth Circuit's application of the standard of review to the facts of
South-Suburban Housing Center, which involved private integration
efforts.
Part III argues first that although the Seventh Circuit correctly
concluded that the affirmative marketing plan was legal, it improp-
erly characterized the challenge to the plan as involving a racial
steering claim requiring analysis under an intentional discrimination
standard only. The challenge to the affirmative marketing program
spoke directly to its effect, on the availability of the housing to po-
tential minority customers, and thus required analysis under a dis-
criminatory effect standard as well. The analysis develops a test for
analyzing whether race-conscious marketing by a realtor has a ra-
cially discriminatory effect on the availability of.housing informa-
tion for potential customers. Second, Part III asserts that the Sev-
12. Id. at 884.
13. i. at 886.
14. /i. at 887.
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enth Circuit incorrectly concluded that the decision by a realtor
board conducting a multiple listing service to adopt a color-blind
marketing scheme allowed the board to deny access to the listing
service to properties marketed in a race-conscious manner. The
analysis argues that listing the property would not require a board
to cooperate with race-conscious tactics in contravention of its philo-
sophical ideals. Instead, denying access to the listing service consti-
tuted interference with housing rights in violation of the Fair Hous-
ing Act.
Finally, Part III focuses on the impact South-Suburban Housing
Center will have on affirmative marketing efforts. This is the first
federal appellate court decision to address the legality of affirmative
real estate marketing programs under the Fair Housing Act. The
Seventh Circuit's endorsement of these activities will likely spur
their continued use, by both public and private entities. The Note
asserts that South-Suburban Housing Center will also encourage
additional use of other race-conscious tactics, especially pro-integra-
tion financial incentives. The Note finally posits that since South-
Suburban Housing Center did not require one realtor to cooperate
with another realtor's race-conscious efforts, the use of real estate
agents in the affirmative marketing process will be curtailed. In-
stead, private affirmative marketing efforts will be largely imple-
mented by non-profit groups that are not directly involved in the
real estate transaction process.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Before the Fair Housing Act
A century of post-Civil War institutionalized racism created well-
entrenched segregated housing patterns in the United States. 5
15. ROBERT G. SCHWEMM, HOUSING DISCRIMINATION: LAW AND LITIGATION § 2.2, at 2-2 to 2-
4 (1990); see also Karl A. Taeuber, The Contemporary Context of Housing Discrimination, 6
YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 339 (1988) (discussing the history of racial migration and segregation in
the United States). The institutions involved in perpetuating segregated housing included all levels
of government, realtors, insurers, and bankers. They molded straightforward and strict guidelines
for consumers, subjugating individual choice to perceived social norms. Tobin, supra note 4, at 9
(1987).
As late as 1950, the National Association of Realtors ("NAR") Code of Ethics stated that
"[rlealtors should not be instrumental in introducing into a neighborhood a character of property
or occupancy, members of a race or nationality or any individual whose presence will clearly be
detrimental to property values in the neighborhood." Fair Housing: Hearings Before the Sub-
comm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong., 2d Sess.
97 (1988) [hereinafter Fair Housing Hearings] (statement of Winston H. Richie, Director, East
[Vol. 41:12711274
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Through the use of racial zoning and restrictive covenants during
the first half of the twentieth century, black Americans were effec-
tively blocked from access to most urban housing stock. 16 The great
numbers of blacks migrating to the North during the first half of
the twentieth century were largely confined to narrow, intensely seg-
regated tracts within the central city. 7 Expansion of black housing
Suburban (Cleveland) Council for Open Communities).
16. SCHWEMM, supra note 15, §§ 2.2, 3.3-3.4, at 2-2 to 2-4, 3-4 to 3-11. The Supreme Court
invalidated explicit racial zoning in Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917) (invalidating an
ordinance that prohibited whites or blacks from purchasing on any block in which they were a
racial minority). Restrictive covenants subsequently sprung up en masse as a substitute means of
blocking black access to all-white areas. CHARLES ABRAMS, FORBIDDEN NEIGHBORS: A STUDY OF
PREJUDICE IN HOUSING 82 (Kennikat Press 1971) (1955). Restrictive covenants were particularly
widespread in Chicago, and received the explicit approval of the Federal Housing Authority
("FHA"). Id. at 110. State court sanction of restrictive covenants led to the creation of "Neigh-
borhood Improvement Associations," which mobilized opposition to minority entry under the guise
of protecting the beauty and safety of the community. Id. at 181-90. At one time Chicago had
nearly 100 of these associations, which enforced community loyalty by branding members who
sold property to "undesirables" as enemies to be punished. Id. at 110, 187-88.
The Supreme Court invalidated enforcement of racially restrictive covenants in Shelley v. Krae-
mer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948), holding that the judicial enforcement by state courts of such restrictions
was sufficient state action to trigger the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protec-
tion Clause. Id. at 28. However, Shelley did not prohibit voluntary adherence to racially restric-
tive covenants. Id. at 13. It was not until after the Fair Housing Act was passed that restrictive
covenants were found illegal in and of themselves. Mayers v. Ridley, 465 F.2d 630 (D.C. Cir.
1972) (en banc).
Invalidating explicit methods of maintaining racial segregation did not end more subtle methods
for achieving an identical result. Government land use zoning restrictions (particularly restrictions
on multi-unit development) often had the economic effect of excluding blacks from certain com-
munities. See infra notes 165-84 and accompanying text (discussing discriminatory effects analy-
sis). Additionally, segregated housing was perpetuated by discriminatory private real estate prac-
tices, including racial steering, denying access to brokerage services, and intimidation. See infra
notes 35-57 and accompanying text (discussing the Title Vill prohibitions against certain real
estate practices).
17. See ABRAMS, supra note 16, at 9 (discussing how minorities were forced into the slums of
the old city centers). Chicago is a good illustration of the black housing experience during the first
half of the twentieth century. Chicago was not always segregated; in 1898 only 25% of Chicago's
30,000 blacks lived in neighborhoods with a black majority. Over 30% of the blacks lived in areas
that were over 95% white. As late as 1910, blacks were less segregated from native whites than
Italian immigrants. BERRY, supra note 1, at 3.
The move toward segregation began with the great black migration to the North, which began
around 1915, fueled by the resurgence of the Ku Klux Klan in the South and wartime production
needs. Id. at 3-4. Black migration increased even further from 1930 to 1950 as the curtailment of
European immigration in the 1920s created a void in the labor market. ABRAMS, supra note 16, at
7. The black population in Chicago rose to 110,000 by 1920, and to over 509,000 by 1950. Id. at
26; BERRY. supra note 1, at 3. The confluence of white racial fears and prejudice, as institutional-
ized in Chicago real estate practices, effectively limited black housing choice and forced most to
live in a narrow, one-half mile by five mile belt on the city's south side. Id. at 6, fig. I-1. By 1950,
66.9% of blacks lived in areas that were over 90% black. Conversely, only 3% of whites lived
areas that were over 50% black. By 1960, Chicago manifested the greatest degree of racial segre-
gation among the eleven metropolitan areas with over 200,000 blacks. Id. at 4-5.
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opportunities came mainly in the form of realtor "blockbusting" of
adjacent white neighborhoods.' 8
The push for federal legislation outlawing discrimination in hous-
ing began in 1954 with Brown v. Board of Education,9 where the
Supreme Court redirected public policy by holding that officially
segregated schools violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment to the Constitution.20 The Executive Branch ex-
panded on the constitutional protection against de jure segregation
in 1962 when President Kennedy issued Executive Order 11,063.21
This order prohibited racial discrimination in federally financed
housing.22 Congress then passed the Civil Rights Act of 1964,23
which prohibited racial discrimination in all public accommodations
(Title II),24 in all federally financed programs (Title VI), 2 5 and by
public and private employers (Title VII).2"
Although all branches of the federal government supported the
goal of ending segregation in society by the mid-1960s, their efforts
were primarily directed at ending government-sponsored discrimina-
tion.27 Title VI did not expressly prohibit private discrimination in
18. Taeuber, supra note 15, at 341-42; see also Lind, supra note 5, at 608 (noting that in
earlier days interracial neighborhoods were not regarded as a legitimate part of the social system,
but were assumed to be in a state of pathological flux).
"Blockbusting" refers to realtor exploitations of racial tensions created when blacks move into a
previously all-white neighborhood. Realtors make uninvited solicitations for listings, intimating
that the neighborhood is undergoing or about to undergo a change in racial composition. This
practice preys on the fears and prejudices of whites and is effective in stimulating sales (and
realtor commissions) in racially transitional neighborhoods. Zuch v. Hussey, 394 F. Supp. 1028,
1049-50 (E.D. Mich. 1975), affd without opinion, 547 F.2d 1168 (6th Cir. 1977). Blockbusting is
expressly prohibited by the Fair Housing Act. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(e) (1988) (prohibiting, for
profit, an attempt to induce any person to rent or sell a dwelling by representations regarding the
entry or prospective entry of persons of a particular racial group); 24 C.F.R. § 100.85(c)(1)
(1991) (associating a particular racial group with increased crime, lowered property values or
decline in quality of schools or other community services is a prohibited representation).
19. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
20. Id; see Pierre deVise, Housing Discrimination in the Chicago Metropolitan Area: The Leg-
acy of the Brown Decision, 34 DEPAUL L. REV. 491, 492 (1985) (explaining that Brown was "a
major landmark and a turning point in American public policy").
21. 27 Fed. Reg. 11,527 (Nov. 20, 1962) (codified at 3 C.F.R. § 261 (1991), as amended by
Exec. Order 12,259 (1980)), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 3608 (1988).
22. Id.
23. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1975(a)-
1975(d), 2000(a)-2000(h)(6) (1988)).
24. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(a) (1988).
25. Id. § 2000(d).
26. Id. § 2000(e). Title VII employment discrimination precedents are universally applied when
analyzing housing discrimination claims under the Fair Housing Act. See infra text accompanying
notes 142-233 for a discussion of the Title VII/Title VIII analogy.
27. Only Title VII directly prohibited private discrimination, and only in the employment con-
[Vol. 41:12711276
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housing,2" and courts had not interpreted the Civil Rights Act of
1866 to prohibit such discrimination either."
In 1966, President Johnson sponsored an unsuccessful federal leg-
islative effort to prohibit discrimination in both the public and pri-
vate housing markets .3  The Johnson Administration again spon-
sored similar legislation in 1967, but it was substantially altered by
the House and not acted upon by the Senate. 31 In 1968, Senator
Mondale introduced what is known as the Fair Housing Act of 1968
(Title VIII). 32 The Act was debated and quickly passed by both the
Senate and the House, propelled by the assassination of Dr. Martin
Luther King and the release of the Kerner Commission Report,
which warned that racial segregation was an underlying cause of
numerous urban civil disorders, and which recommended enacting
comprehensive fair housing legislation. " President Johnson signed
text. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e).
28. Title VI is "impotent" with regard to the private housing market. JAMES A. KUSHNER. FAIR
HOUSING: DISCRIMINATION IN REAL ESTATE, COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT AND REVITALIZATION §
1.04 (1983).
29. 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1988) (providing that all citizens shall have equal rights to purchase and
convey real property). For over a century, this statutory protection lay dormant; courts assumed
that its prohibitions were no greater than any constitutional prohibition on housing discrimination.
SCHWEMM. supra note 15, § 27.1, at 27-2 to 27-3; KUSHNER. supra note 28, § 1.01; see infra note
34 (discussing later expansion of § 1982).
30. S. 3296 & H.R. 14765, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966). A Senate filibuster prevented floor
debate on the bill. 112 CONG. REC. 1183 (1966). During this period, Martin Luther King, Jr.,
started a national campaign against housing discrimination in Chicago. The campaign met with
controversy when Mayor Richard J. Daley and seven black committeemen told King to "go back
to Georgia." deVise, supra note 20, at 494-95. King responded with a campaign of civil disobedi-
ence. Massive rioting, looting, and arson ensued on the city's west side, and King conducted nu-
merous marches through white neighborhoods in the city. Eventually, Mayor Daley agreed to
convene a watchdog fair housing agency. Id.
31. H.R. 5700 & S. 1026, 90th Cong., Ist Sess. (1967). The House Judiciary Committee al-
tered the bill to prohibit only violence and intimidation against civil rights workers. H.R. 2516,
90th Cong., Ist Sess. (1967).
32. Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 81 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (1988)).
The Fair Housing Act was amended by Pub. L. No. 93-383, 88 Stat. 729 (1974) to prohibit
discrimination in housing on the basis of sex, and by Pub. L. No. 100-430, 102 Stat. 1619 (1988)
to prohibit discrimination in housing on the basis of physical handicaps.
33. Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders 1 (March 1, 1968) [here-
inafter Kerner Commission Report] (concluding that America was "moving towards two societies,
one black, one white-separate and unequal"). The Kerner Commission further -noted that
thousands of blacks had attained income levels and living standards matching or exceeding those
of whites who "upgraded" themselves from ethnic neighborhoods; yet blacks remained in predomi-
nantly black neighborhoods because they were "effectively excluded" from white residential areas.
Id. at 244.
The Fair Housing Act was signed into law just seven days after the assassination of Dr. Martin
Luther King, Jr. King's assassination sparked race riots in major urban areas across the country,
and galvanized quick support for the Act in the House. SCHWEMM, supra note 15, § 5.2, at 5-4 to
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the bill into law on April 11, 1968. 3"
B. Substantive and Administrative Scope of the Fair Housing
Act
The Fair Housing Act prohibits housing practices that discrimi-
nate on the basis of race .a The specific prohibitory provisions of the
Act are quite detailed; many controversies can be resolved from the
plain language of the statute. 6 Section 3604(a) of the Act has the
broadest scope. That section makes unlawful: (1) discriminatory re-
fusals to sell or rent after the making of a bona fide offer; (2) dis-
criminatory refusals to negotiate for the sale or rental of a dwelling;
and (3) discriminatory practices that otherwise make unavailable or
deny housing to any person.37 The language of this section, among
other things, prohibits the practice known as steering, whereby pro-
spective home buyers or renters are channelled to designated areas
on the basis of race. 8 Other subsections of section 3604 prohibit
racial discrimination in the terms and conditions of a sale or rental
of a dwelling, or in the provisions of services connected with the sale
or rental; 9 publishing advertisements indicating a racial prefer-
5-5.
34, 114 CONG. REc. 3604 (1968). Shortly after enactment of the Fair Housing Act, the Su-
preme Court interpreted section 1982 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 to prohibit private racial
discrimination in housing as well. Jones v. Alfred Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968). The Court
held that racial restraints on the right to purchase or lease property were among the "badges and
incidents of slavery" the Thirteenth Amendment was designed to prohibit. Id. at 440-41. For a
discussion of the interrelation between § 1982 and Title VIII analysis, see SCHWEMM, supra note
15, § 27.2, at 27-5 to 27-8.
35. In addition to race, the Fair Housing Act prohibits discrimination on the basis of "color,
religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin." See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c) (1988)
(prohibiting discriminatory advertisements). Subsections 3604(a) and (b) leave out "handicap"; §
3604(f) separately addresses housing discrimination against handicapped persons with respect to
practices prohibited by these two sections. See infra notes 38-42 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing in detail the housing practices prohibited by §§ 3604(a) and (b)).
36. Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 102-104 (1979) (stating that in
Title Vill cases, courts must look to the plain meaning of the statute first); SCHWEMM. supra note
15, § 7.1, at 7-1.
37. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a).
38. Village of Bellwood v. Dwivedi, 895 F.2d 1521, 1529 (7th Cir. 1989); see infra note 39
(noting that steering can violate § 3604(b) as well). "Steering is not a total refusal to sell or rent;
rather, it is a practice that makes certain housing 'unavailable' " on the basis of race. SCHWEMM,
supra note 15, § 13.4(2)(a), at 13-11. The Supreme Court, although not directly ruling on
whether Title VIII prohibits steering, granted standing to plaintiffs suing under a steering theory.
Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363 (1982); Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bell-
wood, 441 U.S. 91 (1979).
39. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b). Covered terms and conditions include rent, prices, and lease or sale
contract terms. 24 C.F.R. § 100.65 (1991); United States v. Pelzer Realty Co., 484 F.2d 438,
1278
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ence;" representing that a dwelling is unavailable when it is availa-
ble;41 or inducing or attempting to induce the sale or rental of a
dwelling by representations regarding the entry or prospective entry
to the neighborhood of persons belonging to a certain racial group.
42
Other substantive sections of the Fair Housing Act prohibit dis-
crimination in the provision of ancillary services related to the sale
and rental of housing. Section 3605 prohibits discrimination in the
financing or appraising of residential real property.43 Section 3606
prohibits discrimination in the provision of brokerage services. 44
This section prohibits denying or conditioning access, on the basis of
442-43 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 936 (1974). Section 3604(b) also prohibits discrim-
ination in the provision of services in connection with the sale or rental of housing. Some courts
have interpreted this language to prohibit steering practices by realtors. McDonald v. Verble, 622
F.2d 1227, 1233 (6th Cir. 1980) (holding that a realtor's failure to show black customer a house
listing that was made available to white home buyers violated § 3604(b)).
40. 42 U.S.C. 3604(c); see Ragin v. New York Times, 923 F.2d 995, 999 (2d Cir.) (holding
that an advertisement violates § 3604(c) if it suggests to an ordinary reader that a particular
racial group "is preferred or dispreferred for the housing in question"), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 81
(1991). The claim in Ragin alleged that the housing advertisements in question exclusively used
white models in ads for properties located in predominantly white areas, and used black models
only in connection with services advertised for these properties, or in ads for properties located in
"black" areas. Id. at 996-98; see also Spann v. Colonial Village, 662 F. Supp. 541, 546 (D.D.C
1987) (requiring a showing of a pattern of discriminatory advertising; isolated instances of target
modeling are insufficient to prove a § 3604(c) violation).
HUD regulations also delineate certain practices in addition to human models that are associ-
ated with discriminatory advertising. 24 C:F.R § 109.20 (1991) (directions implying racial prefer-
ence based on certain well-known racial landmarks, selective use of a particular advertising media,
selected geographical advertising). But cf. id. § 109.16(b) (stating that this section does not re-
strict affirmative advertising efforts (1) designed to attract persons to dwellings who otherwise
would not be expected to apply, or (2) undertaken to remedy the effects of past discriminatory
advertising of dwellings).
41. 42 U.S.C. 3604(d); see Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 373 (1982) (hold-
ing § 3604(d) "establishes an enforceable right to truthful information concerning the availability
of housing"). Professor Schwemm observes that the broad interpretation given § 3604(a) has re-
sulted in that section absorbing the coverage of § 3604(d) and rendering it for the most part
"superfluous." SCHWEMM. supra note 15, § 16.1, at 16-3.
42. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(e). This section prohibits the practice known as "blockbusting." See
supra note 18 (discussing the mechanics and legal parameters of the blockbusting prohibition).
43. Id. § 3605. This section covers all businesses engaged in residential real estate transactions.
Id. § 3605(a). Specific financing transactions covered by this section include mortgages, construc-
tion loans, and appraisals of property. Id. 3605(b). In addition to prohibiting financial discrimina-
tion based on the race of an individual applicant, § 3605 also prohibits the practice of denying
financial assistance for properties located in particular areas. This practice is commonly referred
to as "redlining." Cartwright v. American Say. & Loan Ass'n, 880 F.2d 912, 922-24 (7th Cir.
1989) (but noting plaintiffs failed to make out prima facie case); Laufman v. Oakley Bldg. &
Loan Co., 408 F. Supp. 489, 491-98 (S.D. Ohio 1976) (finding redlining activities also violated §
3604(a) and § 3617 of the Act); SCHWEMM, supra note 15, § 18.2(3), at 18-11 to 18-15 (discuss-
ing redlining in detail).
44. 42 U.S.C. § 3606.
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race, to any multiple listing service,45 real estate brokers organiza-
tion, or facility relating to the business of selling or renting hous-
ing."' A final section prohibits acts that interfere with another per-
son's housing rights. 7 Section 3617 makes it unlawful to coerce,
intimidate or interfere with any person: (1) in the exercise or enjoy-
ment of housing rights; 48 (2) on account of his having exercised or
enjoyed any housing. right;4 19 or (3) on account of his having aided or
encouraged any other person in the exercise or enjoyment of any
housing rights.50 Many activities that violate section 3617 also vio-
late provisions of either sections 3604, 3605 or 3606.51 There is con-
flict as to whether a section 3617 violation may occur absent a con-
current violation of another Fair Housing Act prohibition. 2 For
45. Among the issues involved in South-Suburban Housing Center was a controversy over the
listing of properties in a certain multiple listing service. South-Suburban Hous. Ctr. v. Greater S.
Suburban Bd. of Realtors, 935 F.2d 868, 874, 885-87 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 971
(1992); see infra notes 417-31 and accompanying text (discussing the Seventh Circuit's applica-
tion of the Fair Housing Act to the multiple listing service controversy). A multiple listing service
is "an organization of real estate brokers which shares with its members the listings of all real
estate parcels for sale that the other members have." Blake v. H-F Group Multiple Listing Serv.,
345 N.E.2d 18, 20-21 (I1. 1976). When a home 'i listed for sale with a certain member broker,
that broker will share the listing with all the other members of the listing service. If a member
other than the listing broker sells the home, an arrangement is made for sharing the commissions
earned. Id. at 21. This type of arrangement is common throughout the United States. The effec-
tiveness of multiple listing services in marketing real estate is so great that the activities of some
services are challenged as limiting competition and unreasonably restraining trade in violation of
antitrust laws. Id. at 23-26; United States v. Realty Multi-List, Inc., 629 F.2d 1351 (5th Cir.
1980).
46. Blake, 345 N.E.2d at 23-26. There is virtually no case law involving § 3606. SCHWEMM,
supra note 15, § 19, at 19-1 to 19-3.
47. 42 U.S.C. .§ 3617.
48. 48. See, e.g., Laufman v. Oakley Bldg. & Loan Co., 408 F. Supp. 489, 494-98 (S.D. Ohio
1976) (holding that mortgage redlining interferes with minority customer's attempt to purchase
housing).
49. See, e.g, Stackhouse v. DeSitter, 620 F. Supp. 208, 211 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (firebombing of
residence owned by minority family after they purchased house in an all-white neighborhood).
50. See, e.g, United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179, 1188 (8th Cir. 1974) (holding
that municipality's exclusionary zoning decision interfered with low-income housing developer on
.account of its aiding minorities in their housing rights), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 821 (1975). This
exclusionary zoning decision also interferes with prospective minority tenants in the exercise of
their housing rights. Id.
51. See Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1288
(7th Cir. 1977) (holding that exclusionary zoning decision violated both § 3617 and § 3604(a)),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1025 (1978); United States v. American Inst. of Real Estate Appraisers,
442 F. Supp. 1072, 1079 (N.D. Ill. 1977), appeal dismissed, 590 F.2d 242 (7th Cir. 1978) (hold-
ing house appraisals that treat race or ethnic origin as a negative in valuing property deny housing
in violation of § 3604(a) as well as interfere with their housing rights protected under § 3617).
52. Compare Burrell v. City of Kankakee, 815 F.2d 1127, 1130-31 (7th Cir. 1987) (finding no
independent violation where court held zoning decision did not make housing "unavailable" in
violation, of § 3604(a)) with Stackhouse v. DeSitter, 620 F. Supp. 208, 211 (N.D. Ill. 1985)
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instance, no court has held that an exclusionary zoning decision vio-
lates section 3617 without also holding that it violates Section
3604(a).5 3 But several court decisions support the theory that an in-
dependent violation of section 3617 can be established, particularly
when housing rights have already been exercised or enjoyed.54
The Fair Housing Act provides broad and varying mechanisms to
administer and enforce its provisions. Title VIII can be enforced ei-
ther by the Attorney General 55 or through private action. 56 Most
housing discrimination suits brought under Title VIII are private
actions; although even one isolated discriminatory act violates Title
VIII, the Act allows the Attorney General to initiate a suit only if
he or she has reason to believe the defendant is engaged in a "pat-
tern and practice" of discrimination.57
The authority and responsibility for administering the Act is
vested in the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development
("HUD").58 Section 3608(e)(5) of the Fair Housing Act mandates
that the Secretary "administer the programs and activities relating
to housing and urban development in a manner affirmatively to fur-
ther the policies of the [Act]." 5 These Federal government "pro-
grams and activities" including housing "grants; loans; contracts; in-
(deeming firebombing of residence in attempt to force minority family from neighborhood an
independent § 3617 violation).
53. SCHWEMM, supra note 15, § 20.2(l) n.22, at 20-5.
54. See, e.g., Smith v. Stechel, 510 F.2d 1162, 1164 (9th Cir. 1975) (holding that interfering
with a person on account of his aiding another in their housing rights can be a totally independent
violation; it may deal "with a situation where no discriminatory housing practice may have oc-
curred at all because the would-be tenant has been discouraged from asserting his rights");
Stackhouse v. DeSitter, 620 F. Supp. 208, 211 (N.D. I11 1985) (reasoning that to require another
Fair Housing Act violation as a prerequisite to finding a violation of § 3617 would render the
section "mere surplusage"); see also SCHWEMM, supra note 15, § 20.2(1), at 20-4 to 20-7 (assert-
ing that an independent violation can be shown when the interference or intimidation comes after
housing rights have been exercised, noting that in these cases, there is no prior denial of housing
that would trigger a § 3604(a) violation).
55. 42 U.S.C. § 3614.
56. Id. §§ 3610-3613. Victims of discriminatory housing practices can raise an administrative
complaint to the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development ("HUD") (§§
3610-3612), or may-file a court action directly (§ 3613).
57. Id. § 3614(a)(1). The pattern and practice requirement requires the United States to prove
more than the mere occurrence of isolated or sporadic discriminatory acts. The government must
establish that racial discrimination was the defendant's standard operating procedure. United
States v. Pelzer, 484 F.2d 438 (5th Cir. 1973) (requiring more than an accidental departure from
otherwise nondiscriminatory practices); United States v. Hunter, 459 F.2d 205, 217-18 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 934 (1972). The Attorney General may also initiate suits where a denial of
rights raises an issue of "general public importance." 42 U.S.C. § 3614(a)(2).
58. 42 U.S.C. § 3608(a).
59. Id. § 3608(e)(5).
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surance; [and] guarantees."60 To comply with this mandate, HUD
has promulgated rules and regulations imposing certain duties and
conditions on program participants.61 The affirmative mandate im-
posed upon HUD sparked considerable controversy as to what ac-
tions were required to further the policies of the Act. The mandate
also raised the issue of what policies or purposes the Act was
designed to serve.6 2
C. The Fair Housing Act: Dual Purposes of Eliminating
Discrimination and Promoting Integration
In Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 3 the Supreme
Court unanimously interpreted the Fair Housing Act to promote in-
tegrated housing as well as prohibit discrimination in housing." ' Re-
ferring to the Senate floor debate, the Court held that the statute's
purpose was to replace the ghettos with " 'truly integrated and bal-
anced living patterns.' "6 The Trafficante Court also held that the
statute was entitled to a broad and generous construction in order to
effectuate its policies.6
60. Exec. Order No. 12,259, § 1-102, 3 C.F.R. 261 (1980), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 3608.
61. See, e.g.. 24 C.F.R. § 200.610 (1991 ) (stating that participants in Federal Housing Author-
ity programs "shall pursue fair housing marketing policies in soliciting tenants" in order to
achieve a condition in which persons of similar incomes have a similar range of housing choices).
62. See infra note 65 and accompanying text (discussing the Fair Housing Act's dual goals of
eliminating discriminatory housing practices and promoting integrated housing).
63. 409 U.S. 205 (1972).
64. Id. (specifically holding that white tenants in a large apartment complex had standing to
sue their landlord for discriminating against minorities). The Supreme Court reaffirmed the im-
portance of integrated housing in Linmark Assocs. v. Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1982). The Court
expressly recognized that "substantial benefits flow to both whites and blacks from interracial
association." Id. at 94-95.
65. Id. at 211 (quoting Senator Mondale at 114 CONG. REC. 3422 (1968)). The Trafficante
Court also noted the scarcity of legislative history available to determine the congressional intent
behind the Act. Id. at 212; see also T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Note, Racial Steering: The Real
Estate Broker and Title VII, 85 YALE L.J. 808, 821 n.49 (1976) (noting that Title ViII was
introduced on the floor of the Senate, and therefore legislative history must focus on actual floor
debate); SCHWEMM, supra note 15, § 5.2, at 5-5 (stating that the legislative history did not in-
clude the committee reports and documents normally accompanying major legislation, and that
most important statements of scope and intent were made during floor debate); Jean E. Dubofsky,
Fair Housing: A Legislative History and a Perspective, 8 WASHBURN L.J. 149 (1968) (delineating
the full legislative history behind the 1968 Act).
66. Trafficante, 409 U.S. at 212.
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1. The Duty To Integrate: The Distinction Between Public and
Private Entities
Many lower courts have interpreted the language in Trafficante to
mean that the Fair Housing Act requires more than a neutral pos-
ture towards integration, and have interpreted the mandate as im-
posing an affirmative duty to integrate upon public entities.6 7 Al-
though the affirmative duties imposed by section 3608 of the Fair
Housing Act apply explicitly only to HUD, courts have interpreted
the language also to impose a duty to integrate on entities partici-
pating in or receiving funds from HUD-sponsored housing pro-
grams.68 Pursuant to this interpretation, HUD has imposed regula-
tions requiring that local housing authorities and other recipients of
federal housing assistance undertake certain integrative efforts, in-
cluding the development of affirmative marketing plans geared to-
wards ensuring that persons with similar incomes have similar hous-
ing choices.69
Whether a private duty to integrate exists is less clear. The stan-
dard of review applied by courts to suits arising under the Fair
67. Otero v. New York City Hous. Auth., 484 F.2d 1122, 1133-34 (2d Cir. 1973) (finding
housing authority obligation under § 3608 to take affirmative steps to promote racial integration
in public housing); Shannon v. HUD, 436 F.2d 809, 820 (3d Cir. 1970) (finding color-blindness in
national housing policy is impermissible); United States v. Charlottesville Redev. & Hous. Auth.,
718 F. Supp. 461, 468 (W.D. Va. 1989) (imposing upon local housing authority a duty to pursue
the goal of integration); see also Linda M. Vodar, Note, The Use of Racial Housing Quotas To
Achieve Integrated Communities: The Oak Park Approach, 6 LOYOLA U. CHI. L.J. 164, 177
(1975) (arguing that the Fair Housing Act's mandate to avoid discrimination "does not mean that
agencies should ignore the effects of racial factors"). Brown v. Board of Education also supports
the public duty to integrate housing. 347 U.S. 483 (1954); see GEORGE R. METCALF, FAIR Hous-
ING COMES OF AGE 187-94 (1988) (detailing how public housing integration efforts directly affect
school integration efforts, and concluding that, because Brown held officially segregated schools to
be unconstitutional, requiring governments to promote integrated housing will further advance the
Supreme Court's constitutional mandate).
This public duty to integrate is not absolute. Cf. Board of Educ. v. Powell, I10 S. Ct. 2722,
2738 (1991) (stating that government has no further duty to maintain school integration once
good faith desegregation efforts have been accomplished).
68. United States v. Charlottesville Redev. & Hous. Auth., 718 F. Supp. 461, 464-65 (W.D.
Va. 1989); Otero v. New York City Hous. Auth., 484 F.2d 1122, 1133-34 (2d Cir. 1974); see also
Exec. Order 12,259, supra note 60, at § 1-103 (interpreting §3608(e)(5) as covering all applicants
and participants in all federal housing programs); cf. Trafficante, 409 U.S. at 212 (granting the
language of the Act a broad construction to effect its policies). But see Acevedo v. Nassau
County, 500 F.2d 1078, 1082 (2d Cir. 1974) (applying § 3608 only to HUD).
69. See 24 C.F.R §§ 200.610 to 200.640 (1991) (requiring participants in subsidized housing
programs to affirmatively administer them to ensure individuals with similar income levels have a
like range of housing choices available to them); 24 C.F.R. §§ 880.601 to 881.601 (1991) (requir-
ing federally assisted housing developers to undertake marketing activities to ensure housing op-
portunities are available to families who are least likely to apply).
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Housing Act derives largely from Title VII employment law prece-
dent.7" The Supreme Court has held that under Title VII, employers
are not required to implement efforts to achieve racial balance in
the work force. 71 In the context of the Fair Housing Act, the Sev-
enth Circuit recently stated in Village of Bellwood v. Dwivedi72 that
Congress did not intend to charge private realtors with the burdens
of benign intentions that had racial effects beyond their control. 73
However, the United States Civil Rights Commission has stated
that to promote integration successfully, a duty to promote integra-
tion must also be imposed upon private entities as well.74 The Com-
mission noted that the duty to integrate must apply to everyone, or
there will be only scattered success. 75 Assuming that private entities
may not be required to take affirmative steps to integrate housing,
the next issue is determining what voluntary action a private entity
may take to promote the integration goal of the Fair Housing Act.
2. Promoting the Integration Goal by Eliminating Discrimination
There is considerable debate over what methods may be used to
promote the Act's goal of integration. The stated purpose of Title
VIII is "to provide, within Constitutional limitations, for fair hous-
70. See infra notes 142-233 and accompanying text (discussing in detail the standard of review
applied in cases arising under Title VIII).
71. See Sheet Metal Workers v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 457-62 (1986) (discussing legislative
history leading to enactment of § 7030) of Title VII, which expressly disclaimed any duty by
labor organizations or labor-management committees to maintain racial balance in the work-
place); see also Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 515 (1988) (stating that the
Court has "on numerous occasions recognized that Congress intended voluntary compliance to be
the preferred means of achieving the objectives of Title VII").
72. 895 F.2d 1521 (7th Cir. 1990).
73. Id. at 1529; see also Unites States v. Parma, 661 F.2d 562, 571 (6th Cir. 1981) (holding
that "private attitudes and opinions are not subject to official control"); Brown v. Artery Org., 654
F. Supp. 1106 (D.D.C. 1987) (finding that imposing a duty to integrate on private landlords and
developers would make them responsible for consequences out of their control, such as the racial
mix in the community, and would likely halt efforts to upgrade housing stock); cf Brown v. Board
of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1964) (holding unconstitutional only official, de jure segregation).
74. EQUAL OPPORTUNITY IN SUBURBIA: REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL
RIGHTS 52 (July 1974) [hereinafter CIVIL RIGHTS COMMISSION]. The Commission stated that
firms that were part of the housing market must take affirmative action to seek out minority
clientele, and builders must develop plans for minority home seekers, including numerical goals.
Id. at 70. The Commission noted that a remedy must both end discrimination and broaden hous-
ing opportunities of low- and moderate-income families; success on only one front will perpetuate
segregation. Id. at 63.
75. Id.; see also James A. Kushner, The Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988: The Second
Generation of Fair Housing, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1049, 1114 (1989) (discussing the need to provide
incentives to real estate professionals in order to facilitate free choice and integration in housing).
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ing throughout the United States.""6 However, neither the statute,
nor any Supreme Court opinion, specifically defines what "fair hous-
ing" means." There are several competing views; 1) that Title VIII
was designed only to eliminate discrimination;78 2) that Title VIII
was designed to eliminate discrimination and promote integration;79
or 3) that Title VIII was designed to eliminate discrimination in
housing and thereby promote integrated housing. 80 The Supreme
Court has championed the importance of racially integrated hous-
ing,81 but it has not held that promoting integrated housing will
meet the congressional mandate to provide fair housing.82 It is also
difficult to divine congressional intent from the legislative history be-
hind the 1968 Act; the history is largely confined to floor debate in
the Senate.83 Federal courts interpreting the statements made dur-
76. 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (1988) (declaration of policy).
77. Alexander Polikoff, Sustainable Integration or Inevitable Resegregation; the Troubling
Questions, in HOUSING DESEGREGATION AND FEDERAL POLICY 43, 47 (John M. Goering ed.,
1986).
78. Id. at 48. Under this definition, "fair housing" means "open" housing, "free from discrimi-
nation and accessible to all in free market competition, regardless of the racial pattern that re-
sults." Id.
79. Id. Under this definition, "fair housing" is integrated housing, eliminating discrimination
would be insufficient to carry out the stated policy of the Fair Housing Act. Id. Alexander Polikoff
argues that HUD, through its published fair housing guidelines and agreements with private orga-
nizations, has interpreted Title ViII to embody an integrative purpose independent of its purpose
of ending discrimination in housing. Id. at 49.
80. Id. at 48. This definition assumes that integration will result from the elimination of dis-
crimination, and does not intend to specifically authorize race-conscious programs to achieve inte-
gration. Id.
81. E.g., Linmark Assocs. v. Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 94-95 (1977) (holding in First Amend-
ment commercial speech case that promoting stable, racially integrated housing is a vital govern-
mental goal); see also Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1972); Gladstone,
Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91 (1979).
82. See supra note 77 and accompanying text (noting how the Supreme Court has not yet
defined parameters of fair housing).
83. See supra notes 32-34 (ndting how Title ViII was hurriedly passed during a period of
national crisis); Aleinikoff, supra note 65, at 821 (noting that since Title ViI was introduced on
the floor of the Senate as an amendment to another bill, its legislative history must be based on
hearings and debate). Statements of the floor sponsors of the Act give conflicting indications of its
purpose. Senator Mondale, who introduced the bill on the Senate floor, stated that Title ViII was
designed "to replace the ghettos by truly integrated living patterns," and that "America's goal
must be that of an integrated society, a stable society." 114 CONG. REC. 3422 (1968). But Senator
Mondale also stated that "the basic purpose of this legislation is to permit people who have the
ability to do so to buy any house offered to the public if they can afford to buy it," and that "we
readily admit that fair housing by itself will not move a single negro into the suburbs-the law of
economics will do that." 114 CONG. REC. 3421-22 (1968) (emphasis added).
Senator Brooke, a co-sponsor of the bill, echoed this equal opportunity sentiment, stating that
although America's future "must lie in the successful integration of all our many minorities . ..
that future does not require imposed residential . . . integration; it does require the elimination of
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ing the floor debate have held that Congress perceived that enforce-
ment of the 1968 Act's antidiscrimination provisions would be suffi-
cient to promote the goal of integration.84
There are several common antidiscrimination techniques used by
persons and entities to combat discrimination and eliminate housing
segregation. One popular and effective method of determining if
housing discrimination exists is through the use of "testers." 8 5 Test-
ing involves a team, usually made up of one black and one white,
who are given comparable socioeconomic profiles.8" They separately
seek like housing from one realtor or seller in order to investigate
and prove allegations that the realtor is treating persons differently
on the basis of race.8  Testers are often used to expose the realtor
practice known as "steering," whereby real estate agents encourage
segregated housing patterns by directing home seekers to designated
areas where their race is predominant and, conversely, withholding 88
compulsory segregation in housing." 114 CONG. REC, 2524-25 (1968). For an excellent discussion
of the legislative history behind Title ViII, see Dubofsky, supra note 65, at 149-66.
84. United States v. Starrett City Assocs., 840 F.2d 1096, 1102 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 488
U.S. 946 (1988); see Burney v. Housing Auth., 551 F. Supp. 746, 765 (W.D. Pa. 1982) (stating
that Congress perceived the policies of antidiscrimination and antisegregation to be complemen-
tary); see also Rodney A. Smolla, In Pursuit of Racial Utopias: Fair Housing, Quotas and Goals
in the 1980's, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 947, 1006 (1985) (interpreting the HUD affirmative marketing
regulations to be process rather than end result oriented).
This congressional perception parallelled congressional attitudes toward Title ViI. See Sheet-
metal Workers v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 464 (1986) (finding congressional failure to discuss reme-
dies when considering Title VII resulted from prevailing attitude that prohibitive language would
be sufficient to eradicate the effects of discrimination).
The 1988 amendments to the Fair Housing Act have not resolved the issue of congressional
intent. Congress remained silent on this issue, although programs to promote integration had cre-
ated controversy in the federal courts for twenty years. The House did defeat an amendment to
the 1988 Act that would have prohibited all Title ViII integration maintenance programs. 134
CONG. REC. H4902-08 (daily ed. June 29, 1988). The defeat is sometimes cited as an inference of
Congressional approval of affirmative action efforts. Kushner, supra note 75, at 1051. But see
John M. Payne, Fair Housing for the 1990s: The Fair Housing Amendments Act and the Ward's
Cove Case, 18 REAL EST. LJ. 307, 336 (1990) (stating that defeat of affirmative action prohibi-
tion may not accurately reflect congressional sentiment-managers of the 1988 Act who vocifer-
ously fought any attempt to upset the carefully balanced compromise between civil rights and real
estate lobbies).
85. Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363 (1982) (holding that testers have standing
to sue under the Fair Housing Act); see James A. Kushner, An Unfinished Agenda, The Federal
Fair Housing Enforcement Effort, 6 YALE L & POL'Y REV. 348, 352 (1988) (stating that a HUD
study demonstrates that only testing can identify a pervasive scheme of discrimination, since vic-
tims seldom know when they have received disparate treatment; and that without testing, Title
ViII is relegated to a symbolic role in the quest for fair housing).
86. Havens Realty, 455 U.S. at 371.
87. Id.
88. Village of Bellwood v. Dwivedi, 895 F.2d 1521, 1529 (7h Cir. 1990) (stating that misrep-
resenting to customers that properties are not available in certain areas constitutes illegal steering
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or slanting8" information about properties in areas where the home
seeker is a racial minority in order to channel them away from that
area. 0 Steering violates the Fair Housing Act prohibition against
conduct that "otherwise make[s] unavailable or den[ies]" housing
on the basis of race.9 1
Another mechanism employed by municipalities to combat dis-
criminatory housing practices is the promulgation of antisolicitation
ordinances and for-sale sign restrictions.92 Antisolicitation ordi-
nances limit the ability of realtors to contact uninterested or unwill-
ing-homeowners. 3 Their purpose is *to prevent realtor blockbusting
tactics, which induce panic sales by white homeowners in areas of
racial transition, and lead to rapid, all-black resegregation of the
area." Similarly, restrictions on the size and placement of for-sale
signs are designed to eliminate the proliferation of these signs,




In addition to enforcing the antidiscrimination provisions of the
Act, public and private entities have also developed antidiscrimina-
tion programs in order to foster the goal of integration.9" Many of
the antidiscrimination programs are primarily aimed at educating
real estate professionals on avoiding liability under the Act. 7 The
under § 3604(a)).
89. Heights Community Cong. v. Hilltop Realty, Inc., 774 F.2d 135, 139-41 (6th Cir. 1985)
(holding that realtor statements about specific properties or neighborhoods that tend to unduly
influence customer choice on the basis of race, and are made with intent to steer, make housing
otherwise unavailable in violation of § 3604(a)), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1019 (1986).
90. Havens Realty, 455 U.S. at 366 n.1.
91. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (1988); Dwivedi, 895 F.2d at 1529.
92. E.g., Curtis v. Thompson, 840 F.2d 1291, 1297-1300 (7th Cir. 1988) (ordinance prohibited
any solicitation of homeowners who had signed a notice indicating they were not interested in
selling their homes); see South-Suburban Hous. Ctr. v. Greater S. Suburban Bd. of Realtors, 935
F.2d 868, 887-99 (7th Cir. 1991) (examining the legality of various municipal solicitation and for-
sale sign restrictions in the south suburbs of Chicago), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 971 (1992).
93. Curtis, 840 F.2d at 1298.
94. See supra note 18 (discussing blockbusting tactics in detail).
95. South-Suburban Hous. Ctr. v. Greater S. Suburban Bd. of Realtors, 713 F. Supp. 1068,
1094 (N.D. Ill. 1988), afid in part and rev'd in part, 935 F.2d 868 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied,
112 S. Ct. 971 (1992).
96. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T Hous. & URBAN DEV., FAIR HOUSING AND THE REAL ESTATE INDUS-
TRY, PARTS I AND I1: TRAINER'S GUIDE AND TRAINING WORKBOOK AND MATERIALS (Nov. 1986)
[hereinafter TRAINING HANDBOOK]; U.S. DEP'T Hous. & URBAN DEV. & NAT'L ASS'N OF REAL-
TORS, VOLUNTARY AFFIRMATIVE MARKETING AGREEMENT (1977, as amended 1982 & 1987)
(hereinafter HUD-NAR VAMA]; NATIONAL ASS'N OF REALTORS, FAIR HOUSING COMPLIANCE:
A QUICK REFERENCE GUIDE FOR REAL ESTATE BROKERS AND AGENTS (1989) [hereinafter FAIR
HOUSING COMPLIANCE MANUAL].
97. See TRAINING HANDBOOK, supra note 96. The Training Handbook deals extensively with
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programs and local ordinances also attempt to facilitate black entry
into underrepresented neighborhoods, but primarily by promoting
the neighborhood or community as race neutral and committed to
equal opportunity in housing."' The programs largely ignore efforts
to maintain integration. 9
Enforcement of the Fair Housing Act and implementation of an-
tidiscrimination efforts have not ended housing segregation in
America. First, housing enforcement efforts are not uniform; there
is greater compliance in areas where there is stricter enforcement of
the Act.1"' Second, real estate brokers are economically motivated,
and often discriminate because they fear that selling a house in a
white neighborhood to a black person will cost them future busi-
proper conduct during the showing or listing of real estate, and emphasizes how to answer and
direct inquiries so as to avoid violating the Act. It also cites numerous examples of violative
conduct.
98. See FAIR HOUSING COMPLIANCE MANUAL, supra note 96. The manual focuses exclusively
on avoiding conduct that discriminates against minorities); see also HUD-NAR VAMA, supra
note 96. The HUD-NAR VAMA also focuses more on fostering desegregation than maintaining
integration; its regulations primarily emphasize equal opportunity and free housing choice. The
HUD-NAR VAMA does provide for "affirmative marketing" in order to attract minorities to
underrepresented areas. However, the language in the HUD-NAR VAMA is distinctly neutral,
defining the object of "affirmative marketing" to be providing free choice, and ensuring that all
people of similar financial resources feel welcome to apply and are assured of equal opportunity.
HUD-NAR VAMA, §§ 3(b)-3(c) at 2.
The HUD-NAR VAMA advertising requirements require realtors to advertise in a way
designed to make housing availability known to all persons with similar interests and financial
resources, but do not require any specific advertising techniques, such as advertising in minority
media. Id. § IV(A)(5), at 3. It should be noted that the VAMA does not prohibit targeted adver-
tising either. The Civil Rights Commission explicitly supports this type of advertising, stating that
affirmative action requires seeking out minority clientele by advertising in minority media. See
CIVIL RIGHTS COMMISSION. supra note 74, at 62; see also Polikoff, supra note 77, at 49 (arguing
that HUD-NAR VAMA sanction's the use of pro-integration activities by private real estate
brokers).
However, the VAMA definition of affirmative marketing is much different than that used by
organizations attempting to maintain integration. See infra notes 308-10 and accompanying text
(defining affirmative marketing as targeting specific racial groups for special outreach efforts in
order to foster continuing housing integration).
99. See supra note 98 (early efforts aimed mainly at achieving integration). Park Forest, Illi-
nois, passed into law a package of "integration maintenance" ordinances in 1973, establishing an
avowed commitment to equal opportunity in housing. However, a proposed "exempt location"
provision that would have permitted "steering" in order to maintain racial balance was dropped
from consideration. See BERRY, supra note 1, at 373-74 (discussing in detail the provisions of the
Park Forest ordinance, and asserting that Park Forest officials assumed that integration could
occur naturally in a housing market free from racial bias).
100. Robert G. Schwemm, Responses to Housing Discrimination and Residential Resegrega-
tion, in THE FAIR HOUSING ACT AFTER TWENTY YEARS: A CONFERENCE AT YALE LAW SCHOOL.
MARCH, 1988, at 63, 65 (Robert G. Schwemm ed., 1989) [hereinafter YALE CONFERENCE] (as-
serting that housing suppliers behave differently if they are operating in an area with an active
Fair Housing Organization that engages in extensive compliance monitoring).
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ness. 1°1 Third, apart from any overt discrimination, economic differ-
ences between blacks and whites also limit the housing opportunities
available to black home buyers. 102 Finally, the success of community
integration depends largely on the willingness of different racial
groups to live together.'
0 3
The use of antidiscrimination programs by themselves has also
failed to achieve lasting integration. 04 Successful integration is A
two-step process that requires 1) eliminating segregation by facili-
tating black entry into all white areas, and 2) maintaining a stable
racial balance to prevent resegregation. 10 Enforcing the Title VIII
prohibitions and implementing pure antidiscrimination programs
only facilitates the first step.10 6 The goal of maintaining stable hous-
101. CIVIL RIGHTS COMMISSION, supra note 74, at 16, 20 (stating that there is economic pres-
sure within the real estate industry to "toe the line" because perpetuating the dual housing market
increases realtor profits); see also Richard C. Firstman, Trying Iard To Keep that Racial Mix;
Shaker Heights, Oak Park: Tale of Two Midwest Suburbs, NEWSDAY, Dec. 9, 1990, at 7 (assert-
ing that for-profit mentality of brokers is inconsistent with programs designed to maintain
integration).
102. Karl A. Tauber, Causes of Residential Segregation in YALE CONFERENCE, supra note
100, at 37. Tauber delineates three perspectives on why segregation continues regardless of anti-
discrimination efforts:.
(1) Economic differences: most blacks cannot afford suburban housing. Many work in the cen-
tral city, often in government jobs, and prefer to live close to work. Id. Black neighborhoods allow
easy access to "black" consumer, social, and cultural needs. People looking for different housing
use friends and co-workers as sources, and search along usual transportation routes. Thus, they
usually find housing near where they already live. Id.
(2) Personal preference: Blacks prefer a neighborhood that is over 50% black; whites prefer the
opposite. If whites perceive increasing black migration into a neighborhood, they will leave. Blacks
who perceive a neighborhood is white dominated will stay away. Thus, free choice promotes and
reinforces segregation. Id.
(3) Institutional racism: Past discrimination inhibits black capital investment in home equity.
Lack of ability to purchase homes in many neighborhoods reflects the lack of inherited wealth
resulting from past discrimination. Id. at 37-38.
103. See Williamsburg Fair Hous. Comm. v. New York City Hous. Auth., 450 F. Supp. 602,
606 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (noting that occupancy quotas that force different racial groups to live to-
gether achieve only temporary integration); see also Isabel Wilkerson, Balancing Act; A Special
Report; One City's 30-Year Crusade for Integration, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30, 1991, at Al (integra-
tion is historicall, a harder sell to whites than to blacks).
104. Bruce S. Gelber, Race-Conscious Approaches to Ending Segregation in Housing: Some
Pitfalls on the Road to Integration, 37 RUTGERS L. REV. 921, 928-29 (1985).
105. Note, Benign Steering and Benign Quotas: The Validity of Race-Conscious Government
Policies To Promote Residential Integration, 93 HARV, L. REV. 938, 944-45 (1980). The author
also comments that it is much easier to promote initial desegregation by facilitating black entry
than to maintain integration by persuading whites to move into mixed neighborhoods. Id. at 957.
Winning the second prong requires taking into account white prejudice when formulating govern-
ment policy. Id.
106. Id.; see infra notes 114-18 and accompanying text (discussing the phenomena of neighbor-
hood "tipping" and how it can rapidly destroy the integrated character of a neighborhood).
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ing integration has led many public entities and private groups to
abandon a color-blind approach towards housing integration.10 7
These groups consciously take race into account when formulating
housing programs, and utilize affirmative action measures to further
the integration goal.1"8
3. Promoting the Integration Goal Through Race-Conscious Af-
firmative Action Programs
Affirmative action housing programs operate on the premise that
integration will not occur naturally, even when the substantive
prohibitions of the Fair Housing Act are strictly enforced.109 Race-
conscious programs were created in an attempt to remedy the dan-
ger of resegregation in areas experiencing racial transition." 0 The
programs vary widely in technique and scope, " ' but all share two
common elements. First, the programs are designed to promote the
Act's ultimate goal of achieving stable, racially integrated hous-
ing. 1 2 Second, the means to this end involves purposefully consider-
ing race when providing housing or housing services."'
Most race-conscious programs are implemented in response to the
threat of racial "tipping.""' Tipping characterizes a phenomenon in
which an increasing ratio of blacks to whites in a neighborhood trig-
gers white flight from the neighborhood, resulting in resegrega-
107. See infra notes 245-353 and accompanying text (discussing in detail various race-con-
scious fair housing programs and their legality under Title ViII).
108. See Note, supra note 105, at 957.
109. See Firstman, supra note 101, at 7 (reporting that professionals in the housing industry
believe that affirmative action measures are needed to maintain integration because segregation
always results when the normal housing market takes its course).
110. See cases cited infra note 114 (regarding instances where race-conscious techniques were
instituted in response to the threat of neighborhood tipping).
111. SCHWEMM, supra note 15, § I 1.2(2)(a), at 11-5 to 11-8.
112. Id. at 11-7.
113. Id.
114. United States v. Starrett City Assocs., 840 F.2d 1096, 1101 (2d Cir); cert. denied, 488
U.S. 956 (1988); Otero v. New York City Hous. Auth., 484 F.2d 1172 (2d Cir. 1973); United
States v. Charlottesville Redev. & Hous. Auth., 718 F. Supp. 461 (W.D. Va. 1989); Steptoe v.
Beverly Area Planning Ass'n, 674 F. Supp. 1313 (N.D. Ill. 1987); Burney v. Hous. Auth., 551 F.
Supp. 746 (W.D. Pa. 1982); Alschuler v. HUD, 515 F. Supp. 1212 (N.D. Ill. 1981), aff'd, 686
F.2d 472 (7th Cir. 1982); Schmidt v. Boston Hous. Auth., 505 F. Supp. 988 (D. Mass. 1981);
Williamsburg Fair Hous. Comm. v. New York City Hous. Auth., 450 F. Supp. 602 (S.D.N.Y.
1978). But see Shannon v. HUD, 436 F.2d 809 (3d Cir. 1970) (ordering race-conscious tenant
assignment plan as remedy for past discrimination by agency); Gautreaux v. Chicago Hous.
Auth., 296 F. Supp. 907 (N.D. i1l. 1969) (ordering public housing projects to be placed in all-
white neighborhoods as remedy for past exclusionary zoning tactics by the City of Chicago).
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tion. 115 The concept of tipping captures the essence of resegregation;
black entry creates white fear, leading to further white exit and de-
cline in white entry, which further increases white fear, encouraging
still more whites to leave and fewer whites to enter. 16 Ultimately,
an all-black neighborhood is created." 7 Some race-conscious pro-
grams have proved very effective in preserving a stable racial mix."18
However, their legality under the Fair Housing Act has been the
subject.of much debate."'
There was little discussion of integration maintenance programs
when Congress passed the original Fair Housing Act in 1968.120
Nor did Congress address the legality of these programs when pass-
ing the 1988 amendments,' 2' although judges and scholars had de-
bated their legality and appropriateness for years.' 2 The issue of
legality arises because race-conscious integration programs create
tension between the Act's dual goals of ending housing discrimina-
115. See Edward J. Hansen & Jonathan Harwood, United States v. Starrett City Associates
and United States v. Yonkers Board of Education: Can More Be Done To Remedy Housing Dis-
crimination?, 4 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 1, 10-13 (1988).
116. See Note, supra note 105, at 943.
117. Id.
118. See infra notes 616-17 and accompanying text (discussing the impact of race-conscious
tactics on the racial makeup of a community over a period of time).
119. See infra notes 245-353 and accompanying text (discussing the legality of race-conscious
housing programs).
120. Two witnesses, both real estate professionals, briefly mentioned integration maintenance
quotas during Senate subcommittee hearings on the 1967 Fair Housing Act. Fair Housing Act of
1967: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Housing and Urban Affairs of the Comm. on Banking
and Currency on S. 1358, S. 2114 and S. 2280, 90th Cong., 1st Sess 398-99, 422-23 (1967); see
e.g., id. at 398-99 (statement of Fred Kramer) (stating that integration might be threatened by
adhering only to antidiscriminatory principles).
121. Pub. L. No. 100-430, 102 Stat. 1619 (amendments completely silent on issue of race-
conscious integration programs). But see 134 CONG. REC. 4902-08 (1988) (noting that during
debate on 1988 amendments, the House of Representatives specifically rejected an amendment
that would prohibit affirmative action).
122. See e.g Otero v. New York City Hous. Auth., 484 F.2d 1122 (2d Cir. 1973) (public
housing access quotas implemented to achieve integration permitted if temporary in duration);
Steptoe v. Beverly Area Planning Ass'n, 674 F. Supp. 1313 (N.D. Ill. 1987) (upholding housing
counseling by private non-profit group that involved giving housing information only to those wish-
ing to make integrative moves); Burney v. Housing Auth., 551 F. Supp. 746 (W.D. Pa. 1982)
(invalidating public housing authority plan that gave priority to applicants to the extent their race
helped maintain a two-to-one white/black ratio); John M. Goering, Neighborhood Tipping and
Racial Transition: A Review of Social Science Evidence, 44 J. AM. INST. PLANNERS 68 (1978)
(asserting that using occupancy quotas is the only way to successfully combat tipping); Rodney A.
Smolla, Integration Maintenance: The Unconstitutionality of Benign Programs that Discourage
Black Entry To Prevent White Flight, 1981 DUKE LJ. 891, 893 (arguing that race-conscious
plans impermissibly discriminate against minorities); Note, supra note 105 (asserting that race-
conscious plans, including quotas, ultimately benefit minorities because integrated living has a
long-term effect of increasing understanding between the races).
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tion and promoting integrated housing. 123
The tension created is racial, political, and legal. 24 Some judges,
scholars, and minority groups argue that race-conscious housing
programs stigmatize minorities by reinforcing stereotypes, which
leads to further discrimination. 12 5 These race-conscious programs
have created a rift between traditional advocates of racial integra-
tion because of their potential limits on black access to housing.
Some advocates argue that their use reinforces and implies accept-
ance of alleged white prejudice inherent in the programs. 2 Political
tension is created because the programs are usually introduced by
white-dominated city governments; minorities have little or no voice
in the process. 27 Opponents of the programs assert that integration
maintenance prevents black concentrations in suburbs, and that suc-
cessful large scale integration maintenance would be diffused
equally across a metropolitan area. 12 8 This, opponents argue, would
dilute black political power and dilute the strength of black eco-
nomic, religious, and cultural institutions that facilitate a cohesive
group identity.' 29 Indeed, history has shown that in cities with suc-
123. E.g., United States v. Starrett City Assocs., 840 F.2d 1096, 1102 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
488 U.S. 946 (1988); United States v. Charlottesville Redev. & Hous. Auth., 718 F. Supp. 461,
468 (W.D. Va. 1989).
124. See infra notes 125-35 and accompanying text (discussing reasons for the tension between
the goals of the Act).
125. See Burney, 551 F. Supp. at 758-59 (noting that government housing quota plans stigma-
tize blacks through negative implications accompanying government policies that restrict black
access to housing; the white majority perceives quotas as official statements of black undesirabil-
ity); see also City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (warning that
employment classifications based on race carry danger of stigmatic harm to minorities). But cf.
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 289 (1978) (plurality) (maintaining that
implications of inferiority are not always present when race used to promote pluralism in
education).
126. Note, supra note 105, at 939; see also YALE CONFERENCE, supra note 100, at 119 (state-
ment of Peter L. Flemister) (arguing that integration maintenance is pure discrimination against
minorities, designed to maintain continued white domination and supremacy in society). For fur-
ther discussion of whether race conscious programs connotate racial inferiority of blacks, see Rob-
ert C. Farrell, Integrating by Discriminating: Affirmative Action that Disadvantages Minorities,
62 U. DET. L. REV. 553, 593 (1985).
127. Starrett City, 840 F.2d at 1102 (asserting that integration maintenance programs single
out those least represented in the political process to bear the brunt of a benign program); see also
Smolla, supra note 122, at 916. Smolla argues that whites impose integration maintenance plans
to prevent resegregation, and that no governing body of a predominantly white community has
adopted a program to ensure blacks are a majority. Id. This is not successful integration to whites.
Id.
128. Smolla, supra note 122, at 919.
129. Id. Integration maintenance programs are also attacked as irresponsible attempts at gov-
ernment-sponsored social engineering. President Reagan's Assistant Attorney General William C.
Bradford stated that "race-conscious" remedies are unacceptable. "I don't think any government
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cessful integration maintenance programs in place, whites dominate
the community power structures. 130
Finally, despite the benign motivations of promoters, some race-
conscious plans create legal tension because they discriminate
against the very groups the Fair Housing Act was designed to
help.1 31 In particular, some race-conscious plans deny housing or
make it otherwise unavailable to minorities in violation of the Fair
Housing Act. 32 Courts accuse benign quotas of violating section
3604(a) of the Act by denying housing or making it otherwise un-
available on the basis of race.133 Courts are more receptive to the
use of pro-integration incentive programs and affirmative marketing
programs; however, many realtors and some minority groups assert
that these race-conscious efforts also violate section 3604(a) by
making housing otherwise unavailable on the basis of race."" In
particular, detractors of the latter programs argue that they consti-
ought to be about the business to reorder society, or neighborhoods, to achieve some degree of
proportionality in the racial composition of housing." WASH. POST, July 11, 1984, at A4. But cf
Fair Housing Hearings, supra note 15, at 22 (statement of Alexander Polikoff) (quoting William
Bradford Reynolds, Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Civil Rights Division of the
Unites States Department of Justice) ("We have no opposition to affirmative marketing efforts in
order to reach out and encourage more minorities to move into communities where they aren't, to
encourage whites to move into minority communities."); Otero v. New York Hous. Auth., 484
F.2d 1122, 1134 (2d Cir. 1973) (allowing housing officials to make decisions based solely on
whether they immediately benefit minority groups would render them "willing, and perhaps un-
witting, partners in the trend toward ghettoization of our urban centers").
130. See Firstman, supra note 101, at 9 (noting also that in Oak Park, one of the county's most
successfully integrated suburbs, there is only one black on the village board).
131. Starrett City, 840 F.2d at 1099 (blacks forced to wait up to eleven times longer than
whites for a public housing slot); Williamsburg Fair Hous. Comm. v. New York City Hous.
Auth., 493 F. Supp. 1125, 1136 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), affd, 647 F.2d 163 (2d Cir. 1981) (housing
plan that prioritized applicants based on how they would affect racial makeup of complex had
disparate impact on blacks).
132. See infra notes 245-82 and accompanying text (discussing the effect occupancy quotas
have on black access to housing).
133. Starrett City, 840 F.2d at 1101 (holding that requiring blacks to wait substantially
longer-eleven months longer on the average-than whites for open public housing slots in order
to maintain integration was equivalent to denying housing to blacks). United States v. Charlottes-
ville Redev. & Hous. Auth., 718 F. Supp. 461, 469 (W.D. Va. 1989) (finding that occupancy
quota in housing complex makes housing less available to blacks).
134. Compare Steptoe v. Beverly Area Planning Ass'n, 674 F. Supp. 1313 (N.D. I11. 1987)
(upholding an affirmative marketing program) and Schmidt v. Boston Hous. Auth., 505 F. Supp.
988 (D. Mass. 1981) (upholding a pro-integration incentive program) with Fair Housing Hear-
ings, supra note 15, at 133-61 (statement of Robert Butters, Chairman, National Association of
Realtors) (asserting that both types of programs render color-blind marketing impossible, and
impose a de facto optimum racial mix on a community) and YALE CONFERENCE, supra note 100,
at 118 (statement of Peter L. Flemister) (asserting that race-conscious techniques present a para-
dox of preserving integration by discriminating against African-Americans).
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tute illegal "steering," which the Supreme Court defined as di-
recting prospective home buyers or renters interested in equivalent
properties to different areas according to their race. 135
The tensions created by race-conscious housing programs indicate
proponents must justify their use. Determining whether the threat of
resegregation makes a race-conscious program necessary or appro-
priate under Title VIII requires analysis of several issues underlying
the phenomenon. 36 One issue is whether factors other than white
prejudice contribute to racial tipping. 3 7 A second problem is fixing
the precise point at which a neighborhood will tip;13 8 and also what
criteria to use in determining that tipping point.3 9 A final issue is
135. Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 94 (1979). The Illinois code
defines illegal steering as
influencing or attempting to influence a person by any words or acts in connection
with viewing, buying or leasing of real estate, so as to promote, or tend to promote,
the continuance of maintenance of segregated housing, or so as to retard, obstruct or
discourage integrated housing on or in any street, block or neighborhood of the
municipality.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3, paras. 5701-5743 (1991),
136. See John Yinger, On the Possibility of Achieving Racial Integration Through Subsidized
Housing, in HOUSING DESEGREGATION AND FEDERAL POLICY, supra note 77, at 290, 294-97.
Yinger discusses the tipping phenomena at length and argues that analysis of racial transition
should not focus exclusively on tipping. He asserts that one must analyze how racial transition is
distributed throughout the entire metropolitan area, not just its effect on one neighborhood, and
notes the possibility that discrimination focuses racial transition into certain neighborhoods and
thereby magnifies the pressures that lead to complete resegregation. Id.
137. See Note, supra note 105, at 942 (stating that the high mobility of Americans-one-sixth
move every year-means that the tipping point can be reached without white residents leaving the
community at abnormally high rates); see also Lind, supra note 5, at 643 (arguing that white
prejudice leading to white flight is exacerbated by white homeowners' behavior). Professor Lind
further asserts that whites defer routine home maintenance as they lose confidence in the neigh-
borhood's future, in anticipation of investment in a new home. The playing out of this process in
integrated neighborhoods leads people to associate these neighborhoods with reduced value and
blight. Id.
138. United States v. Starrett City Assocs., 840 F.2d 1096, 1099 (2d Cir.) (noting that the
general consensus places the tipping point at 10-20% minorities in a formerly all-white neighbor-
hood), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 946 (1988); William E. Hellerstein, The Benign Quota, Equal Pro-
tection, and "The Rule in Shelley's Case," 17 RUTGERS L. REV. 531, 534 (1963) (stating that the
tipping point will vary based on the level of community prejudice, but holding that a 60/40 white
to black ratio is the general range); Bernard Navasky, The Benevolent Housing Quota, 6 How.
L.J. 30, 31 (1960) (estimating tipping point at 20-60%); Note, supra note 105, at 942 (noting the
estimated tipping point is at 25% to 30% minority). Contra Fair Housing Hearings, supra note
15, at 183 (statement of Alexander Polikoff, Chairman, Business and Professional People for the
Public Interest) (arguing that there is no set tipping point, and that the racial composition of
home-seeker traffic is an important factor in measuring the danger of neighborhood tipping).
139. King v. Harris, 464 F. Supp. 827 (E.D.N.Y. 1979), delineated three criteria for determin-
ing if the tipping point has been reached: (1) the gross number of minority group families in a
measurable economic or social group who are likely to adversely affect housing conditions; (2) the
quality of community services and facilities; and (3) the attitudes of majority group residents who
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deciding which programs will effectively combat tipping 140 without
violating the antidiscrimination provisions of Title VIII."' When
analyzing these issues, it is necessary first to determine what the
proper standard of review is for analyzing disputes under the Fair
Housing Act.
D. Standard of Review: The Title VIIITitle VIII Analogy
The Title VIII standard of review is primarily derived from Title
VII precedent.142 Lower courts rely on the Supreme Court's lan-
guage in Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.1' 3 when
making this analogy."' The Trafficante Court held that, under Title
VII, Congress intended to define standing under the statute very
broadly.' It then held that "with respect to suits under the 1968
Act, we reach the same conclusion."' 6 Most lower courts have re-
lied on this language as authority for applying Title VII precedents
when analyzing whether particular conduct violates Title VIII. 147
might be persuaded to leave the area as a result of their subjective reactions to the first two
criteria. Id. at 842.
.140. This is an area of considerabl disagreement. One commentator argues that only through
access quotas will our society be able to achieve lasting integration. Marc. A. Kushner, Note, The
Legality of Race-Conscious Access Quotas Under the Fair Housing Act of 1968, 9 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1053 (1988). The Civil Rights Commission has proposed creation of new communities as a
way of combatting racial polarization. CIVIL RIGHTS COMMISSION, supra note 74, at 56; see also
YALE CONFERENCE, supra note 100, at 40-42 (statement of Richard F. Muth). Muth's argument
is based on economics: Since whites are willing to pay more for proximity of members of the same
group than blacks, the only remedy is to increase the amount whites are willing to offer for
properties in integrated neighborhoods, such as through the use of mortgage assistance. See id.
141. See United States v. Charlottesville Redev. & Hous. Auth., 718 F. Supp. 461, 468 (W.D.
Va. 1989) ("[Tlhe mere existence of that duty [to integrate] does not mean that defendant is free
to take any steps it wishes in furtherance of that duty.").
142. SCHWEMM, supra note 15, § 10.1, at 10-1 to 10-4.
143. 409 U.S. 205 (1972).
144. E.g., Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926 (2d Cir.), af'd,
408 U.S. 15 (1988) (per curiam); Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126, 146-49 (3d Cir.
1977); Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1288-89
(7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1025 (1978).
145. Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 210 (1972). For a discussion of
tester standing under Title VII, see Steven G. Anderson, Comment, Tester Standing Under Title
VII: A Rose by Any Other Name, 41 DEPAUL L. REV. 1217 (1992).
146. Id.
147. Phillips v. Hunter Trails Community Ass'n, 685 F.2d 184, 190 (7th Cir. 1982); Robinson
v. 12 Lofts Realty, Inc., 610 F.2d 1032, 1038 (2d Cir. 1979); Williams v. Mathews Co., 499 F.2d
819, 826 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1021 (1974); United States v. Pelzer Realty Co., 484
F.2d 438, 443 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 936,(1974i.
There is still debate as to the propriety of strictly analogizing Title VII to Title VIII. Some
courts and commentators suggest Title VIII should have its own independent doctrine of analysis.
See Residents Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126, 148-49 (3d Cir. 1977) (" '[Tlhe consequences
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When determining whether a plaintiff has established a prima facie
case of housing discrimination, courts utilize the doctrine set forth
in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 48 another Supreme Court Title VII
case. The Griggs Court held that a plaintiff may prove a violation of
Title VII by showing either discriminatory intent or discriminatory
effect.149
1. Proving Discriminatory Intent
Discriminatory intent involves disparate treatment, which, under
Title VIII means "treating a person differently because of
race. . . . It implies consciousness of race, and purpose to use race
as a decision-making tool."' 150 The elements of proof needed to es-
tablish a prima facie intentional discrimination case under Title
VIII are derived principally from McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
of an error in admitting a tenant do not seem nearly as severe, as, for example, the consequences
of an error in hiring an unqualified airline pilot.' ") (quoting Elliot M. Mineberg, Comment, Ap-
plying the Title VII Prima Facie Case to Title VIII Litigation, II HARV. CR-C.L. L. REV. 128,
174 (1976)); see also Christopher P. McCormack, Comment, Business Necessity in Title VIII:
Importing an Employment Discrimination Doctrine into the Fair Housing Act, 54 FORDHAM L.
REV. 563, 565 (1986) (noting that fewer business considerations support the defense of business
necessity in housing than in employment).
In addition, under Title VII, public or private employers have indistinguishable interests and
duties, neither has a duty to maintain an integrated workforce. Title VIII creates separate, more
stringent standards for public entities, and the regulatory aspects of government with respect to
housing have no counterpart in Title VII. Id. at 567, 580-81; see 42 U.S.C. §§ 3608-3609 (1988)
(placing an affirmative duty on public entities to achieve integration in public housing).
148. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
149. Id. at 430-31 (finding that an required by an employer as a prerequisite to an employee's
promotion had an illegal disparate impact because it adversely affected a disproportionately large
number of blacks). The fact that the Senate rejected an amendment during the 1968 debates that
would have required proof of intent to discriminate under some circumstances further supports the
position of most courts that the Fair Housing Act has a discriminatory effect standard. 114 CONG.
REC. 5214-22 (1968). But see President's Remarks on Signing the Fair Housing Amendments Act
of 1988, 24 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc, 1141 (Sept. 13, 1988) (President Reagan insisting that
Title VIII speaks only to intentional discrimination, and rejecting the position that a Title VIll
violation can be established by showing conduct has a racially disparate impact or discriminatory
effect).
Note that housing discrimination claims brought under the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment require proof of discriminatory intent. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp. v.
Village of Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
Early cases cited Griggs as supporting the use of either discriminatory intent or discriminatory
effect analysis under Title VIii. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights,
558 F.2d 1283, 1290 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1025 (1978); United States v. City of
Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179, 1184-85 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1042 (1975).
150. Village of Bellwood v. Dwivedi, 895 F.2d 1521, 1529-30 (7th Cir. 1990) (also warning
that one should not equate differences in outcome with differences in treatment).
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Green,"' an employment discrimination case decided under Title
VII. 1 2 Under Title VIII, a prima facie case of disparate treatment
is established by showing: (1) the plaintiff is a member of a racial
minority or other protected class; (2) plaintiff applied for and was
qualified to rent or purchase the unit involved; (3) plaintiff was re-
jected by the defendant; and (4) the housing opportunity remained
available afterwards. 53 This test was recently applied in Asbury v.
Brougham,"4 where an apartment complex manager stated to a
black customer that no apartments were available.'55 The manager
also refused to provided the customer with price or room layout in-
formation.' 56 The Tenth Circuit found a prima facie case of dispa-
rate treatment because a white customer applying the next day was
told several apartments were available, and was also shown several
room layouts.'57 The four elements are not always rigidly adhered
to. Discriminatory intent analysis is also commonly applied to racial
steering and exclusionary zoning claims, where no outright refusal
to sell or rent is present. 58
A violation of the Fair Housing Act will be found even if race is
not the sole motivating factor in the denial of housing.' 59 To rebut a
151. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
152. Id. at 802. McDonnell Douglas established that a prima facie case of disparate treatment
in the employment context was made if: (1) plaintiff was a member of a protected class; (2)
plaintiff applied and was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (3)
despite these qualifications, the plaintiff was rejected; and (4) after the plaintiff's rejection, the
position remained open and the employer continued to seek applications from persons with the
plaintiff's qualifications. Id. at 802; see also Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335-36
n.15 (1977) (noting that disparate treatment is shown when employers treat some people less
favorably than others because of their race; proof of discriminatory motive is essential).
153. E.g., Phillips v. Hunter Trails Assocs., 685 F.2d 184, 190 (7th Cir. 1982).
154. 866 F.2d 1276 (10th Cir. 1989).
155. Id. at 1280.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 1280-81.
158. See Village of Bellwood v. Dwivedi, 895 F.2d 1521, 1529-30 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding
proof of discriminatory motive is critical); Heights Community Cong. v. Hilltop Realty, Inc., 774
F.2d 135, 140-43 (6th Cir. 1985) (implying disparate treatment will be found when a realtor has
knowledge that his conduct is likely to produce a racially discriminatory effect on the housing
market), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1019 (1986); United States v. City of Parma, 661 F.2d 562, 575
(6th Cir. 1981) (holding that refusal by city to complete application for federal funds for low-
income housing where pressing need for it was revealed shows discriminatory motive), cert. de-
nied, 456 U.S. 926 (1982); Resident's Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126, 142 (3d Cir. 1977)
(holding that discriminatory intent was shown where city joined opposition to townhome project,
knowing some of the opposition was racially motivated, and also took affirmative steps to termi-
nate projects knowing their discriminatory effect), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 908 (1979).
159. Robinson v. 12 Lofts Realty, Inc., 610 F.2d 1032, 1038 (2d Cir. 1979) (holding that the
fact that denial is also motivated by economic concerns is insufficient); Dwivedi, 895 F.2d at 1530
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prima facie case of disparate treatment, the defendant must articu-
late a legitimate, nondiscriminatory purpose for denying housing.' 60
The purpose must be specific and supportable, and not a mere pre-
text to discrimination.""' Asbury v. Brougham 62 also illustrates this
concept. There the apartment manager defended her claim of un-
availability on the basis that the building was classified as all-adult,
and the plaintiff had a child.' 3 The Tenth Circuit ruled this defense
was merely a pretext for discrimination, because exceptions to the
rule had been made in the past for white tenants." 4
2. Proving Discriminatory Effect
In addition to finding a violation of the Act where a housing sup-
plier intentionally discriminated on the basis of race, courts will also
find conduct violative of Title VIII if it has a discriminatory effect
on a particular racial group. Courts favor discriminatory effect anal-
ysis because it is easier to prove a prima facie case of discriminatory
effect than one of disparate treatment. 65 Courts assert that discrim-
inatory effect analysis is more effective in implementing the Act's
purpose of ending discrimination in housing. 6
(stating in dicta that a realtor's fear that he would be ostracized and lose business if he sold to a
black in a white neighborhood is an insufficient defense to racial steering).
160. Marble v. H. Walker & Assocs., 644 F.2d 390 (5th Cir. 1981) (unmarried, unable to meet
necessary financial obligations); Robinson, 610 F.2d 1032 (misrepresenting facts in application);
Jimenez v. Southridge Corp., 626 F. Supp. 732, 734-35 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (failure to meet finan-
cial qualifications); see also KUSHNER, supra note 28, § 5.2 (detailing various legitimate reasons
for treating plaintiff differently); cf McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804
(1973) (discussing legitimate employer defenses to an intentional discrimination charge brought
under Title VI1).
161. Compare Resident Advisofy Bd. v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126, 142 (3d Cir. 1977) (ruling fear
of violence too subjective a purpose, ruled a pretext to discrimination), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 908
(1978) with Jiminez v. Southridge Co-op., Section I, Inc., 626 F. Supp. 732, 734-35 (E.D.N.Y.
1985) (finding that an applicant's failure to meet reasonable financial qualifications is a legitimate
reason for denying housing).
162. 866 F.2d 1276, 1281-82 (10th Cir. 1989).
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1290 (7th
Cir. 1977) (noting that requiring proof of discriminatory intent is an impossible burden to satisfy
because intent, motive, and purpose are elusive concepts), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1025 (1978);
United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179, 1185 (8th Cir. 1974) (finding use of discrimi-
natory effect analysis justified because "clever men can easily conceal their motivations"), cert.
denied, 422 U.S. 1042 (1975); see McCormack, supra note 147, at 564 (noting that a low thresh-
old of "business purpose" can rebut the inference of intentional discrimination; under disparate
impact analysis, a much more stringent business purpose test is imposed).
166, Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d at 1290. The Arlington Heights court asserts that overt big-
otry is unfashionable, but racial discrimination has not disappeared. Id. at 1287.
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A prima facie case of discriminatory effect requires proof that a
facially neutral practice either (1) has a disparate impact on a pro-
tected racial group or (2) perpetuates the effects of segregation.167
There are few pure discriminatory effect cases, as most Title VIII
cases also involve intentional discrimination or perpetuation of seg-
regation claims as well. 168
a. Disparate impact analysis
In a true disparate impact analysis, the degree a challenged hous-
ing practice impacts on a racial group is relevant in making out a
prima facie discriminatory effect claim.' 69 In Betsey v. Turtle Creek
Associates,170 for example, the Fourth Circuit found a violation
where there was a statistical showing of a substantially greater ad-
verse impact on minorities.' 7 ' The defendant apartment complex
owner had instituted an all-adult policy in a housing complex where
68.3% of the families with children were minorities. To implement
this policy, 75% of the minorities were evicted, but only 27% of the
whites.' 72 In contrast to the Turtle Creek decision, the Seventh Cir-
cuit, in Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. v. Village of Ar-
lington Heights'7 ' found that a municipal zoning decision that ex-
cluded a planned low-income housing project did not have a
substantial disparate impact on minorities. The court noted that
60% of the persons on the waiting list for subsidized housing were
white. 17  The latter case also raises the issue of how to measure
properly the extent of discriminatory effect. Courts are divided as to
whether a housing practice's disparate impact should be measured
by comparing the percentages of each racial group affected by the
practice to their percentage of the total population, 75 or by compar
167. Id. at 1290.
168. SCHWEMM, supra note 15, § 10.4(2)(b), at 10-25 to 10-29.
169. See Southend Neighborhood Improvement v. County of St. Clair, 743 F.2d 1207, 1209
(7th Cir. 1984) (holding that Title VIII only prohibits practices with "significant" discriminatory
effects).
170. 736 F.2d 983 (4th Cir. 1984).
171. Id. at 987-88; see also Keith v. Volpe, 858 F.2d 467, 484 (9th Cir. 1988) (finding dispa-
rate impact found where two-thirds of group eligible for blocked housing project were minorities).
172. Turtle Creek, 736 F.2d at 987-88.
173. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1291 (7th
Cir. 1977), cert. denied. 434 U.S. 1025 (1978).
174. Id. at 1291. Note that the disparate impact analysis in Arlington Heights was only one
prong in the four-factor perpetuation of segregation test promulgated by the Seventh Circuit. Id.
at 1290.
175. Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926, 938 (2d Cir.) (main-
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ing the absolute numbers of each racial group affected. 76
In either case, the defendant can rebut the prima facie inference
of discrimination by showing "a business necessity sufficiently com-
pelling to justify the challenged practice.""' Like discriminatory ef-
fect analysis, the business necessity defense is also derived from
Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,'18 a Title VII employment discrimina-
tion case. In Griggs, the Supreme Court held that a defendant may
justify a job requirement that has a discriminatory effect by demon-
strating a business necessity for the requirement.17 9 In particular,
the requirement must have a manifest relation to successful job per-
formance."8 Under Title VIII, when weighing the defendant's inter-
ests against the discriminatory effect of the challenged housing
practice, courts examine the availability of alternatives and their
cost to the defendant.18' The burden is different and more difficult
to overcome than when a defendant is confronted with a showing of
discriminatory intent.' 82  Defendants may overcome a showing of
disparate treatment by articulating a legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason for the practice.' In contrast, most courts impose a high
threshold of justification in disparate impact cases. 4
b. Perpetuation of segregation analysis
In perpetuation of segregation analysis, the focus is on whether a
housing decision produces a discriminatory effect on the community
as a whole. 8 ' This type of analysis is usually applied to claims that
taining that courts should evaluate disparate impact claims in terms of percentages rather than
absolute numbers), affd, 408 U.S. 15 (1988) (per curiam).
176. In re Malone, 592 F. Supp. 1135, 1160-61 (E.D. Mo. 1984), aff'd sub. nom. Malone v.
City of Fulton, 794 F.2d 680 (8th Cir. 1986) (finding no disparate impact even though a higher
percentage of blacks affected because more whites were affected than minorities).
177. Turtle Creek, 736 F.2d at 987. See infra notes 197-99, 211 for a more detailed discussion
of the business necessity defense in the context of perpetuation of segregation claims.
178. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
179. Id. at 431.
180. Id. at 431-32.
181. See McCormack, supra note 147, at 580. McCormack also asserts that where a defend-
ant's decision is supported by subjective considerations, courts must examine whether the subjec-
tive nonracial factors have any objective utility in furthering his interest. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. See, e.g., United States v. Starrett City Assocs., 840 F.2d 1096, 1100-02 (2d Cir.) (re-
jecting threat of white flight as justifying imposition of racial quotas), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 946
(1988); Turtle Creek. 736 F.2d at 988 (requiring a compelling business necessity).
185. See Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926, 937-38 (2d Cir.
1988).
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municipalities or other governmental bodies have used their zoning
or land use powers to unlawfully block construction of integrated
housing developments in predominantly white areas."' 6 In Metropol-
itan Housing Development Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights,18 7
the Seventh Circuit held that if a housing decision "perpetuates seg-
regation and thereby prevents interracial association it will be con-
sidered invidious under the Fair Housing Act independently of the
extent to which it produces a disparate effect on different racial
groups."18 The Supreme Court has not directly ruled on the legal-
ity of this type of analysis; however, in Huntington Branch, NAACP
v. Town of Huntington,'89 the Court affirmed a Second Circuit deci-
sion that approved the use of perpetuation of segregation analysis. 190
The Supreme Court declined to address the issue, however, because
the defendant had conceded its validity.'
Courts have developed two different ways of analyzing perpetua-
tion of segregation claims. The Second Circuit's Huntington Branch
opinion provided a traditional two-step discriminatory effects analy-
sis, first analyzing the effect of the defendant's actions on maintain-
ing segregated housing patterns in the community, and then, if the
prima facie case was established, shifting the burden to the defend-
ant to justify its actions as a business necessity. 92 In Huntington
Branch, the defendant city's zoning ordinance restricted construc-
tion of private, multifamily housing to a largely minority urban re-
newal area.'93 The city refused to amend the ordinance to permit
construction of a subsidized housing project that, with its goal of
25% minority occupancy, would begin desegregating a neighbor-
hood that was 98 % white.' The court noted that minority families
in Huntington were 250% more likely than white families to fall
below the income cutoff that determined eligibility to live in the pro-
ject. '0 Thus, the Second Circuit concluded that the refusal impeded
integration by restricting low-income housing, needed by minority
186. SCHWEMM, supra note 15, § 10.4(2)(c), at 10-29.
187. 558 F.2d 1283 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1025 (1978).
188. Id. at 1290.
189. 408 U.S. 15 (1988).
190. Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926 (2d Cir. 1988).
191. The town did not argue that the standard was incorrect, but that its conduct did not
violate the standard. Id. at 936-37.
192. Id. at 937-39.
193. Id. at 938.
194. Id. at 937.
195. Id. at 938.
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families, to predominantly black areas. 196 The Second Circuit then
addressed the business justification defense of the city, holding that
the defense must meet two separate requirements: (1) It must be
bona fide and legitimate, and (2) no less discriminatory alternatives
must be available to the defendant. 197 The court rejected the city's
defense, that the proposed site would promote traffic and health
hazards, as not legitimate or bona fide. 9' It also held that another
proffered reason 'for denying a building permit, that it would en-
courage development in a predominantly black urban renewal area,
could be accomplished just as effectively by providing tax incentives
for developers. 99
The second method of analyzing perpetuation of segregation
claims is the Arlington Heights multifactor balancing test, which
encompasses both the prima facie case and any articulated de-
fense.200 No one factor is dispositive as to whether a violation has
taken place.201 Four distinct factors are analyzed: (1) the degree of
discriminatory effect,20 2 (2) evidence of discriminatory intent,20 3 (3)
the defendant's reason for taking the challenged action, 04 and (4)
196. Id.
197. Id. at 939.
198. Id. The Second Circuit also reasoned that for analytical ease, the second prong should be
analyzed first. Id. In the context of rejecting sites for low-income housing, the Second Circuit
suggested dividing the justifications as either "plan specific" or "site specific." The court stated
that "site specific" justifications would usually survive the least discriminatory alternative prong.
Justifications that met this prong would then be scrutinized to determine if they were legitimate
("of substantial concern") and bona fide. Id. The Huntington court ruled that the defendant's
reasons for denying a housing permit, although site specific (traffic hazards and health concerns),
were not supported by any evidence. Id. at 940. But cf. Village of Bellwood v. Dwivedi, 895 F.2d
1521, 1531 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding that customer preference can be a bona fide justification for
private business practices having an aggregate effect of perpetuating segregation).
199. Huntington, 844 F.2d at 939.
200. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1290 (7th
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1025 (1978).
201. Id.
202. Id. Arlington Heights involved the Village's refusal to rezone a tract of land that would be
used to build low-income housing. The Seventh Circuit held that building the complex would be a
significant step toward integrating the overwhelmingly white community, but that its discrimina-
tory effect was unclear because the Village asserted other properly zoned land was available. Id.
at 1291.
203. Id. at 1291. The showing of intent does not have to be enough to satisfy the constitutional
standard in Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (holding that only intentional discrimina-
tion violates the Equal Protection Clause). Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d at 1291. However, "the
equitable argument for relief is stronger when there is some direct evidence that the defendant
purposefully discriminated against members of minority groups." Id. at 1292.
204. Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d at 1292. The Seventh Circuit noted that it would not be
overly solicitous of private entities seeking to protect private rights where their conduct perpetu-
ates segregation, but will defer more readily to government bodies acting within the scope of their
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whether the plaintiff seeks to compel the defendant to provide hous-
ing or merely to refrain from interfering with others who wish to
provide housing.20 5 The Seventh Circuit in Arlington Heights held
that the least important factor was the showing of intent,2"6 and fur-
ther held that close cases should be determined in favor of the
plaintiff.2"7
In Arlington Heights, the Seventh Circuit applied this test to a
claim that the Village violated the Fair Housing Act by refusing to
rezone a tract of land that would be used to build low-income hous-
ing in an overwhelmingly white area.208 First, the court ruled that
the discriminatory effect on minorities was relatively weak, because
60% of the people eligible for subsidized housing in the Chicago
metropolitan area were white. 0 9 Second, the court found that there
was no specific evidence that the Village's refusal to rezone the land
was based on a desire to excluded minorities from the area.210
Third, the court ruled .that the Village was acting within the ambit
of statutorily authorized zoning authority, and thus, its decision was
entitled to deference as legitimate government action. 21 1 Finally, the
court ruled that the plaintiffs did not seek to compel the Village to
affirmatively aid the construction project, but only sought to enjoin
the Village from interfering with "their plans to dedicate their land
to furthering the congressionally sanctioned goal of integrated hous-
ing. '12 The Seventh Circuit remanded the case for further determi-
nation of the discriminatory effect issue.21 3 It held that on remand,
if the district court found that there was no other land that was both
properly zoned and suitable for low-income housing, it should rule
that the Village's refusal to rezone perpetuated segregation in viola-
authority. Id. at 1293. In Arlington Heights, the Village was acting within its statutorily granted
authority to zone property use. Id.
205. Id. at 1293. The Seventh Circuit held that compelling a defendant to construct integrated
housing or requiring that it take affirmative steps to ensure that it is built would entail massive
judicial intrusion on private autonomy, but enjoining interference with a plaintiffs attempt to
build housing on land it owned was a permissible equitable remedy. Id.
206. Id. at 1292.
207. Id. at 1294 (reasoning that it must liberally construe the Fair Housing Act).
208. Id. at 1291-94.
209. Id. at 1291; see supra notes 175-76 and accompanying text (discussing whether disparate
impact should be measured by comparing absolute numbers of each racial group affected, or by
comparing percentages of each racial group affected).
210. Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d at 1292.
211. Id. at 1293.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 1294.
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tion of section 3604(a) of the Act.2"4
Although the Huntington Branch and Arlington Heights perpetu-
ation of segregation tests are procedurally different, they do not pro-
duce different results.2 15 In fact, the Huntington Branch court
agreed with the Arlington Heights court that plaintiffs are more
likely to prevail when they seek to enjoin governmental interference
with plans than when they seek to compel the government to build
integrated housing."
3. Proving Discriminatory Effect-The Distinction Between Public
and Private Entities
Discriminatory effect claims may turn on whether the defendant
is a public or private entity. Most courts do not distinguish between
public and private defendants when determining whether a plaintiff
has established a prima facie case of discriminatory effect.21 7 How-
ever, a recent district court case, Brown v. Artery Organization,218
held that this analysis is not appropriate for private defendants. 9
The Brown opinion reasoned that, unlike public entities, private par-
ties have no duty to integrate and should not be held responsible for
individually neutral housing decisions that have an aggregate effect
of perpetuating segregation. 2 0 The Brown court interpreted the Ar-
214. Id.
215. See, e.g., Keith v. Volpe, 858 F.2d 467, 483 (9th Cir. 1988) (applying both tests, and
finding city liable under each); Resident's Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126, 148 n.32 (3d Cir.
1977) (using traditional two-step analysis, but noting that decision would be the same using the
Arlington Heights four-factor test), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 908 (1978).
216. Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926, 940 (2d Cir.), affid,
488 U.S. 15 (1988) (per curiam).
217. E.g., Betsey v. Turtle Creek Assocs., 736 F.2d 983 (4th Cir. 1984) (private apartment
complex owner); Smith v. Town of Clarkton, 682 F.2d 1055 (4th Cir. 1982) (municipality);
United States v. City of Parma, 661 F.2d 562 (6th Cir. 1981) (same), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 926
(1982); Smith v. Anchor Bldg. Corp., 536 F.2d 231 (8th Cir. 1976) (private developer).
218. 654 F. Supp. 1106 (D.D.C. 1987).
219. Id. at 1114-16 (requiring a showing that private entity had discriminatory intent in per-
petuation of segregation cases). But see United States v. Starrett City Assocs., 840 F.2d 1096,
1100-01 (2d Cir.) (holding that occupancy quotas violate fair Housing Act for both private and
state actors), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 946 (1988); Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of
Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1293 (7th Cir. 1977) (noting that business justification of
private entity in perpetuation of segregation claim will be scrutinized more carefully than justifi-
cations offered by government entities), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1025 (1978).
220. Brown. 654 F. Supp. at 1115; see supra notes 67-75 (discussing the public vs. private duty
to integrate under Title Vill). But cf Betsey, 736 F.2d at 988 (holding that Arlington Heights
multifactor analysis is not appropriate for private defendants, who should be held to more strin-
gent "compelling" business necessity standard). Note that Betsey was a strict disparate impact
case. Id.
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lington Heights four-factor test as establishing a sliding scale test
between discriminatory intent and discriminatory effect; a greater
showing of disparate impact will allow a lesser showing of discrimi-
natory motive.22 However, under the Brown test every action
against a private party requires at least some evidence of discrimi-
natory intent.222
Conversely, once a prima facie case of discriminatory effect is es-
tablished, some courts appear to place a higher threshold of business
necessity on private defendants than on public entities. 23 The Ar-
lington Heights test explicitly requires courts to give greater defer-
ence to legitimate governmental actions than to actions protecting
private interests, particularly when the action is based on zoning au-
thority.224 The Fourth Circuit, in Betsey v. Turtle Creek. Associ-
ates,22 indicated that the Arlington Heights test was inapplicable to
private parties, and that private parties should be required to show a
compelling business necessity for their actions. 26 However, whether
the justification required by governmental defendants is qualita-
tively different than the "compelling business necessity" standard is
not clear. Courts examining governmental defenses have applied a
"least restrictive alternative" standard to them. 2 7 This, on its face,
appears to be as stringent a test as business necessity.228 Addition-
ally, governmental bodies do not have the same economic interests
at stake as private defendants, and government actions have more
potential for widespread harm than most private actions.2 29 Thus, it
can be argued that an even more exacting standard is imposed on
governmental bodies to justify actions with a discriminatory
impact.23 °
221. Brown. 654 F. Supp. at 1117.
222. Id.
223. See infra notes 224-26 and accompanying text.
224. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1293 (7th
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S, 1025 (1978). But cf. McCormack, supra note 147, at 580-81
(arguing that public entities should have a stricter burden, because they have regulatory interests
that impact on the welfare of the entire community).
225. 736 F.2d 983 (4th Cir. 1984).
226. Id. at 988 n.5.
227. Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926, 939 (2d Cir.), affd
488 U.S. 15 (1988) (per curiam); Resident's Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126, 149 (3d Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 908 (1978).
228. See McCormack, supra note 147, at 602-06 (comparing the business justification stan-
dards applied to public as opposed to private defendants).
229. Id. at 604 n.285.
230. Id. at 602. Even the Arlington Heights court, which granted deference to certain govern-
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In conclusion, although there is a close analogy between Title
VII1 and Title VII doctrine,23' the two standards of review are not
mirror images of one another. Courts interpreting the Fair Housing
Act have created an independent doctrine with respect to some dis-
criminatory effect claims.232 In addition, unlike the neutral Title
VII, Title VIII differentiates between public and private entities,
placing on the former an affirmative duty to integrate.233 These dif-
ferences can create uncertainty when analyzing a claim that a be-
nign housing practice discriminates on the basis of race.
E. Applying the Legal Standards to Race-Conscious Programs
Courts analogize to Title VII 'Supreme Court precedents when
analyzing whether race-conscious programs implemented to promote
integration violate the Fair Housing Act.234 In United Steelworkers
of America v. Weber,235 the Supreme Court held that a private em-
ployer may voluntarily institute a race-conscious hiring program to
ameliorate the effects of its past racial discrimination.23 6 However,
Weber does not provide a perfect analogy for Title VIII race-con-
scious programs. The Supreme Court has held that the legislative
history of Title VII shows that Congress did not want race-conscious
affirmative measures "invoked simply to create a racially balanced
workforce.' 237 Unlike Title VII, the Fair Housing Act seeks to
mental actions, closely balanced this interest with the level of discriminatory impact caused by the
action. The Arlington Heights court held that if no other properly zoned and suitable sites were
available, the legitimate governmental interest would be subordinated to the integration goal of
the Fair Housing Act. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d
1283, 1293-94 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1025.
231. See supra notes 142-49 (discussing how the Title VIII standard of review was derived
from Title VII precedent).
232. For instance, there is no perpetuation of segregation claim available under Title VII.
SCHWEMM, supra note 15, § 10.2 (4)(C).
233. See supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text (detailing how the language of the Act and
accompanying regulations places an affirmative duty on public entities to integrate housing). The
language of the Act itself is silent as to any private duty.
234. See infra notes 235-39 and accompanying text (discussing the analogy).
235. 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
236. Id. In upholding the plan, the Supreme Court noted that it was a voluntary, temporary
measure to achieve racial balance, and was not designed to maintain racial balance. Id. at 208-09.
237. Sheet Metal Workers v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 475 (1986); Weber, 443 U.S. at 209. But
ef Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616 (1987) (authorizing the use of sex as a factor in
promotion decisions where there is substantial historical underrepresentation of women in a partic-
ular workforce); Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 323 (1978) (appendix to opin-
ion of Powell, J., concurring) (arguing that Title VII allows schools to take race into account
when making admissions decisions in order to attain a racially diverse student body).
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achieve racial balance as well as to end discrimination.2 38  Still,
courts analyzing race-conscious programs under the Fair Housing
Act uniformly rely on Title VII affirmative action standards to sup-
port their decisions.239 Under Title VIII, the legality of race-con-
scious housing programs depends on how they are categorized.240
Categorizing the various race-conscious housing programs is not
easy. There is no set terminology for differentiating one plan from
another; the language used by one scholar often contradicts that of
another scholar.2 41 For purposes.of this Note, race-conscious plans
have been subdivided into three categories: benign quotas,242 inte-
gration incentives, 4 3 and affirmative marketing plans.4
I. The Legality of Benign Quotas
Benign quotas involve government agency or private developer
housing assignment plans that limit the entry of racial groups in
order to maintain integration. 4 5 Benign quotas may be character-
ized as either access quotas or ceiling quotas. Access quotas set
aside a certain number of housing units for occupancy by members
of a particular racial group. 48 They are designed to ensure that a
minimum number of a targeted group is represented in the overall
238. See supra notes 63-66 and accompanying text (discussing the Fair Housing Act's purpose
of promoting racial integration in housing).
239. See infra notes 259-63 and accompanying text (discussing the Second Circuit's use of
Title Vii doctrinal analysis to examine the legality of benign housing quotas).
240. See Lind, supra note 5, at 646-47 (arguing that extent of justified intrusion allowable to
meet goal of integration depends on the specific characteristics of the municipality).
241. Compare id. at 610 n.27 (defining "integration maintenance" programs as encouraging
voluntary efforts to integrate, as opposed to "integration management," which are programs that
limit consumer choice in order to sustain integration) with BERRY, supra note 1, at 352 (asserting
that integration maintenance allows for manipulation of the housing market to prevent resegrega-
tion); and Smolla, supra note 122, at 898 (defining integration maintenance as covering all types
of race-conscious programs).
242. See infra notes 245-82 and accompanying text.
243. See infra notes 283-304 and accompanying text.
244. See infra notes 305-53 and accompanying text (discussing in depth affirmative marketing
techniques and their legality); see also Smolla, supra note 122, at 898-900. Smolla delineates
three approaches to "integration maintenance": (I) quotas or limits on minority entry; (2) encour-
aging or discouraging entry of racial groups; and (3) race-conscious dispersal of entrants through-
out the community. Id.
245. United States v. Starrett City Assocs., 840 F.2d 1096, 1103 (2d Cir.) (holding an occu-
pancy quota illegal because it had a discriminatory effect against blacks), cert. denied, 488 U.S.
946 (1988).
246. Id. at 1104; see Gelber, supra note 104, at 930 (describing the difference between access
and ceiling quotas).
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population of an area."4 7 Ceiling quotas set an upper limit on a
targeted group's representation in a neighborhood or community.248
They are intended to maintain integration by controlling access by
members of a group whose presence might lead to tipping.249
United States v. Starrett City Associates25 is the seminal case on
the issue of whether the use of racial occupancy quotas to combat
the threat of tipping is legal under the Fair Housing Act.2"' In Star-
rett City, the Second Circuit invalidated the use of a racial occu-
pancy quota implemented by a private apartment complex developer
to maintain racial balance in the complex.25 2 Specifically, the Sec-
ond Circuit categorized the Starrett .City occupancy controls as a
"ceiling" quota, which has the purpose of maintaining integration,
as opposed to an "access" quota, which has the purpose of creating
or achieving integration.25 3
The Starrett City court found the quota had a significant discrim-
inatory effect on black applicants for the complex.2"4 Because the
number of black applicants greatly exceeded the number of white
applicants, blacks were forced to wait up to eleven times longer than
whites for open units. 2 55 The court equated the extended wait with
an illegal "denial" of housing under section 3604(a) of the Fair
Housing Act. 56 Utilizing Johnson v. Transportation Agency257 as
247. Starrett City, 840 F.2d at 1102 (citing Otero v. New York Hous. Auth., 484 F.2d 1122,
1133 (2d Cir. 1973)) (upholding housing authority start-up quota implemented at new housing
complex to prevent creation of a "pocket ghetto").
248. Id. at 1104 (noting that developer of a private apartment complex placed racial occupancy
limits of 64% white, 22% black, and 8% hispanic).
249. Id. at 1102; Gelber, supra note 104, at 930.
250. 840 F.2d 1096 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 946 (1988).
251. Id.
252. Id. at 1098 (noting that the housing complex set-an occupancy limit of 64% whites, 22%
blacks, and 8% hispanics). The court noted that "[wihile quotas promote Title Vill's integration
policy, they contravene its anti-discriminatory policy." Id. at 1101. Federal district courts had
previously held that this type of quota was illegal under Title VIll. Burney v. Housing Auth., 551
F. Supp. 746 (W.D. Pa. 1982) (rejecting system in which new applicants and transfer applicants
in public housing project were given priority based on whether their race would help maintain a
two-to-one black/white ratio); Williamsburg Fair Hous. Comm. v. New York City Hous. Auth.,
493 F. Supp. 1225 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (same regarding permanent apartment complex occupancy
quota of 75% white, 20% hispanic, and 5% black).
253. Starrett City, 840 F.2d at 1101-02. The Starrett City court stated that not every denial,
especially a temporary denial, of low-income public housing has a discriminatory impact on mi-
norities. Title VIII does not proscribe all race-conscious programs. Id. at 1100.
254. Id.
255. Id. at 1099. Starrett City's active file was 21.9% white in October of 1985, but whites
occupied 64.7% of the apartments in January of 1984. Blacks comprised 53% of the active file,
but only occupied 20.8% of the apartments. Id.
256. Id. at 1100.
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precedent for analyzing the business necessity defense for race-con-
scious programs, the Starrett City court ruled as insufficient the de-
veloper's defense that the occupancy quota Was necessary to prevent
racial tipping.25 8
Relying on Johnson, the Second Circuit reasoned that the use of
race-conscious plans must be based on some history of prior discrim-
ination or racial imbalance within the entity seeking to use them. 59
It also reasoned that plans "employing racial distinctions must be
temporary in nature with a defined goal as its termination point. 260
The Second Circuit held that the occupancy quotas imposed by the
developers did not meet these requirements. The court noted that
the housing complex had never previously discriminated, the devel-
opers' avowed purpose in implementing the quota was to perma-
nently maintain integration, and there was no definite termination
date.261 Thus, the Second Circuit concluded, regardless of whether
Starrett City was a private entity or a state actor, its occupancy
controls illegally denied housing to minorities under the Fair Hous-
ing Act.26 2
The Second Circuit distinguished the factual situation in Starrett
City from that in Otero v. New York City Housing Authority,2"'
where the Second Circuit upheld a public housing authority's occu-
257. 480 U.S. 616 (1987).
258. Starrett City, 840 F.2d at 1101-02. A housing expert had estimated the tipping point of
Starrett City at 40%; another expert found that a two-to-one white-to-minority ratio produced
stable integration. Id. at 1099; see supra note 138 (discussing the difficulty in measuring a precise
tipping point).
259. Starrett City, 840 F.2d at 1102; see also Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267
(1986) (plurality) (maintaining that societal discrimination alone is an insufficient basis for adopt-
ing "benign" practices with discriminatory effects).
260. Starrett City, 840 F.2d at 1101; see Wygant, 476 U.S. at 276 (requiring that a race
conscious plan not be "ageless in [its] reach into the past, and timeless in [its] ability to affect the
future").
261. Starrett City, 840 F.2d at 1102-03.
262. Id. at 1101-03. The dissent disagreed with this holding, and argued that the plan was
narrowly tailored to achieve its goal of integration, particularly in light of the fact that prior
efforts to maintain integration in the complex through affirmative advertising had failed. Id. at
1106 (Newman, J., dissenting). Judge Newman asserted that where private property is concerned,
a policy choice to maintain integration through quotas is a policy choice that should be left up to
the individual. Id. at 1108 (Newman, J., dissenting).
Judge Newman also argued that the plan should be upheld because HUD gave approval when it
was originally conceived by the developer five years prior to the suit. Id. at 1104 (Newman, J.,
dissenting). But see United States v. Charlottesville Redev. & Hous. Auth., 718 F. Supp. 461, 464
(W.D. Va. 1989) (holding that courts do not have to defer to HUD administrative approval of
racial quotas; mere letters of approval carry insufficient weight, and HUD has no power to excuse
discriminatory acts).
263. 484 F.2d 1122 (2d Cir. 1973).
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pancy quota that adversely impacted minorities.284 In Otero, the
housing authority had cleared a predominantly black area for urban
renewal.2"' Former site residents were promised priority in the new
development. However, to prevent tipping, the housing authority
subsequently set aside 50% of the new units for nonsite residents,
88% of whom were, white.268 The Otero court held that the quota
was legal under section 3608(d)(5) of the Fair Housing Act, reason-
ing that despite its discriminatory effect on minorities the quota was
essential to achieving racial balance in the project and preserving
the integrated status of adjacent neighborhoods.2"7
The Starrett City court observed that, unlike the quota imposed
by Starrett City Associates, the quota in Otero applied only to the
initial start-up occupancy of the new housing complex.268 The court
observed that the Otero quota would end once the complex was ini-
tially occupied; it was not a continuing limitation on access like the
quota imposed by the Starrett City complex.26 9 Since the plan in
Otero had the purpose of achieving integration rather than main-
taining integration, it constituted a permissible "access" quota
under Johnson and Wygant.27 0
Professor Schwemm argues that the real distinction between the
Starrett City and Otero plans did not turn on the duration of the
plans or whether they were designed to "achieve" as opposed to
"maintain" integration.2 1 Instead, Schwemm points out that the
quota in Otero was upheld on the basis that the defendant was a
public entity and thus had an affirmative duty to integrate pursuant
264. Id.
265. Id. at 1125-29.
266. Id. at 1128.
267. Id. at 1133-34. Otero held that the defendant must submit convincing evidence that color-
blind adherence would almost certainly lead to eventual destruction of racial integration existing
in the community. Otherwise, the denial of housing would constitute illegal discrimination on the
basis of race. Id. The court held there was convincing evidence that allowing priority access to
former site residents would create a pocket ghetto and endanger the integrated status of adjacent
neighborhoods. Id. at 1135.
A district court imposed an access quota in Young v. Pierce, 685 F. Supp. 975 (E.D. Tex.
1988). The court required HUD, pursuant to a finding that HUD maintained racially segregated
housing, to implement a tenant assignment plan in all low-income housing to achieve integration.
Id. at 978.
268. United States v. Starrett City Assocs., 840 F.2d 1096, 1103 (2d Cir.) (citing Otero v.




271. SCHWEMM, supra note 15, § 11.2(2)(c)(ii), at 11-18.
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to section 3608(e)(5) of the Act.27 2 In contrast, the defendant in
Starrett City was a private entity and had no duty to integrate.
However, the reasoning in Starrett City was followed the next year
in United States v. Charlottesville Housing & Redevelopment Au-
thority,273 a case involving a racial quota implemented by a public
housing authority.2 74  The Charlottesville court held that where
there is a conflict between the Act's dual purposes, the duty to avoid
discrimination must trump the obligation of the housing authority to
promote integration.27 5 The district court'reasoned that a racial oc-
cupancy quota seeking to maintain a 50/50 racial balance was not a
narrowly tailored remedy for past discrimination because it was not
"circumscribed in its effect on innocent parties. 27 6
Community-wide racial quotas have also come under legal attack.
After legal action was threatened, the city of Oak Park, Illinois,
rescinded a proposed ordinance prohibiting any seller or broker from
knowingly selling real property to a black person if over 30% of
that block was black.277 A Cleveland Heights, Ohio, resolution
designed to freeze integration at a 75:25 white-to-black ratio by
steering blacks away from the market was also challenged in
court.2 '
In summary, Title VIII permits racial occupancy controls only
when they have the purpose of achieving racial balance.279 Courts
have uniformly held occupancy quotas illegal when they seek to
maintain integration.28 ° Although the quotas are easy to administer,
272. Id. at 11-19.
273. 718 F. Supp. 461 (W.D. Va. 1989).
274. Id.
275. Id. at 468.
276. Id. at 470-7 1.
277. See Vodar, supra note 67, at 165-66 (noting that the plan was not designed to remedy
past discrimination); OAK PARK BOARD OF TRUSTEES, PRELIMINARY DRAFT OUTLINE OF THE OAK
PARK. IL. COMMUNITY PLAN FOR RACIAL INTEGRATION 14-18 (May 20, 1974) (discussing the
efficacy of various integration plans). In addition, Oak Park's 1968 Fair Housing Ordinance pro-
hibited differential treatment based on race, but exempted certain locations, buildings, and trans-
actions from prosecution if a reasonable plan to prevent or eliminate de facto segregation was
submitted to, and approved by the city's Community Relations Commission. This clause "in effect
legitimized an informal quota system at the discretion of the [Commission]." BERRY, supra note
1, at 282-83.
278. Smith v. Cleveland Heights, 760 F.2d 720 (6th Cir. 1985). The decision only involved
standing to sue; the Sixth Circuit did not reach the merits of the case. The court ruled that an
allegation of stigmatic harm flowing from such a community-wide racial quota is enough for
standing if the plaintiff lived in the community. Id. at 722-23.
279. Otero v. New York City Hous. Auth., 484 F.2d 1122 (2d Cir. 1973).
280. See supra notes 251-77 and accompanying text (discussing the legality of ceiling quotas).
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and they effectively promote the Fair Housing Act's goal of integra-
tion,281 they do so at the unacceptable cost of limiting the free hous-
ing choice of minorities.28 2
2. The Legality of Pro-Integration Incentives
Pro-integration incentives usually involve government agencies or
municipalities offering economic aid or other types of incentives to
encourage integrative housing choices. 8 a Proponents of the use of
pro-integration incentives argue that, unlike occupancy quotas, eligi-
bility is determined not by the race of the housing customer, but by
the purchaser's choice to make an integrative move. 8 4 This type of
race-conscious tactic is especially popular in the Chicago and Cleve-
land metropolitan areas.285 For instance, the Chicago suburb of Oak
Park, Illinois, instituted a program providing matching rehabilita-
tion funds for landlords undertaking integrative efforts 8.28  Oak Park
281. Polikoff, supra note 77, at 12 (stating that ceiling quotas are attractive because they im-
mediately ease whites' fear of tipping by ensuring whites are the dominant percentage).
282. United States v. Starrett City Assocs., 840 F.2d 1096, 1102 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 488
U.S. 946 (1988); see Yinger, supra note 136, at 303-05. Yinger argues that ceiling quotas in-
crease black demand for housing in other areas and thus may hasten racial transition in those
areas as well as boost the price minorities have to pay for this alternative housing. Yinger asserts
that one way to avoid the temptation to use ceiling quotas is to ensure whites do not have all white
enclaves to which they can flee. Id.
283. See infra notes 285-90 and accompanying text (detailing various types of pro-integration
incentives).
284. Fair Housing Hearings, supra note 15, at 62 (position paper of the Business and Profes-
sional People United for the Public Interest).
285. Id. at 4 (statement of Alexander Polikoff) (calling these metro areas "outstanding exam-
ples" of communities overtly working to foster racial diversity), Milwaukee, Wisconsin, has also
instituted pro-integration incentives to meet a consent decree ordering Milwaukee to desegregate
its school system. Soja A. Thomas, Comment, Efforts To Integrate Housing: The Legality of
Mortgage-Incentive Programs, 66 N.YU. L. REV. 940, 948-49 (1991).
286. See Gelber, supra note 104, at 937 (discussing Oak Park matching fund ordinance). The
Oak Park ordinance pays landlords matching funds of $1000 per unit to rehabilitate rental units.
In return for the funds, landlords must agree to allow the Oak Park Housing Center to serve as
their rental agent. Id. The Housing Center affirmatively markets the property and encourages
integrative moves. Landlords must allow the housing Center 120 days to rent the property; if the
unit is vacant more than one month, landlords are given an 80% rent subsidy for the next 90
days. Id.
The ordinance was implemented to combat the threat of racial tipping on the city's east side. At
the time, of Oak Park's 563 apartment buildings, 63 were all black, 58 of them on the east side.
Charlie Cooper, Plan To Integrate Apartments, OAK LEAVES, Aug. 1, 1984, at 3; accord OAK
LEAVES, Nov. 7, 1984, at 3; OAK LEAVES, Aug. 1, 1984, at 18.
For an excellent discussion of government and private efforts to maintain racial integration in
Oak Park, see BERRY, supra note 1, at 277-303. These efforts were spurred by the rapid racial
transition of the adjacent Austin neighborhood of Chicago, which, through block-by-block racial
succession, changed the racial makeup of Austin from predominantly white to predominantly
1312
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also implemented an equity assurance program to protect the prop-
erty values of homeowners living in integrated neighborhoods.187
The Cleveland metropolitan area has pioneered the use of mortgage
assistance and subsidized loans to induce persons to make integra-
tive moves. 8 In addition, a Boston housing authority gave housing
applicants willing to make integrative housing choices priority on its
waiting list.289
There has been little scholarly debate over pro-integration incen-
tives to date,29 0 and litigation involving their use is rare, particularly
black at a rate of two city blocks per year from 1965 to 1970. Id. at 285. This black expansion
threatened to completely envelop the east side of Oak Park. Oak Park's black population rose
from 57 to 720 residents from 1965 to 1970, with most of them concentrated on the east side. Id.
at 279-83.
287. See Maureen A. McNamara, Comment, The Legality and Efficacy of Homeowners Eq-
uity Assurance: A Study of Oak Park, Illinois, 78 Nw. U. L. REV. 1463, 1466 (1984) (discussing
the Oak Park equity assurance ordinance). The ordinance acts as a method to prevent white flight,
seeking to counter the threat of blockbusting and accompanying declines in property values. The
municipality guarantees the equity value of a home at the time a resident joins the program, and
reimburses him for any decline. The theory is that if the city guards against risk of declining
property values, residents will be encouraged to remain, property values will stabilize, and the
integrated housing market will continue. Id. The program is paid for by a special property tax
assessment. Fair Housing Hearings, supra note 15, at 25 (statement of Alexander Polikoff).
288. See YALE CONFERENCE, supra note 100, at 94 (statement of Donald DeMarco) (noting
that the community of Shaker Heights, Ohio, affirmatively encourages integration by providing
subsidized mortgages to persons wishing to make integrative moves); see also MORRIS MILGRAM.
GOOD NEIGHBORHOOD: THE CHALLENGE OF OPEN HOUSING 95-100 (1977). Milgram details the
efforts of housing councils in Shaker Heights and Cleveland Heights, Ohio to maintain integration
in their communities during the late 1970s. He notes that the Shaker Heights integration incen-
tives also provided for deferred payment on the subsidized mortgages. Id.
Efforts to promote integration in the Cleveland suburbs involve a partnership of cities, schools
and organizations in the private sector, including the largest private real estate corporation in the
state of Ohio. Fair Housing Hearings, supra note 15, at 105-11 (statement of Winston H.
Richie). The Ohio Housing Finance Center involves proceeds from a government bond issue that
are set aside for subsidizing integrative moves on a metropolitan wide basis. Id.; see also id. at
144 (statement of Robert D. Butters) (reciting a statistical breakdown of eligibility for incentives
based on racial group). Both the East Suburban Housing Fund (Cleveland) and the Fund for the
Future of Shaker Heights (Ohio) involve private organizations combining low-interest second
mortgage loan and housing counseling. Id. at 40-41 (statement of Alexander Polikoff).
289. Schmidt v. Boston Hous. Auth., 505 F. Supp. 988 (D. Mass. 1981).
290. Fair Housing Hearing, supra note 15, at 50-51 (testimony of Alexander Polikoff) (noting
that although the purpose of pro-integration financial incentives is identical to that of affirmative
marketing, incentives have not been subject to comparable legal and policy debate). Robert D.
Butters, Chairman of the National Association of Realtors, has criticized pro-integration incen-
tives as not expanding housing choice. He argues that these plans are actually an attempt to
create and maintain a racial balance, and since incentives usually operate in already integrated
areas, minority home seekers have significantly less than the total universe of homes available to
them when seeking subsidized financing. Id. at 189 (statement of Robert D. Butters). Butters also
accused wide-scale use of financial incentives as promoting "steering" by real estate agents. He
argues that (1) discounted financing makes pro-integrative sales easier to close than "normal"
housing transactions, (2) agents are obligated to secure the highest ice for the seller, and (3)
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:1271
with respect to the use of financial incentives.2"' The most important
case in this area is Schmidt v. Boston Housing Authority,92 where
a district court upheld a HUD tenant assignment plan that accorded
priority to applicants choosing to be housed in a development in
which their race was a substantial minority.2 93 The court ruled that
the plan did not deny housing to any person because it still provided
for freedom of housing choice.294 Applicants desiring to live in a
complex where their race was in the majority could do so; they
merely faced a longer wait.2 95 The Schmidt court found that the
plan did not have any discriminatory effect on minorities; the pro-
portion of black applicants to white applicants was not significantly
higher, thus there was no significantly longer waiting period for
minorities.2 96
Financial incentive programs have not been directly challenged in
court under the Fair Housing Act.297 However, some scholars feel
that these types of programs violate the Fair Housing Act because
they have the practical effect of deflecting some minority entry into
the community.2 98 Pro-integration incentives are also criticized as
pushing pro-integrative housing choices will make it easier for the agent to meet that duty, since
the lower financing enables the seller to ask a higher price as an offset. Id. at 144 (statement of
Robert D. Butters). Pro-integration plans are also perceived as acting as a de facto occupancy
quota, since they often trigger at a predetermined integration "goal." Id. at 113-14 (testimony of
Winston H. Richie); see also Thomas, supra note 285, at 955-67 (arguing that incentive plans
that determine eligibility based on a percentage goal for any particular racial group (i.e., 60%
black-40% white) may constitute impermissible use of racial criteria). Thomas favors language-
neutral incentives, where pro-integrative moves are defined as those moves to areas where the
applicants' race is at least 15% less than the metro average, or moves to transition areas, where
over a five-year period the applicants' racial percentage has dropped at least 10%. Id. at 972.
291. See infra notes 293-97 (discussing a case involving waiting list priority where financial
incentives were not at issue).
292. 505 F. Supp. 988 (D. Mass. 1981).
293. Id. at 991-92.
294. Id. at 995; see Fair Housing Hearing Hearings, supra note 15, at 65 (statement of George
G. Calster, Professor of Economics, Wooster College) (asserting that the Schmidt plan is clearly
facially neutral because both whites and nonwhites can be classified as minority preference appli-
cants depending on the development chosen). But see Thomas, supra note 286, at 972 (arguing
that the Schmidt plan is very similar to the occupancy quota plan invalidated in Burney v. Hous-
ing Authority, 551 F. Supp. 746 (W.D. Pa. 1981)). See supra note 252 (discussing facts of
Burney).
295. Schmidt, 505 F. Supp. at 995.
296. Id. at 993-96.
297. See Clayton v. Village of Oak Park, 453 N.E.2d 937 (II1. App. Ct. 1983) (upholding Oak
Park ordinance implementing equity assurance program on grounds unrelated to the Fair Housing
Act).
298. See Sm'olla, supra note 84, at 999 (arguing that the equity assurance plan is unconstitu-
tional). Smolla asserts that it is doubtful that housing just as cheap and convenient is in fact
available for every prospective minority entrant in currently all-white neighborhoods. Thus, the
1314
1992] RACE-BASED REAL ESTATE MARKETING 1315
discriminatory because the current economic status of blacks makes
it much more difficult for them to take advantage of the
incentives.2 9
HUD has remained officially neutral on the legality of pro-inte-
gration incentives."' After Congress passed the 1988 amendments
to the Fair Housing Act, HUD published proposed rules and illus-
trations interpreting the Act."' However, during the thirty-day pub-
lic comment period, many people argued that some illustrations had
the effect of disallowing certain pro-integrative practices, such as
subsidized loans." 2 HUD declined to incorporate the illustrations
into its permanent regulations, opting instead to wait for Congres-
sional direction in this area.30 3 In summary, pro-integration incen-
tives are in a state of flux. They are the subject of little present
attention by the courts, but they have recently been heavily criti-
cized by scholars and community activists as discriminating against
minorities in much the same way as racial quotas do.304
3. The Legality of Affirmative Marketing Efforts
Affirmative marketing has been a mainstay of fair housing efforts
practical effect of integration incentives will be to discourage some black entry. Id.; see also YALE
CONFERENCE, supra note 100, at 95 (statement of Robert Ellickson) (arguing that equity assur-
ance plans are ineffective because they address symptoms of short run panic as opposed to the
disease of deep-seated prejudice).
299. See Thomas, supra note 285, at 967 n.220. Thomas notes that a recent study of the
Shaker Heights, Ohio, incentive program shows that it is effectively directed towards maintaining
white demand. Out of seventy-nine subsidized loans made under the program in 1990, only four
went to blacks. Thomas attributes this to the fact that integrated areas have more modest housing
stock than predominantly white areas. Thus, it is easier to meet the economic requirements of a
house purchase in an integrated neighborhood. Under the pro-integration incentives, only white
buyers would qualify for a subsidized move to an integrated neighborhood. Id.; see also Wilker-
son, supra note 103, at Al (noting that few blacks can afford to make integrative moves into the
all-white areas of Shaker Heights, where most neighborhoods are "leafy mansion districts"). Wil-
kerson notes that to offset the problem of minority entry into Shaker Heights, the city funnels
loans to blacks willing, and financially able, to move into an adjacent ring of all-white suburbs. Id.
300. See infra notes 302-05 and accompanying text (discussing HUD position on pro-integra-
tion incentives).
301. 53 Fed. Reg. 52,789 (1988) (proposed Nov. 7, 1988).
302. See Preamble to Final Rule Implementing Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, 24
C.F.R. ch. I, subch. A, app. I, at 690-91 (1989) (1991 ed.) [hereinafter HUD Preamble] (listing
the various regulations that had been altered or removed to avoid the impression that HUD ap-
proved or disapproved of certain incentive practices). One example of a removed section was sec-
tion l00.130(b)(l), which prohibited the use of "different qualification requirements, processing
procedures or evaluation standards in accepting applications or in approving loans and other finan-
cial assistance for dwellings." 53 Fed. Reg. 45,027-28 (1988).
303. HUD Preamble, supra note 302, at 690.
304. See supra notes 294, 299 (discussing criticism of pro-integration financial incentives).
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since the Fair Housing Act was passed in 1968. What affirmative
marketing constitutes is susceptible to different interpretations.
Realtors, for example, often interpret affirmative marketing as ap-
plying only to minorities, and only for the purpose of opening previ-
ously segregated areas.30 5 However, courts have recently interpreted
affirmative marketing efforts as serving the much broader goal of
promoting stable housing integration. 30 6 The court in Steptoe v.
Beverly Area Planning Association"7 recently characterized affirm-
ative marketing as follows:
Affirmative marketing ... aims to attract and influence housing consumers
and providers in a manner favorable to residential integration. The con-
sumer may indeed choose not use [sic] a housing service and yet is not cut
off from buying or renting dwellings . . . . While a municipality may allo-
cate its informational services to take into account racially discriminatory
conditions in the housing market, affirmatively marketing its service does
not limit or close off the number of homes for sale or apartments for rent in
the private market."0 8
Affirmative marketing plans "seek to level the informational play-
ing field" by encouraging the entry of underrepresented racial
groups to a community and making special outreach efforts to these
groups.3 0 ' The goal is to promote more racially diverse demand for
housing in transitional areas, and thus better maintain stable inte-
gration. ° Some scholars and minority organizations strongly object
to affirmative marketing programs, accusing them of constituting
"reverse steering" that limits the free housing choice of minorities in
violation of the Fair Housing Act. 311 They argue that communities
305. South-Suburban Hous. Ctr. v. Greater S. Suburban Bd. of Realtors, 713 F. Supp. 1068,
1075 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (discussing voluntary affirmative marketing agreement between HUD and
the National Association of Realtors; the agreement defined affirmative marketing as justifying
only remedial special outreach efforts), aff'd in part and reversed in part. 935 F.2d 868 (7th Cir.
1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 971 (1992); see supra notes 98-99 (noting that early realtor affirm-
ative marketing agreements were designed to end discrimination, and not necessarily to promote
integration).
306. See infra notes 308-11 and accompanying text.
307. 674 F. Supp. 1313 (N.D. Ill. 1987).
308. Id. at 1319-20 n.9 (quoting Lind, supra note 5, at 639-40, 642).
309. YALE CONFERENCE. supra note 100, at 123.
310. South-Suburban Hous. Ctr. v. Greater S. Suburban Bd. of Realtors, 713 F. Supp. 1068,
1085 (N.D. II1. 1988), affd in part and rev'd in part, 935 F.2d 868 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied,
112 S. Ct. 971 (1992); see Fair Housing Hearings, supra note 15, at 118 (statement of Alexander
Polikoff) (asserting that the intended effect of affirmative marketing is to redress the situation
where a portion of the market is not working, not to assure a particular occupancy).
311. YALE CONFERENCE. supra note 100, at 122 (remarks of Peter Flemister) (maintaining
that affirmative marketing is similar to racial quotas in that both reach out to everyone except
minorities); Fair Housing Hearings, supra note 15, at 144 (testimony of Robert D. Butters) (ar-
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engaging in affirmative marketing further racial stereotypes by im-
plicitly saying that a black minority is a "social pollutant that has to
be diluted." 31' Furthermore, opponents assert that a group cannot
extend special outreach efforts to one group without lessening efforts
to other groups. But, despite the criticism directed at affirmative
marketing and the fact that thousandsof plans have been imple-
mented in the United States, there is very little litigation involving
the plans a.3 4 Affirmative marketing plans cover two basic strategies:
(1) housing counseling of individual customers;31 5 and/or (2) special
advertising campaigns.3 ' These strategies are implemented by both
public and private entities, and sometimes a combination of both
types of activities.3 1 7
a. Publicly sponsored affirmative marketing efforts
Most court cases addressing the issue of affirmative marketing
have involved government-sponsored plans implemented in public
housing projects; courts almost uniformly support their legality.1
These public affirmative marketing programs are often instituted to
comply with the affirmative mandate to integrate, which is placed
on HUD-funded entities by section 3608(e)(5). 319 HUD regulations
interpreting this mandate require entities receiving federal housing
guing that affirmative marketing makes color-blind marketing impossible). But see id. at 88 (testi-
mony of George C. Calster) (asserting that affirmative marketing does not constitute steering for
five reasons: (1) it involves voluntary home seeker choice; (2) the plans are explicit in their intent;
(3) the plans are evenhanded, including all races of home seekers; (4) the plans expand the range
of housing choices; and (5) the plans have a desegregative effect).
312. Housing Ruling Reaction Divided; Does it Help or Hurt Integration, CHI. TRue., Dec. 25,
1988, § 2, at I [hereinafter Housing Ruling] (reporting fair housing commentators' views).
313. See Jerry Shnay & Linda P. Campbell, Court OK's Race-Based Housing, CH. TRIe., Jan
28, 1992, § I, at I (reporting views of fair housing commentators).
314. See SCHWEMM, supra note 15, § 11.2(2)(b), at 11-10; Reply Brief for Appellant at 13,
South-Suburban Hous. Ctr. v. Greater S. Suburban Bd. of Realtors, 935 F.2d 868 (7th Cir. 1991)
(Nos. 89-2122, 89-2777) (citing trial transcript and noting that over two thousand affirmative
marketing agreements were entered into in Illinois during the last ten years).
315. Steptoe v. Beverly Area Planning Ass'n, 674 F. Supp. 1313, 1315 (N.D. Ill. 1987). But cf
Fair Housing Hearings, supra note 15, at 25 (statement of Alexander Polikoff) (stating that af-
firmative marketing and housing counseling are two separate race-conscious tactics).
316. Almonte v. Pierce, 666 F. Supp. 517 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
317. See infra notes 319-53 and accompanying text.
318. E.g. Alschuler v. United States Dep't of Hous. &.Urban Dev., 686 F.2d 472, 486 (7th
Cir. 1982); Almonte v. Pierce, 666 F. Supp. 517, 522; United States v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ., 635
F. Supp. 1577, 1579 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); Jenkins v. Missouri, 593 F. Supp. 1485, 1499-1500 (W.D.
Mo. 1984).
319. See supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text (discussing the scope and extent of obliga-
tions imposed on public entities by § 3608(e)(5) of the Fair Housing Act).
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assistance to make special outreach efforts to groups that normally
would not be expected to seek housing because of economic or other
considerations. 2 The Supreme Court has held that HUD's inter-
pretation of the Fair Housing Act "ordinarily commands considera-
ble deference."3'' This deference is an important factor in the ap-
proval courts give to government-sponsored affirmative marketing
programs.
22
HUD has also published various handbooks directing HUD par-
ticipants on how to properly formulate an affirmative marketing
plan.32  HUD delineates a two-step process. 324 First, the entity must
identify the population segments least likely to apply for housing
without special outreach efforts, taking into account neighborhood
customs, price, discrimination, and other factors that have the effect
of denying housing choice.325 Second, the entity must develop an
outreach program designed to reach those segments identified as
least likely to apply.326
Almonte v. Piercez1 7 illustrates the legal issues surrounding the
formulation of an affirmative marketing plan by a public entity. The
case involved a claim by Hispanics that a public housing project
wrongfully failed to identify them as a group eligible for special out-
320. See 24 C.FR § 200.600 to .640 (1991) (establishing that entities receiving federal aid for
housing projects have an affirmative duty to make special outreach efforts to underrepresented
racial groups); Id. §§ 880.601(a), 881.601(a) (1991) (establishing that builders receiving subsi-
dized construction loans or other aid must make special outreach efforts to underrepresented ra-
cial groups).
321. Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 107 (1979).
322. See SCHWEMM, supra note 15, § 11.2(2)(e), at 11-27 (arguing that § 3608(e)(5) of the
Fair Housing Act limits the scope of affirmative marketing efforts available to private entities).
323. E.g. U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. & URBAN DEV., AFFIRMATIVE FAIR HOUSING MARKETING
TECHNIQUES: FINAL PROJECT REPORT (Jan. 23, 1976); U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. & URBAN DEV., THE
BALTIMORE PLAN FOR AFFIRMATIVE MARKETING IN REAL ESTATE: FINAL REPORT (Aug. 1983);
U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. & URBAN DEV., IMPLEMENTATION OF AFFIRMATIVE FAIR HOUSING MAR-
KETING REGULATIONS app. 2, at 3 (1973) (noting that special steps may be needed to attract
minorities to white areas and vice versa). Local governments also have published affirmative mar-
keting guidelines. See CLEVELAND COMMUNITY HoUs. RESOURCE BD., STATEMENT ON AFFIRMA-
TIVE ACTION (May 1984); SCOTT WUNKER ET AL., AFFIRMATIVE MARKETING HANDBOOK: A
GUIDE TO INTEGRATED HOUSING (Park Forest, Ill., publ., Apr. 1979).
324. See Almonte v. Pierce, 666 F. Supp. 517, 522 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (citing. provisions con-
tained in the 1982 HUD handbook on equal housing opportunity).
325. Id.
326. Id. The 1973 edition of the handbook indicated that "[flor housing located in predomi-
nantly white areas, it will normally be necessary to make special efforts to make its availability
known to minorities; similarly, for housing in areas of minority concentration, special efforts may
be needed to make its availability known to whites." Id. at 521-22 (citing to the 1975 version of
the HUD handbook.
327. 666 F. Supp. 577 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
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reach efforts.32 The housing authority had made special advertising
efforts in white media for a new public housing project, but chose
not to advertise in Spanish language media.3 29 The district court re-
jected the claim that this action illegally discriminated against His-
panics by making housing otherwise unavailable in violation of sec-
tion 3604(a) of the Fair Housing Act.330 The court reasoned that in
the area of the city where the project was located, Hispanics were
twice as likely to fall below the poverty line as non-Hispanics, and
thus meet the income eligibility requirements for the project.3 31 The
significant numbers of eligible Hispanics showed that the private de-
veloper was correct in not identifying them "as individuals least
likely to apply. 332 Therefore, the court ruled, the statistics were fa-
tal to a claim of discriminatory effect.333
An unanswered issue in government-sponsored affirmative mar-
keting is whether local communities can require private entities to
undertake affirmative marketing activities. '3  The community of
Park Forest South, Illinois (now renamed University Park) adopted
such an ordinance, which required realtors to encourage entry of
racial groups underrepresented in the community as compared to
the group's overall representation in the Chicago metropolitan
area. 335 However, the village rescinded the ordinance after an ad-
ministrative complaint challenging it was filed with HUD.336 Thus,
although private entities may be required to promulgate affirmative
marketing plans by virtue of participating in federally sponsored
housing programs,3 7 it is unclear whether the Fair Housing Act
also allows state and locally sponsored housing programs to require
328. Id.
329. Id. at 520.
330. Id. at 527.
331. Id. at 528.
332. Id. at 529.
333. Id. at 528.
334. See infra notes 336-38 and accompanying text.
335. See Smolla, supra note 122, at 899 (discussing Park Forest South ordinance and also
noting that since blacks constituted 25% of the community, but only 20% of the Chicago metro-
politan area, the effect of the ordinance would compel real estate brokers to encourage whites, and
not blacks, to move to Park Forest South).
336. Arquilla-DeHaan Realtors v. Village of Country Club Hills, No. 80 C 2070 (N.D. Ill.
Oct. 31, 1980); see also MILGRAM, supra note 288, at 97-98. Milgram discusses a Cleveland
Heights, Ohio ordinance targeting a 75:25 white-black racial balance in the city. Milgram notes
that to achieve this balance, information about certain properties within the city was sometimes
deliberately withheld from persons based on their race in order not to upset the target racial
balance. Milgram asserts that these efforts presented a blatant example of steering. Id.
337. See supra note 321 (discussing HUD participation requirements).
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affirmative marketing from their participants.
b. Privately sponsored affirmative marketing programs
The language of the Fair Housing Act does not give private enti-
ties an affirmative mandate to integrate."" HUD regulations also
lack any discussion of whether private groups may engage in affirm-
ative marketing. 3 9 However, the preamble to the regulations states
that "nothing in the Amendments to the Fair Housing Act or their
legislative history would support a conclusion that Congress sought
to make choice-broadening activities such as the Department's Af-
firmative Fair Housing Marketing Program, unlawful discrimina-
tory housing practices." ' The preamble states that these activities
would run afoul of the Act only if they resulted in "choice limita-
tions."3 '1 A recent HUD notice suggests that efforts by for-profit
groups, such as realtors, may be viewed less favorably than efforts
by nonprofit groups such as fair housing organizations. 342  Real es-
tate brokers, unlike fair housing organizations, play a central role in
the real estate transaction, and their actions can more readily re-
strict housing.34 3
The legality of nonprofit fair housing counseling efforts was re-
cently examined in Steptoe v. Beverly Area Planning Association.344
The Steptoe court upheld a private housing council plan that pro-
vided housing information only to people who wanted to make non-
traditional housing moves. 34 5 These nontraditional moves included
338. See supra notes 66-68 (noting that § 3608(e)(5) places duty to integrate only on public
entities).
339. HUD Preamble, supra note 302, at 689-90.
340. Id. at 690. The Preamble further notes that these activities "promote greater opportunities
for persons to participate in . . .housing programs" and are designed to "make available informa-
tion that broadens housing choices for persons." Id.
341. Id.; cf Fair Housing Advertising; Scope, 24 C.F.R. § 109.16(b) (1991) (requiring that
regulations prohibiting certain types of advertising activities "shall not be construed to restrict"
advertising pursuant to an affirmative marketing program).
342. See Recognition of Substantially Equivalent Laws, 53 Fed. Reg. 26,318 (1988) (giving
HUD recognition and approval to a Hazel Crest, Illinois, fair housing ordinance, stating that
"nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit special outreach efforts conducted by units
of local government or non-profit fair housing agencies").
343. Fair Housing Hearings, supra note 15, at 188 (statement of Alexander Polikoff). Unlike
realtors, the bulk of municipalities and housing centers engaged in affirmative marketing do not
own or control the housing stock. Id. at 188-89. Polikoff observes, in contrast, that brokers are
involved in the actual mechanics of buying property; they suggest homes to be shown or not
shown. Thus, Polikoff asserts, realtors may more easily make housing unavailable. Id.
344. 674 F. Supp. 1313 (ND. Ill. 1987).
345. Id. at 1315-16 (the justification for the program by the goal of preventing tipping).
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black customers moving to predominantly white neighborhoods, or
white customers moving to integrated neighborhoods. 46 People de-
siring to make "traditional" moves were referred to normal market-
ing channels. 47 The district court rejected a claim that this practice
constituted illegal steering, noting that the council's practice of fully
informing all customers of their policy avoided this danger." 8 The
court also reasoned that the council did not directly participate in
real estate transactions but rather only supplemented normal real
estate marketing channels. Thus, the council, did not "otherwise
make unavailable" or deny housing to customers in violation of sec-
tion 3604(a) of the Fair Housing Act. 49
In addition to purely private affirmative marketing efforts, there is
also a notable example of a cooperative race-conscious marketing
effort between a local government and a private housing organiza-
tion. In Oak Park, eighty percent of the 10,600 rental units in the
Village are listed with the Oak Park Housing Center ("Center"), a
fair housing agency supported both by private grants and Village
appropriations. 50 The Center counsels residents, real estate agents,
prospective renters, and home buyers on the merits of making in-
tegrative moves, particularly when a neighborhood is attracting a
disproportionate number of blacks.3 51 This cooperative effort in Oak
Park has not been directly challenged under the Fair Housing Act.
Nevertheless, the reaction to the Park Forest South ordinance illus-
trates the intense debate engendered by the use of affirmative mar-
keting techniques by both public and private entities. The fact that
346. Id. at 1315.
347. Id. at 1316. The Housing Council was not affiliated with the real estate industry and was
not involved in the sale, rental, or transfer of real estate. Id.
348. Id. at 1320; see also Lind, supra note 5, at 640 nn. 187-88 (noting that realtors opposing
affirmative marketing accuse it of functioning as steering, and that steering is illegal regardless of
its effect). Lind also notes there is disagreement as to what is illegal-the act of influencing itself,
or influencing so as to effect a predictable, segregative effect. Id.
Affirmative marketing plans are not without burdens, especially those plans focusing solely on
integrated neighborhoods, because their services are restricted solely to whites. But, "to the extent
that such services do not supplant the traditional real estate market," such burdens are unlikely to
override the programs' important statutory objectives. Gelber, supra note 104, at 958-59; see also
Note, supra note 105, at 955 (advocating affirmative marketing but warning that if benign steer-
ing becomes pervasive in society, blacks will have no alternative but to live in a community with a
white majority).
349. Steptoe. 674 F. Supp. at 1319 (noting that information needed to make traditional moves
was readily available through other sources).
350. Brenda Wilhelmson, Renter-Friendly Village; Oak Park Center Dedicated to Apartments,
Racial Unity, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 27, 1990 (Your place), at 37.
351. ld.; Gelber, supra note 104; at 937-38; Firstman, supra note 101, at 8-9.
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Park Forest South rescinded its ordinance before its legality under
Title VIII was determined also reflects the fear that some affirma-
tive marketing activities may expose their proponents to legal liabil-
ity.3 52 Left unanswered is the issue of whether all affirmative mar-
keting efforts can always successfully thread the tension between
Title VIII's dual goals of promoting integration and preventing
discrimination.
The following section of this Note discusses the Seventh Circuit's
recent decision in South-Suburban Housing Center v. Greater
South Suburban Board of Realtors, 53 and analyzes its effort to re-
solve some of these unanswered questions surrounding race-con-
scious integration programs.
II. SUBJECT OPINION: SOUTH SUBURBAN-HOUSING CENTER V.
GREATER SOUTH SUBURBAN BOARD OF REALTORS
This case deals with the legality of private and community efforts
to maintain racial balance in the community of Park Forest, Illinois.
The controversy in. South-Suburban Housing Center v. Greater
South Suburban Board of Realtors3 54 arose over the propriety of
the South-Suburban Housing Center ("Housing Center") making
special efforts to market houses in black neighborhoods to white
home buyers. 55 Park Forest was developed as a planned community
by American Community Builders.3 56 Since its incorporation in
1949, Park Forest has actively encouraged open housing throughout
its community.3 57 The community developed a cooperative network
between government agencies and private groups, including the real
estate industry, to help maintain racial balance within its borders. 58
These efforts at integration maintenance included public relations
efforts, housing counseling, and promotion of commercial develop-
352. See Fair Housing Hearings, supra note 15, at 138 (statement of Robert D. Butters) (as-
serting that the failure of Congress to provide specifically for race-conscious marketing techniques
creates intolerable conflict for realtors attempting to promote neighborhood integration).
353. 713 F. Supp. 1068 (N.D. Ill. 1988), aft'd in part and rev'd in part, 935 F.2d 868 (7th Cir.
1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 971 (1992).
354. Id.
355. South-Suburban Hous. Ctr. v. Greater S, Suburban Bd. of Realtors, 935 F.2d 868, 872
(7th Cir. 1991), cert.denied, 112 S. Ct. 971 (1992).
356. Rose Helper, Success and Resistance Factors in the Maintenance of Racially Mixed
Neighborhoods, in HOUSING DESEGREGATION AND FEDERAL POLICY, supra note 77, at 170, 186.
357. Id. (noting that Village trustees created a Commission on Human Relations in 1951 to
plan for peaceful race relations within Park Forest).
358. Id. at 186-87.
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ment3 59 The affirmative marketing activities giving rise to the
South-Suburban Housing Center litigation developed as a response
to rapid racial turnover in a Chicago Heights neighborhood border-
ing Park Forest. This rapid racial transition in turn threatened sta-
ble integration within Park Forest.
3 10
A. Facts and Early Procedural History
During the early 1970s, many blacks moved into the Apache
Street neighborhood in Park Forest, Illinois. 6 By the 1980 census,
the block was fifty-six percent black, and there was little white de-
mand for housing in the neighborhood.36 2 The lack of white demand
was exacerbated by mortgage foreclosures on the street, which re-
sulted in abandoned homes and a blighted appearance. 6 To combat
359. Id.; see BERRY, supra note 1, at 372. During the 1960s, the local government and real
estate brokers within Park Forest also attempted to maintain a stable racial balance by scattering
incoming black home buyers throughout the community, thus avoiding clustering of blacks within
a neighborhood. This was accomplished through race dispersal lists provided by the village
Human Relations Committee. These lists allowed the village to manipulate and control the loca-
tions of black families moving into the community. Id. at 370-73. This type of activity was eventu-
ally prohibited by the 1973 Park Forest Fair Housing Ordinance, which prohibited the "'steering
of majority and minority home buyers or tenants to, from or within Park Forest.' " Id. at 372
(quoting the village ordinance).
360. BERRY. supra note 1, at 356-69. In 1970, a national construction company began to de-
velop the Forest Heights area adjacent to the Eastgate subdivision with low cost homes. Id. at
356. These homes were advertised primarily in black media, and attracted numerous inner-city
blacks who saw the development as a chance to escape from the urban ghetto. Id. The resulting
influx of blacks strained the existing school system, forcing busing of black children into Eastgate
neighborhood schools. The Beacon Hill school, located within the Forest Heights neighborhood,
changed from 25% black to 90% black during 1970 to 1971, which contributed to white flight
from the neighborhoods adjacent to Forest Heights. Id. at 360.
361. South-Suburban Hous. Ctr. v. Greater S. Suburban Bd. of Realtors, 935 F.2d 868, 873
(7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 971 (1992). The Forest Heights subdivision immediately
north of Apache Street had been 99% black since 1972. South-Suburban Hous. Ctr., 713 F.
Supp. 1068, 1076 (N.D. II1. 1988), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 935 F.2d 868, cert. denied, 112
S. Ct. 971 (1992). Apache Street is located within the Eastgate subdivision of Park Forest. The
first black families moved onto Apache street in 1971-72. Shortly thereafter, some houses began to
deteriorate, and property crimes substantially increased. Real estate brokers began steering white
customers from the Eastgate subdivision, as rumors circulated that it could "go black." BERRY,
supra note 1, at 365-67.
362. South-Suburban Hous. Ctr., 935 F.2d at 873. In comparison to the racial makeup of
Apache Street, the percentage of blacks in the Village of Park Forest was 17% as of the 1980
census. South-Suburban Hous. Cir., 713, F. Supp. at 1083. The Apache Street census block had
more than double the black population of any other census block in the subdivision in which it was
located. South-Suburban Hous. Ctr., 935 F.2d at 873.
363. South-Suburban Hous. Ctr., 935 F.2d at 873. The fact that many inner-city blacks lived
in the Eastgate-Forest Heights area, as opposed to blacks from higher socioeconomic backgrounds,
contributed to the high rate of foreclosures. Many families were comprised solely of women and
children, and for most of them "the transition was from a high-rise slum to a one-family house
DEPA UL LA W RE VIE W [Vol. 41:1271
this problem, the Village of Park Forest began to purchase vacant or
abandoned homes in order to rehabilitate and resell them. 3 4 The
South-Suburban Housing Center, a private, not-for-profit group,
then contracted with the Village to buy, rehabilitate, and then resell
three of the vacant properties located on Apache Street. 65 The con-
tract stipulated that the Housing Center would use affirmative mar-
keting efforts to resell the properties.366
The Housing Center listed the properties with a local Century 21
real estate agent. As part of the listing agreement, the agent's com-
mission depended on his making certain special outreach efforts to
potential white buyers. 6 7 These efforts included (1) placement of
advertisements in newspapers with a predominantly white circula-
tion, (2) distribution of information in selected rental developments,
and (3) distribution of information to selected employers.36 8 Century
21 then submitted the listings to the multiple listing service operated
by the Greater South Suburban Board of Realtors ("Board of Real-
tors" or "Board"). 69 The Board subsequently withdrew the Apache
Street properties from its service, asserting that the plan discrimi-
nated against minorities. 370 This multiple listing service included
properties and real estate brokers throughout the southern suburbs
of Chicago.Y Century 21 had contracted with the multiple listing
[that] began deteriorating because they had no experience in keeping a place up." BERRY. supra
note 1, at 356 (quoting CHI. SUN TIMES, July 9, 1971).
364. South-Suburban Hous. Cr., 935 F.2d at 873.
365. Id. South-Suburban Housing Center conducts fair housing activities throughout the south-
ern suburbs of Chicago. These activities include affirmative action efforts, as well as enforcement
of the Act's antidiscrimination provisions through the use of testers. The center filed forty lawsuits
or administrative charges alleging housing discrimination from 1975 to 1988. See Housing Rul-
ing. supra note 312, at 2.
366. South-Suburban Hous. Or., 935 F.2d at 873.
367. Id.
368. Id. at 873. The plan also required the realtor to take no action that limited the housing
choice of any client on the basis of race. Id.
369. Id. The special outreach efforts did not require the multiple listing service, or its other
member brokers, to engage in special outreach activities. There was no reference in the multiple
listing publication to affirmative marketing or special outreach. South-Suburban Hous. Ctr. v.
Greater S. Suburban Bd. of Realtors, 713 F. Supp. 1068, 1077 (N.D. III. 1988), aFf'd in part and
rev'd in part, 935 F.2d 868, cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 971 (1992). However, if a multiple listing
service participant showed the Apache Street properties to- a customer, he was to provide the
Century 21 agent with customer information, including race. Id.
370. South-Suburban Hous. Or., 935 F.2d at 873-74. The Board of Realtors also asserted that
the plan violated the Realtor Code of Ethics and the voluntary affirmative marketing agreement
with HUD. A complaint was also filed against the agent with the realtor's equal opportunity
commission, but was later withdrawn. Id.
371. South-Suburban Hous. Ctr., 713 F. Supp. at 1074.
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services to submit all of its listings to the service." 2 In return, Cen-
tury 21 received access to the listings provided by all other members
of the service. 73 Century 21 could then show these additional list-
ings to its home seeking prospects.37 If the client bought a house
listed by a member broker, Century 21 would then share in the
commission.375 The Board of Realtors later allowed the Housing
Center access on the condition that it indemnify the Board from any
liability arising from the plan.376
The Housing Center sued for relief under the Fair Housing Act,
alleging that the Board's denial of access to the multiple listing ser-
vice (1) had the effect of making the Apache Street properties oth-
erwise unavailable to whites in violation of section 3604(a), (2) vio-
lated section 3606 by discriminating against whites in the provision
of brokerage services on account of race, and (3) interfered with the
Housing Center on account of its encouraging whites in the exercise
of their housing rights, and thus violated section 3617. 377 The Board
of Realtors counterclaimed for declaratory and injunctive relief
under the Act, asserting that the Housing Center's affirmative mar-
keting plan constituted steering of individuals on the basis of race
and thus made housing "otherwise unavailable" in violation of sec-
tion 3604(a).3 7 The Village of Park Forest was also joined as a de-
fendant, on the basis that it was also involved with the efforts to
affirmatively market the Apache Street properties.379
B. The District Court Decision
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illi-
nois ruled that the Housing Center's affirmative marketing plan was
per se legal, holding that it did not contemplate the lessening of
372. Id. at 1077.
373. Id.
374. Id.
375. Id.; see supra note 45 (discussing the advantages of using a multiple listing service to
market property).
376. South-Suburban Hous. Or., 935 F.2d 868, 874 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct.
971 (1992).
377. South-Suburban Hous. Ctr., 713 F. Supp. at 1079-80. The Housing Center also filed
claims against the Board alleging breach of contract and tortious interference with a contract. Id.
at 1080-81.
378. Id. at 1083. The Board also claimed that the affirmative marketing plan violated §§ 1982-
1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, as well as the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Id. The district court denied each of the civil rights claims, and ruled that the real-
tors did not have standing to assert an equal protection violation. Id. at 1084-86.
379. South-Suburban Hous. Ctr., 935 F.2d at 872.
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normal marketing activities, and thus did not "affect detrimentally
the availability of housing" to any person on account of race.3 80 The
district court utilized the Arlington Heights multifactor test 38' to
analyze whether the special outreach efforts to whites denied or
made unavailable housing to minorities in violation of section
3604(a) of the Act. 3 2 The district court held: (1) The program did
not have a disparate impact on the availability of housing to minori-
ties, as it served to increase, not decrease, the existing supply of
housing information; (2) there was no discriminatory intent, as no
evidence indicated the Housing Center intended to control the
movement and distribution of minorities; (3) the Housing Center
activities were infused with a strong public interest, as their purpose
was to promote the national goal of stable, integrated housing; and
(4) the relief sought by the Board of Realtors would permanently
enjoin the Housing Center from using this program, which would
require an unacceptable level of judicial intrusion on the Housing
Center's autonomy.383 The district court concluded that all four Ar-
lington Heights factors weighed in favor of the Housing Center. 8 4
The district court also ruled that the restrictions imposed by the
Board of Realtors on access to the multiple listing service did not
violate any provision of the Fair Housing Act. 8  The district court
reasoned that the decision by the Board to initially deny and later
condition access of the Apache Street properties to its multiple list-
ing service was not a pretext to discrimination, but was motivated
by legitimate fears of liability and philosophical disagreement with
380. South-Suburban Hous. Cr., 713 F. Supp. at 1086. South-Suburban Housing Center was
consolidated with several other cases dealing with various real estate practices in the south subur-
ban area of Chicago: Greater South Suburban Board of Realtors v. City of Blue Island, City of
Country Club Hills, Village of Glenwood, Village of Hazel Crest, Village of Matteson, Village of
Park Forest, Village of Richton Park, Village of University Park. Id. at 1090-103. The primary
issues in these cases involved the legality of certain "anti-blockbusting" ordinances limiting the
ability of realtors to solicit business in the community, and ordinances limiting the size and place-
ment of for-sale signs on property. Id. at 1090. The district court approved various municipal
ordinances limiting the size and placement of for-sale signs, the ordinance's purpose being to mini-
mize white panic and flight in the face of changing racial demographics in the area. Id. at 1091.
The court struck down one ordinance that banned all for-sale signs. Id. It also struck down as
unconstitutionally vague antisolicitation ordinances that prohibited realtors from soliciting or con-
tacting any resident regarding real estate if that resident did not want to be contacted, ruling that
they violated the First Amendment. Id. at 1096.
381. See supra text accompanying notes 200-06 (outlining parameters of test in detail).
382. South-Suburban Hous. Ctr., 713 F. Supp. at 1087.
383. Id. at 1087-88.
384. Id. at 1088.
385. Id. at 1080.
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the special outreach efforts.386 Applying the Arlington Heights test,
the district court also held that the restrictions did not have a dis-
criminatory effect on white home buyers.387 The Board of Realtors
appealed the district court's ruling that the Housing Center's affirm-
ative marketing plan was legal. 388 The appeal by both parties to the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals followed.
C. The Seventh Circuit's Decision
The Seventh Circuit upheld the district court ruling on all
counts. 38 9 It held that the affirmative marketing plan did not dis-
criminate against minorities in violation of the Fair Housing Act.39
It also held that the multiple listing service restrictions imposed by
the Board of Realtors did not discriminate against white home
386. Id. at 1079 (noting that affirmative marketing was uncertain legal terrain at the time and,
observing that although the plan was legal, "there was substantial room for disagreement, on both
the legal and philosophical front").
387. Id. at 1079-80. The Housing Center elected not to appeal the district court's ruling that
restricting or conditioning access to the multiple listing service by the Board did not have a dis-
criminatory effect on whites. As to the degree of discriminatory effect of the multiple listing ser-
vice restrictions, the district court first held that since the purpose of the special outreach program
was to attract whites to the properties in numbers beyond what would normally be expected with
typical marketing programs, the affirmative marketing itself had a disparate impact, and "[t]o the
extent that defendants' activities may decrease[,I the impact of affirmative marketing would not
itself equal disparate impact." Id. It also held that the denial of listing service access did not
perpetuate segregation and that -[t]he actions of defendants in denying use its [multiple listing
service], if anything, would make it more difficult to sell the homes to blacks." Id. at 1080.
As to the Board's motivation for denying listing service access, the court ruled that the Board's
fear of liability exposure for illegal steering if it cooperated was legitimate. Id. In analyzing the
character of relief sought by the Housing Center, the district court noted that the Housing Center
sought to "compel defendants to assist in its affirmative marketing activities," although it noted
the intrusion was not severe. Id. Weighing the Arlington Heights factors, the district court ruled
that the conditioning of access to the multiple listing service did not have a discriminatory effect
against white home buyers. Id.
388. South-Suburban Hous. Ctr. v. Greater S. Suburban Bd. of Realtors, 935 F.2d 868, 878
(7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 971 (1992).
389. Id. at 871. In a lengthy analysis, the Seventh Circuit also upheld the district court ruling
that the realtors lacked standing to assert the equal protection claims of black home buyers. Stat-
ing that third-party standing is discouraged under the Constitution, the court reasoned that it was
unclear whether the interests of the realtors and black home buyers were coterminous. Id. at 880.
With respect to the consolidated cases, the Seventh Circuit upheld all but one of the ordinances
limiting the use of for-sale signs. Id. at 887-97. The Seventh Circuit reversed the district court
regarding the legality of a for-sale sign ordinance in Country Club Hills. It held that the $50
licensing fee imposed by the village was not related to a legitimate government purpose, and
therefore violated the First Amendment. Id. at 898. The Seventh Circuit also reversed the district
court's ruling on the antisolicitation ordinances, and held that the ordinances constituted valid
time, place, and manner restrictions on the realtors' limited commercial speech rights. Id. at 894.
390. Id. at 884-85.
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buyers. 91
I. Affirmative Marketing Ruling
The court first ruled that the affirmative marketing plan did not
"make unavailable or deny" housing to minorities in violation of
section 3604(a) of the Act. 92 The court noted that section 3604(a)
prohibits discriminatory actions, or certain actions with significant
discriminatory effects, that affect the availability of housing."' 3 It
then rejected the Board of Realtors' claim that the plan directed
information about housing away from blacks and towards whites
and thus limited the availability of housing for black home buy-
ers."9 4 The Board had argued that the affirmative marketing efforts
illegally subordinated equal housing opportunity to the goal of inte-
gration.3 95 The Seventh Circuit cited United States v. Starrett City
Associates"'6 and United States v. Charlottesville Redevelopment
and Housing Authority39 7 as mandating the conclusion that an in-
terest in racial integration alone is insufficient to justify a racial sys-
tem that favors whites and thereby lessens housing opportunities for
minorities.3 98 The court then distinguished the Park Forest affirma-
tive marketing plan from the racial quotas invalidated in Starrett
City and Charlottesville.99 It reasoned that, unlike racial quotas,
the affirmative marketing efforts did not exclude minorities from
housing opportunities. 00 Therefore, there were no conflicting goals,
since the plan did not promote integration at the expense of equal
housing opportunity. 10'
The Seventh Circuit then used the racial steering standard of re-
view to analyze the Board of Realtors' claim that the plan deterred
blacks from buying in Park Forest by directing essential information
391. Id. at 886-87.
392. Id. at 882.
393. Id. (citing Southend Neighborhood Improvement Ass'n v. County of St. Clair, 743 F.2d
1207, 1209-10 (7th Cir. 1984)).
394. Id. at 884.
395. Id. at 882.
396. 840 F.2d 1096 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 946 (1988).
397. 718 F. Supp. 461 (W.D. Va. 1989).
398. South-Suburban Hous. Ctr., 935 F.2d at 883; see supra notes 250-62, 272-76 and accom-
panying text (discussing the reasoning of Starrett City and Charlottesville).
399. South-Suburban Hous. Ctr., 935 F.2d at 883.
400. Id.
401. Id.; see also supra notes 123-30 (discussing the fact that race-conscious integration efforts
also create social and political tensions, in addition to legal tension).
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about the properties away from blacks, and by stigmatizing black
residents and home seekers. 402 The court, citing Village of Bellwood
v. Dwivedi,40 a stated that the element of intent required in a steering
case was the same as required for Title VIII cases brought on a
disparate treatment theory." 4 Village of Bellwood held that dispa-
rate treatment means treating persons differently because of their
race, and implies a purpose to use race as a decision-making tool.405
The South-Suburban Housing Center court stated that " '[p1roof of
a discriminatory motive is critical' in a Title VII disparate treat-
ment case, 'although it can in some cases be inferred from the mere
fact of differences in treatment.' "4106
Applying the standard of review to the facts, the Seventh Circuit
reasoned that the affirmative marketing plan merely created addi-
tional traffic to the properties, since they were primarily of interest
to blacks. 0 7 The affirmative marketing plan would constitute illegal
steering only if individual customers were denied housing or misled
as to its availability on the basis of race.4 8 The court found that the
Housing Center did not intend to decrease or restrict black traffic
through its plan.40 In contrast, the Housing Center attempted to
direct information about additional housing opportunities to white
home buyers that they "might not ordinarily know about and thus
choose to pursue. 4 10 Therefore, the Seventh Circuit concluded,
since the special outreach efforts merely created additional white
traffic to the properties, and did not involve lessening of efforts to
attract black home buyers, the Housing Center's affirmative market-
ing plan did not constitute intentional discrimination. 411 The Sev-
enth Circuit also rejected the Board of Realtors' argument that the
increased competition among black and white home buyers was dis-
criminatory, stating that "this is precisely the type of robust multi-
402. South-Suburban Hous. Ctr., 935 F.2d at 883-84.
403. 895 F.2d 1521 (7th Cir. 1990).
404. South-Suburban Hous. Ctr., 935 F.2d at 883 (citing Village of Bellwood, 895 F.2d at
1529-30).
405. 895 F.2d at 1529-30.
406. South-Suburban Hous. Or., 935 F.2d at 883 (citing Village of Bellwood, 895 F.2d 1521,
1529-30 (7th Cir.) (quoting International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335
n.15 (1977))).
407. ld. at 883-84.
408. Id. at 884 (citing Village of Bellwood v. Dwivedi, 895 F.2d 1521, 1530 (7th Cir. 1990)).
409. Id.
410. Id.
411. Id. The court further stated that the affirmative marketing plan, in addition to promoting
integration, also served the Act's purpose of making housing equally available to all. Id.
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racial market activity which the Fair Housing Act intends to
stimulate. 412
The court also rejected the Board of Realtors' claim that the spe-
cial outreach advertising indicated a preference based on race in vi-
olation of section 3604(c), which prohibits discriminatory advertise-
ments.41 It noted that the affirmative marketing merely provided
additional color-blind promotion and advertising towards a racial
group underrepresented in the community.414 The plan contained no
quota or other provisions purporting to make race a factor in deter-
mining who could purchase the homes.41 5 Thus, The Seventh Circuit
concluded that the efforts were not an improper statement of racial
preference.41 "
2. The Multiple Listing Service Ruling
The Seventh Circuit also ruled that the Board of Realtors did not
violate the Fair Housing Act by denying or conditioning access of
the Apache Street properties to its multiple listing service.41 7 Noting
that this was an issue of first impression, the court first found that
the Board did not violate section 3606 of the Act by intentionally
discriminating against white home buyers in the provision of broker-
age services.418 It held that although the Fair Housing Act permits
affirmative marketing, it does not require it, nor does it require one
party to cooperate with the affirmative marketing efforts of an-
other.419 Addressing the issue of whether the Board's philosophical
disagreement with affirmative marketing would justify restrictions
on access to its multiple listing service, the Seventh Circuit relied on
Village of Bellwood4 20 for the proposition that the Fair Housing Act
"does not impose liability for failing to promote integration ..
412. Id. The court stated that affirmative marketing "may simply be a wise business move" in
that it stimulates increased competition in the marketplace. Id.
413. Id. at 884-85; see supra note 39 (discussing parameters of §3604(c)).
414. South-Suburban Hous. Ctr., 935 F.2d at 884.
415. Id. at 884-85.
416. Id.
417. Id. at 886.
418. Id.; see 42 U.S.C. § 3606 (1988) (making it "unlawful to deny any person access to or
membership or participation in any multiple listing service . . . or to discriminate against him in
the terms or conditions of such access, membership or participation, on account of race"). The
Housing Center elected not to appeal the district court ruling that the board's action did not have
a discriminatory effect against white home buyers in violation of § 3604(a) of the Act. South-
Suburban Hous. Or., 935 F.2d at 885 n.14.
419. South-Suburban Hous. Ctr., 935 F.2d at 885-86.
420. 895 F.2d 1521 (7th Cir. 1990).
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[and] [i]f the broker treats all his customers the same, regardless of
race, he is not liable."42 Reasoning from this proposition, the Sev-
enth Circuit concluded that a realtor's decision to adopt a color-
blind marketing policy could never constitute discrimination on the
basis of race.422 Therefore, since the multiple listing service restric-
tions were adopted to further this color-blind policy, they did not
constitute discrimination in the provision of brokerage services.42 3
The court also ruled that the multiple listing service limitations
did not violate section 3617 of the Fair Housing Act by interfering
with the Housing Center on account of its efforts to inform white
persons of housing opportunities.424 The court held that under the
factual circumstances of this case, the section 3617 prohibition
against interfering with the exercise or enjoyment of housing rights
did not provide an independent source of liability.425 The Seventh
Circuit's reasoning relied on a footnote in Metropolitan Housing
Development Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights,426 which stated
that where conduct alleged to have violated section 3617 is the same
conduct that allegedly violated another section of the Act (i.e., oth-
erwise making housing unavailable), the validity of the interference
claim depends on whether the conduct also violates the other sec-
tion.427 Here, the Board of Realtors' restriction on multiple listing
service access was alleged to have violated both the prohibition
against discrimination in brokerage services and the prohibition
against interfering with the exercise of housing rights.42 8 Since there
was no discrimination in brokerage services, the Seventh Circuit
reasoned that there was also no illegal interference with the exercise
421. South-Suburban Hous. Ctr., 935 F.2d at 886 (quoting Village of Bellwood, 895 F.2d at
1531).
422. Id. But cf. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283
(7th Cir. 1977) (holding that facially neutral public policies that have the effect of perpetuating
segregation may illegally discriminate on the basis of race), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1025 (1978).
423. South-Suburban Hous. Ctr., 935 F.2d at 885-86.
424. Id.; see supra notes 46-53 and accompanying text (discussing the three separate ways a §
3617 interference violation can be established).
425. South-Suburban Hous. Ctr., 935 F.2d at 886.
426. 558 F.2d 1283 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1025 (1978).
427. South-Suburban Hous. Ctr., 935 F.2d at 886 (quoting Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp. v.
Village of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1288 n.5 (7th Cir. 1977)). In Arlington Heights, the
Seventh Circuit held that under the facts of the case, the validity of the § 3617 claim depended
upon whether the village's failure to rezone for low-income housing also made housing "otherwise
unavailable" for minorities in violation of § 3604(a). Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d at 1288. The
Arlington Heights court left open the question of whether § 3617 can ever be violated in the
absence of other Title VIII violations. Id.
428. South-Suburban Hous. Ctr.. 935 F.2d at 886.
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of housing rights.4 29 It stated that the realtors did not oppose whites
learning about the properties. The realtors merely disagreed with
the special outreach efforts to them. 430 The Seventh Circuit thus
concluded that the Housing Center "failed to demonstrate interfer-
ence with the aiding or encouraging of other persons in the exercise
of rights under the Fair Housing Act." 431
111. ANALYSIS
The Seventh Circuit, as a result of its decision in South-Suburban
Housing Center, became the first federal appellate court to uphold
the use of private affirmative marketing efforts. In particular, the
court's decision sanctions the use of affirmative marketing tech-
niques by private, for-profit realtors,432 who are among the most in-
fluential institutions in the housing industry. 3 Although the hold-
ing was correct, the Seventh Circuit conducted an incomplete legal
analysis of the affirmative marketing plan. The Park Forest affirma-
tive marketing plan did not present a traditional steering issue for
analysis, as the reasoning of the Seventh Circuit implies. Thus, reli-
ance solely on a discriminatory intent standard is misplaced. In-
stead, the affirmative marketing efforts at issue focused on potential,
unidentified customers, and whether these efforts reduced the avail-
ability of housing information to minorities. Prior case precedent
under Title VIII shows that, under section 3604(a), determining if
affirmative marketing affected the availability of housing requires
analyzing the plan under a discriminatory effect standard as well. 34
In particular, affirmative marketing may be noble in its purpose, but
its implementation may unintentionally reduce the volume of hous-
ing information available to minorities. This Note offers a test for
429. Id.
430. Id. at 886-87. The Seventh Circuit stated that the Fair Housing Act guarantees equal
treatment, not preferential treatment. Id. at 886.
431. Id. The court further noted that limiting access to the multiple listing service did not limit
the ability of the South Suburban Housing Center to aid or encourage white persons "in their
right to enjoy equal treatment in the housing market." Id. at 887 (emphasis added).
432. Id.
433. See supra note 18 (discussing ability of real estate brokers to change quickly the racial
composition of neighborhoods through blockbusting tactics).
434. See Steptoe v. Beverly Area Planning Ass'n, 674 F. Supp. 1313, 1319 n.7 (N.D. Ill. 1987)
(holding that § 3604(a) does not only prohibit steering, but all practices that have "the effect of
making housing unavailable to minorities"); see also Southend Neighborhood Improvement Ass'n
v. County of St. Clair, 743 F.2d 1207, 1209-10 (7th Cir. 1984) (noting that § 3604(a) is con-
cerned with both discriminatory actions and neutral actions with discriminatory effects).
1332 [Vol. 41:1271
RACE-BASED REAL ESTATE MARKETING
determining whether minority access to housing information has
been reduced by a particular affirmative marketing plan, and if so,
whether the reduction violates the Fair Housing Act by otherwise
making unavailable or denying housing on account of race.
The court's decision in South-Suburban Housing Center gave a
ringing endorsement to the use of affirmative marketing plans by
private entities. However, the Seventh Circuit simultaneously re-
moved the teeth from its endorsement by holding that realtors do
not have to cooperate with other realtors' affirmative marketing ac-
tivities.435 Specifically, it held that realtors can withhold services
from other realtors engaging in special outreach efforts. In urban
areas, where cooperation between realtors is an important compo-
nent of real estate sales,' 36 the effect of South-Suburban Housing
Center is to make affirmative marketing techniques "otherwise un-
available" for many realtors. Far from allowing realtors to withhold
cooperation from affirmative marketing efforts, South-Suburban
Housing Center actually sanctions the right of realtors to interfere
with private affirmative marketing efforts. This directly contravenes
the express prohibitions of section 3617 of the Act.
This section of the Note critically examines the Seventh Circuit's
decision regarding restricting access to the multiple listing service.
It posits that (1) requiring the Board of Realtors to unconditionally
list the Apache Street properties in its multiple listing service would
not force the Board to cooperate with the Housing Center's special
outreach efforts, and (2) the access restriction established an inter-
ference violation under section 3617 of the Act, independent of the
extent the restrictions discriminated in the provision of brokerage
services.
A. Legality of the Affirmative Marketing Plan
South-Suburban Housing Center represents the first federal ap-
pellate court decision to explicitly hold that private race-conscious
programs to maintain integration in housing are legal under the
Fair Housing Act.437 This subsection analyzes the South-Suburban
435. South-Suburban Hous. Ctr., 935 F.2d at 886-88.
436. See supra note 45 (discussing the role the multiple listing service plays in urban housing
sales).
437. Other cases supporting affirmative marketing programs involved government programs or
were decided at the district court level. E.g., United States v. Pelzer Realty Co., 537 F.2d 841,
844 (5th Cir. 1976) (federally subsidized private development); Steptoe, 674 F. Supp. 1313 (N.D.
Ill 1987) (affirmative marketing conducted by private neighborhood fair housing counseling
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Housing Center decision regarding the legality of affirmative mar-
keting in light of prior Title VIII case precedent involving benign
race-conscious plans; as well as analyzing how faithful the Seventh
Circuit was to the current analogy between the Title VII and Title
VIII standards of review.
1. Applying the Steptoe Doctrine
The 'decision in South-Suburban Housing Center represents an
important extension of doctrine established in Steptoe v. Beverly
Area Planning Association,438 which upheld the legality of private
housing information programs that assisted only those willing to
make integrative moves.4 39 The Steptoe court reasoned that the pro-
gram did not illegally steer customers or negatively affect the avail-
ability of housing information, because normal real estate channels
were still available and the housing center did not participate or
influence any real estate transactions.44
South-Suburban Housing Center extended this doctrine to parties
with a direct stake in real estate transactions."" Unlike the center in
Steptoe, South-Suburban Housing Center and Century 21 sought to
directly influence housing transactions through affirmative market-
ing activities.442 The Seventh Circuit held that this direct influence
did not illegally steer persons to different properties based on their
race. 4 According to the court, the Housing Center's affirmative
marketing program did not seek to steer individual customers by
directing home buyers interested in equivalent properties to different
areas according to their race.444 Like the situation in Steptoe, the
normal real estate marketing channels were available and unal-
tered.445 Instead, the Housing Center sought to stimulate interest in
the Apache Street properties by steering additional information
about them to white home buyers, who were underrepresented in the
center); Alschuler v. HUD, 515 F. Supp. 1212, 1234 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (affirmative marketing of
public housing project), affd, 686 F.2d 472 (7th Cir. 1982).
438. 674 F. Supp. 1313 (N.D. Ill. 1987).
439. Id. at 1315.
440. Id. at 1319.
441. South-Suburban Hous. Ctr. v. Greater S. Suburban Bd. of Realtors, 935 F.2d 868, 882-84
(7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 971 (1992).
442. Id. at 883 (discussing the plan's purpose of stimulating white traffic to an area with little
present white interest).
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community.' 6 There was no lessening of efforts to attract black
home buyers. The Seventh Circuit held that stimulating competi-
tion by directing additional information to a certain racial group did
not deny housing to minorities in violation of section 3604(a). 4 8 The
Seventh Circuit essentially sailed into uncharted waters with this
reasoning, broadening the scope of permissible affirmative market-
ing programs beyond what even HUD had intimated was
appropriate. 4 9
South-Suburban Housing Center endorses the use of affirmative
marketing by for-profit real estate professionals. HUD has given ap-
proval to affirmative marketing by private nonprofit fair housing
agencies, but its regulations are silent in regards to its use by real-
tors, whose influence in the marketplace could easily tip affirmative
marketing into racial steering. 451 South-Suburban Housing Center
is best interpreted as allowing cooperative special outreach ventures
between fair housing agencies and private realtors.45 1 It should not
stand for the premise that private realtors or realty groups may uni-
laterally undertake affirmative marketing ventures.46 2
2. Adherence to the Title VII/Title VIII Analogy
South-Suburban Housing Center also widened the separation be-
tween Title VII and Title VIII doctrine. In the Title VII employ-
ment context, voluntary efforts by private employers to maintain an
446. Id. at 873, 884; Fair Housing Hearings, supra note 15, at 118 (statement of Alexander
Polikoff) (noting that affirmative marketing is designed to redress a situation where a portion of
the market is not working); YALE CONFERENCE, supra note 100, at 90 (statement of Donald
DeMarco) (arguing that true integration is a situation "where there is black, white and other
demand: all of the black, white and other demand"). DeMarco further states that housing prices
are dependent upon how many people who can afford it are in competition for it. Id. at 92 (state-
ment of Donald DeMarco).
447. South-Suburban Hous. Cr., 935 F.2d at 884.
448. Id. at 884-85.
449. See infra text accompanying note 450.
450. Fair Housing Hearings, supra note 15, at 188 (statement of Alexander Polikoff) (noting
that because real estate professionals directly control the mechanisms involved in real estate trans-
actions, they may easily make housing unavailable); see supra note 343 (describing a HUD notice
approving special outreach efforts by nonprofit groups and local governments).
451. See South-Suburban Hous. Ctr. v. Greater S. Suburban Bd. of Realtors, 713 F. Supp.
1068, 1088 (N.D. II1. 1988), ajfd in part and rev'd in part, 935 F.2d 868 (7th Cir. 1991), cert.
denied, 112 S. Ct. 971 (1992) (commenting that the fact the affirmative marketing plan was
implemented with the cooperation of local government infused it with a strong public interest).
452. See Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1293
(7th Cir. 1977) (stating that legitimate government actions are entitled to more deference than
private actions), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1025 (1988).
19921 1335
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
integrated workforce are impermissible."" But South-Suburban
Housing Center held that private efforts to maintain integration in
housing under Title VIII are permissible."5 ' This supports the pro-
position that under Title VIII, efforts to maintain integration should
be analyzed the same way as efforts to achieve integration. 5
South-Suburban Housing Center also distanced itself from Title
VII precedent that holds that affirmative action employment pro-
grams are legal only if they are implemented in response to prior
racial discrimination 4"6 or imbalance45 in the workplace. The Sec-
ond Circuit in United States v. Starrett City Associates relied on
this Title VII framework, and held that an apartment complex occu-
pancy quota was illegal in part because there was no evidence show-
ing the existence of prior racial discrimination or discriminatory im-
balances adversely affecting whites within the apartment
complex. 8 Like the apartment complex in Starrett City, there was
no history of racial discrimination in Park Forest prior to the time
affirmative marketing was instituted. Park Forest had been concep-
tualized as an "open" community, and various government organi-
zations had worked towards maintaining stable integration within
Park Forest since it was incorporated in 1947. 459 But unlike the
court in Starrett City, the Seventh Circuit implied that the Act's
goal of promoting integration is so strong that nondiscriminatory
race-conscious efforts may be instituted even where no housing dis-
crimination previously existed. 60
453. International Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 528 (1986). But cf.
United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 208-09 (1979) (holding that an employer may insti-
tute voluntary affirmative hiring programs in order to achieve workplace integration).
454. South-Suburban Hous. Ctr. v. Greater S. Suburban Bd. of Realtors, 935 F.2d 868, 882-84
(7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 971 (1992).
455. The Second Circuit reached an opposite conclusion in United States v. Starrett City Asso-
ciates, 840 F.2d 1096, 1103, cert. denied, 488 U.S. 946 (1988), at least with respect to quotas,
reasoning that efforts to maintain integration, as opposed to temporary efforts to achieve integra-
tion, have a more burdensome impact on minorities. Id.
456. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986) (plurality).
457. Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 640 (1987).
458. United States v. Starrett City Assocs., 840 F.2d 1096, 1102 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 488
U.S. 946 (1988). The court noted that Starrett City was initiated as an integrated community,
and that the race-conscious tenanting practices were in place expressly to maintain that initial
integration. Id.
459. See BERRY, sapra note 1, at 351-74 (describing Park Forest experience with integration);
see also supra notes 246-49 and accompanying text (discussing history of racial integration efforts
in Park Forest).
460. South-Suburban Hous. Ctr. v. Greater S. Suburban Bd. of Realtors, 935 F.2d 868, 884
(7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 971 (1992) (reasoning that stimulating increased compe-
tition between black and white home buyers fits in perfectly with the integration goal of the Fair
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Finally, in South-Suburban Housing Center the Seventh Circuit
also distanced itself from Title VII precedent that allows voluntary
affirmative action only if it is temporary in nature. 46 1 The Second
Circuit relied on this Title VII affirmative action precedent in
United States v. Starrett City Associates,2 invalidating a housing
occupancy quota partially on the grounds that it was permanent, not
temporary in nature."3 It reasoned that since the goal of integration
maintenance is continually threatened by the potential for white
flight, there was no definite, perceivable termination date for the
quotas."" ' In contrast, in South-Suburban Housing Center the Sev-
enth Circuit impliedly held that race-conscious housing programs
that were permanent in nature (implemented to combat tipping and
help maintain integration) did not violate Title VIII, at least in the
context of affirmative marketing.465
This move away from a rigid adherence to Title VII doctrine will
enable courts to ensure that the dual purposes of the Fair Housing
Act are both served. Unlike Title VIII, the purpose of Title VII was
only to end discrimination in the workplace, not also to maintain
integration in the workplace.466 Thus, Title VII precedent may not
contain all the mechanisms needed to promote the integration goal
mandated by the Fair Housing Act.46 7
3. Categorizing the Affirmative Marketing Plan for Analysis
South-Suburban Housing Center involved efforts to maintain in-
tegration by controlling the flow of information about specific
Housing Act).
461. Johnson, 480 U.S. at 639-40 (requiring that a plan employing racial distinctions be tem-
porary in nature with a defined goal as a termination point).
462. 840 F.2d 1096 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 946 (1988).
463. Id. at 1102.
464. Id.
465. South-Suburban Hous. Ctr. v. Greater S. Suburban Bd. of Realtors, 935 F.2d 868, 884
(7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 971 (1992). Note that the district court stated that
affirmative marketing was only a temporary measure used to prevent resegregation. South-Subur-
ban Hous. Ctr. v. Greater S. Suburban Bd. of Realtors, 713 F. Supp. 1068, 1087 (N.D. II1. 1988),
a ffd in part and rev'd in part, 935 F.2d 868 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 971 (1992).
The district court reasoned that affirmative marketing would no longer be necessary when the
threat of resegregation abate. Id. The district court distinguished Starrett City as applying only to
quotas of indefinite length. Id. at 1088 n.8.
466. See generally Mineberg, supra note 147 (comparing the statutory construction of Title
VII and Title VIii); see also McCormack, supra note 147, at 577-81 (examining the philosophi-
cal differences between Title VII and Title VIII in the context of the business necessity defense).
467. Note also that Title Vil precedent is only persuasive, and not controlling, in Title Vill
cases.
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properties. Benign race-conscious efforts to manipulate the flow of
information about certain properties generally fall into two catego-
ries. The first method involves controlling which specific customers
receive information about the properties.40 8 The second method in-
volves controlling which potential customer pool receives informa-
tion about specific properties.46 9 The special outreach efforts utilized
by the Housing Center and Century 21 fall into the second
category.47
The two information control mechanisms present distinctly differ-
ent legal implications. Efforts to control which specific customers
receive information about certain properties can be broken down
further into two subcategories: (1) efforts by groups that control
property or are directly involved in the transaction process,471  and
(2) efforts by groups that merely supplement normal real estate
channels.472  Efforts by the former group channel customers to
properties on the basis of race, and thus constitute "reverse steer-
ing" in violation the Fair Housing Act.473 The court in Steptoe v.
Beverly Area Planning Association sanctioned efforts by the latter
group, reasoning that the fair housing organization in question only
supplemented normal marketing channels. 474 Thus, although the fair
housing organization withheld information about certain properties
468. Steptoc v. Beverly Area Planning Ass'n, 674 F. Supp. 1313 (N.D. Ill. 1987). The fair
housing organization ("BAPA") in Steptoe counseled individual customers about housing choices.
It only gave information on pro-integrative moves. BAPA would not give information on tradi-
tional housing choices. Thus, if the customer were white, BAPA would not channel any informa-
tion about property in white neighborhoods to the customer. BAPA would instead direct the cus-
tomer to normal marketing channels to receive that information. Id. at 1315.
469. See infra notes 476-77 and accompanying text (discussing elements of this type of infor-
mation manipulation).
470. South-Suburban Hous. Ctr. v. Greater S. Suburban Bd. of Realtors, 935 F.2d 868, 884
(7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 971 (1992) (differentiating between misleading individual
customers and attracting potential customers).
471. Research has revealed no litigation involving affirmative marketing programs presenting
this type of factual scenario.
472. See supra note 345-48 (discussing parameters of the Steptoe technique).
473. See supra note 38 and accompanying text (defining traditional steering). The essential
elements of a steering violation are a limitation on housing choice, and if techniques are choice-
limiting they violate Title VIII regardless of their purpose. Fair Housing Hearings, supra note 15,
at 179 (statement of Alexander Polikoff). Polikoff asserts that the National Association of Real-
tors encourages broker statements designed to encourage specific customers to make integrative
moves. These statements are different in effect than realtor conduct of not giving information
about specific properties to certain racially identifiable customers. Id. at 23; cf Havens Realty
Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 366 n.I (1982) (stating that the purpose of steering is to main-
tain segregation).
474. Steptoe v. Beverly Area Planning Ass'n, 674 F. Supp. 1313, 1319 (N.D. III. 1987).
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depending on the customer's race, normal marketing channels were
unaffected, and the normal range of housing choices was not
reduced .475
Efforts to manipulate the potential customer pool for a specific
property do not affect identifiable customers, and thus present dif-
ferent legal implications under the Fair Housing Act. These efforts
also fall into two separate subcategories. The first method involves
controlling where information is directed in order to attract custom-
ers of a particular racial group or groups. 470  The second method
involves manipulating the content of the information in order to at-
tract a certain racial mix, or customers of a particular racial
group.4 77
South-Suburban Housing Center involved private efforts to ma-
nipulate the direction of information on specific properties.4 78  The
effort was race conscious in that the Housing Center and Century
21 intentionally directed additional information to certain locations
on the basis that they were predominantly white, and intentionally
475. Id.
476. Almonte v. Pierce, 666 F. Supp. 517 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (noting a plan that directed addi-
tional information about new housing project toward potential black and Asian applicants by plac-
ing notices about the project in black and Asian media).
477. Ragin v. New York Times Co., 923 F.2d 995 (2d Cir.) (ruling that advertisements indi-
cating preference for white customers by repetitive advertising depicting white models as consum-
ers and black models as service employees violates § 3604(c) of the Act), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct.
81 (1991). HUD regulations state that selective use of human models may have a discriminatory
impact. 24 C.F.R. § 109.25 (1991). An example of such selective use is "an advertising campaign
using human models primarily in media that cater to one racial . . . segment of the population
without a complementary advertising campaign that is directed at other groups." Id. § 109.25(c).
HUD further cautions that models should be clearly definable as reasonably representing majority
and minority groups in the metropolitan area, and should portray them on an equal social footing.
Id. § 109.30(b).
HUD states that these regulations should not be construed to restrict advertising efforts to
attract persons to dwellings who would not otherwise be expected to apply, when conducted pursu-
ant to an affirmative marketing program. Id. § 109.16(b). Previous statements of the HUD gen-
eral counsel also take this view. Letter from John J. Knapp, HUD general counsel, to William D.
North, at 3 (Aug. 6, 1985), reprinted in Fair Housing Hearings, supra note 15, at 24. Knapp
states that William Bradford Reynolds, Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Civil Rights
Division of the United States Department of Justice, supports the use of minority models when
advertising in white areas, observing that this "conveys a message of inclusiveness, rather than
exclusiveness, given the current community profile." Id. The Second Circuit does not appear to
adopt this exception. Ragin, 923 F.2d at 1000 (stating that the statute prohibits all ads that
indicate a racial preference to an ordinary reader, whatever the advertisers' intent). Additionally,
the example cited by Assistant Attorney General Reynolds differs from use of white models to
advertise housing in racially mixed areas. This may convey the message of exclusiveness, that
blacks are not preferred.
478. South-Suburban Hous. Ctr. v. Greater S. Suburban Bd. of Realtors, 935' F.2d 868, 873
(7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 971 (1992).
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advertised in selected media because it had a predominantly white
audience. 7 The Seventh Circuit upheld this type of information
manipulation, but with an important qualification. It implied that to
comport with Title VIII, race-conscious manipulation of where
housing information is directed must be additional to, and not sub-
stituted for, normal marketing activities.4 80 Although the Seventh
Circuit indicated that Century 21 had not altered or reduced normal
marketing activities with respect to the Apache Street properties, it
left unanswered the question of how to determine, absent evidence
of a purpose to lessen normal marketing, if a realtor has decreased
normal marketing activities to accommodate special outreach ef-
forts. '81 It also did not address when, if ever, such a decrease would
violate the Fair Housing Act by making housing otherwise unavaila-
ble to a particular racial group by denying them access to informa-
tion about specific properties.
4. Intent vs. Effect Analysis
In reasoning that the Housing Center's affirmative marketing
plan did not violate the Fair Housing Act, the Seventh Circuit ana-
lyzed the controversy as involving a claim of "reverse" steering. 82
Relying on the precedent of Village of Bellwood v. Dwivedi,483 the
court focused solely on the fact that the Housing Center did not
479. The reasoning of the court in South-Suburban Housing Center adopted HUD's position
on selective geographic advertisement. See 24 C.F.R. § 109.25, 109.25(a) (stating generally that
brochure advertisements distributed within a limited geographic area, advertising in particular
geographic coverage sections of major metropolitan newspapers, or advertising in limited circula-
tion newspapers reaching one segment of the community are marketing techniques that may have
a discriminatory impact). However, HUD also states that these regulations should not be con-
strued to limit advertising pursuant to an affirmative marketing program. 24 C.FR. § 109.16.
South-Suburban Housing Center adopts this exception by holding that additional special advertis-
ing in limited circulation newspapers and brochure advertisements distributed within narrow geo-
graphical boundaries did not violate the Fair Housing Act. South-Suburban Hous. Ctr.. 935 F.2d
at 883-84.
480. South-Suburban Hous. Ctr., 935 F.2d at 883-84 The court concluded that the affirmative
marketing plan was legal because it "merely creates additional information to white homebuyers,"
and it rejected the board's claim that the plan directed "essential information about housing avaiL-
ability away from blacks and towards whites." Id.
481. See Shnay & Campbell, supra note 313, at 8 (quoting Laurene Janik, NAR general coun-
sel, stating that "[y]ou can't make a special effort to reach one group without taking time from
talking to other groups").
482. South-Suburban Hous. Ctr., 935 F.2d at 883 (observing that the Board contended that
the plan deterred blacks from buying on Apache Street by directing essential information about
housing availability away from blacks and towards whites).
483. 895 F.2d 1521 (7th Cir. 1990).
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intentionally discriminate against minorities through its plan.484 The
Seventh Circuit reasoned that proof of reverse steering requires a
showing that the defendant treated persons differently because of
race, and that "proof of a discriminatory motive is critical."' ,", Ac-
cording to the court in South-Suburban Housing Center, a steering
violation can only occur when individual customers are channeled
towards particular properties because of race.486 Thus, the court im-
plied that the Fair Housing Act does not apply to steering of poten-
tial customers, or race conscious influence of the marketplace. 87
Since there was no evidence that the Housing Center implemented
the affirmative marketing program with the purpose of restricting
black traffic, there could be no Fair Housing Act violation. 8'
The court in South-Suburban Housing Center did not address
whether the Housing Center's affirmative marketing plan had a dis-
criminatory effect on potential minority homebuyers. The Seventh
Circuit only analyzed the Board of Realtor's claim as involving alle-
gations of discriminatory intent.489 Thus, the Seventh Circuit held
that the Housing Center's affirmative marketing plan had the le-
gally permissible intent of attracting additional white traffic to the
properties.490 In this regard, the Seventh Circuit correctly recog-
nized that racial prejudice affects demand for housing when it ruled
that the Apache Street neighborhood appealed primarily to black
484. South-4uburban Hous. Ctr., 935 F.2d at 883 (citing Village of Bellwood v. Dwivedi, 895
F.2d 1521, 1529-30 (7th Cir. 1990), for the proposition that the mental element required in a
steering case is one of disparate treatment or discriminatory motive).
485. Id. at 883. But see Heights Community Cong. v. Hilltop Realty, 774 F.2d 135,143-49 (6th
Cir. 1985) (holding that unsolicited statement by a realtor that a neighborhood had a heavy black
population violated the Act even if the statement was intended to be merely informational and not
intended to steer), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 109 (1985).
486. South-Suburban Hous. Ctr., 935 F.2d at 883-84 (emphasis added). The Seventh Circuit
relied in part on a passage in Village of Bellwood stating that steering involves "refusing to show
properties because of the race of the customer, or misleading the customer about the availability
of properties because of his race, or cajoling or coercing the customer because of his race to buy
this property or that or look in this community rather than that"). Id. at 884 (quoting Village of
Bellwood, 895 F.2d at 1530). The clear implication of the statement in Village of Bellwood is
that an essential element of steering is the existence of bilateral communication between the real-
tor and an identifiable customer.
487. Id. at 884 ("[W]e see nothing wrong with SSHC [the Housing Center] attempting to
attract white persons to housing opportunities they might not ordinarily know about and thus
choose not to pursue.") (emphasis added).
488. Id.
489. See supra notes 402-12 and accompanying text (discussing the Seventh Circuit's inten-
tional discrimination analysis).
490. South-Suburban Hous. Ctr., 935 F.2d at 884.
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homebuyers, 95 and therefore, the special outreach efforts to whites
did not automatically direct housing information away from
blacks."9 2 It is well settled, however, that benign motivations can
still violate the Fair Housing Act if they "deny" or make "otherwise
unavailable" housing to persons or groups on the basis of race. ' 93
Section 3604(a) does not prohibit intentional steering only; it also
prohibits all practices having the effect of making housing unavaila-
ble to minorities.494 Prior courts examining the issue of whether
race-conscious housing practices make housing unavailable to mi-
norities have applied a discriminatory effects standard of review
also.4195 Even the district court in South-Suburban Housing Center
analyzed whether the Housing Center plan had a discriminatory ef-
fect on minorities.496
The Seventh Circuit should also have focused on whether the
mechanics of the plan had the effect of limiting the flow of informa-
tion about the Apache Street properties to potential black home
seekers. Unlike the counseling center in Steptoe v. Beverly Area
Planning Association,"97 Century 21 was engaged in the provision of
housing.49 8 It controlled the marketing mechanism for properties,
and thus had the capability of making housing unavailable. 499 Of
491. See Otero v. New York Hous. Auth., 484 F.2d 1122, 1129 (2d Cir. 1973) (asserting that
concentration of minorities in one neighborhood will decrease white demand for housing in adja-
cent areas).
492. Cf Parent Ass'n of Andrew Jackson High Sch. v. Ambach, 598 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1979)
(stating that racial attitudes must be taken into account when formulating specific strategies to
implement civil rights goals).
493. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283 (7th Cir.
1977) (stating that neutral zoning decision based on economic considerations would violate Act if
it perpetuated segregation), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1028 (1978).
494. Steptoe v. Beverly Area Planning Ass'n, 674 F. Supp.. 1313, 1319 n.7 (N.D. Il. 1987).
The Seventh Circuit also ignored the rationale of a case they cited to, and quoted from, in their
opinion, Southend Neighborhood Improvement Ass'n v. County of St. Clair, 743 F.2d 1207, 1209
(7th Cir. 1984) (holding that § 3604(a) prohibits both "direct discrimination and practices with
significant discriminatory effects").
495. United States v. Starrett City Assocs., 840 F.2d 1096, 1101-02 (2d Cir.) (ruling that a
racial quota that forced blacks to wait ten times longer for housing than whites had a discrimina-
tory effect on housing availability for minorities), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 946 (1988); Steptoe, 674
F. Supp. at 1319 n.7 (stating that the issue is not whether the center's activities constituted steer-
ing, but whether they could have adversely affected the availability of housing to minorities).
496. See supra notes 379-82 (discussing the district court's use of the Arlington Heights mul-
tifactor test to analyze the legality of the Housing Center's affirmative marketing plan).
497. 674 F. Supp. 1313 (N.D. I11. 1987).
498. See id. at 1320 (holding that because the counseling center did not engage in the provision
of housing, it could not have made housing unavailable).
499. See supra notes 342-44 and accompanying text (discussing the difference between non-
profit and for-profit affirmative marketing efforts).
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crucial importance to the legality of the Housing Center plan was
that it merely supplemented normal marketing activities, and did
not supplant them."' The Seventh Circuit paid lip service to this
issue, but ignored analyzing this crucial point." 1 Had the realtor cut
back on normal advertising of the property in order to make it more
economically feasible to undertake the special outreach efforts, the
affirmative marketing plan may have had a disparate impact on the
ability of minorities to receive information about the Apache Street
properties as compared to white homebuyers °2 This disparate im-
pact could render the properties "unavailable" to black homebuyers
in violation of the Fair Housing Act.
Because affirmative marketing focuses on potential customers, not
actual customers or applicants, 0 3 it is difficult to even determine the
specific group of minorities affected by the affirmative marketing
plan. " Determining whether an affirmative marketing plan has a
disparate impact on minority home seekers requires that the tradi-
tional discriminatory effect tests be refined to take into account the
unique statistical analysis problems posed by measuring potential
customers as opposed to actual customers. 0 5 Determining the exis-
500. South-Suburban Hous. Ctr. v. Greater S. Suburban Bd. of Realtors, 713 F. Supp. 1068,
1078 (N.D. Ill. 1988), afld in part and rev'd in part. 935 F.2d 868 (7th Cir. 1991). cert. denied.
112 S. Ct. 971 (1992); see Gelber, supra note 104, at 925 (asserting that outreach activities are
legal to the extent they supplement, as opposed to supplant, traditional marketing activities).
501. The Seventh Circuit merely stated that the plan involved no lessening of efforts to attract
black home buyers to the properties. South-Suburban Hous. Ctr., 935 F.2d at 884. It did not
discuss how it arrived at the conclusion there was no decrease in efforts. See also South-Suburban
Hous. Ctr., 713 F. Supp. at 1087 (stating that the affirmative marketing did not deprive anyone of
housing information, but not addressing how it reached that conclusion).
502. But ef. Almonte v. Pierce, 666 F. Supp. 517 (S.D.N.Y. 1987). Unlike the plaintiff in
South-Suburban Housing Center, the housing agency in Almonte made a conscious choice not to
advertise the housing project in hispanic media because the group was not underrepresented in the
community as defined by HUD regulations. Id. at 527. The district court upheld the program,
reasoning that the lack of advertising did not deny hispanics housing since they were the group
"least likely to apply to this particular project, and thus requiring special outreach." Id. at 529.
The Almonte court did not indicate that there was any lessening of efforts to attract hispanic
tenants. Id. at 528-29.
503. In contrast, occupancy quotas provide a definitive group of actual customers upon whom
discriminatory effects can be measured. See supra notes 255-57 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing the discriminatory effects flowing from the Starrett City integration maintenance program).
504. See Betsey v. Turtle Creek Assocs., 736 F.2d 983, 987 (4th Cir. 1984) (holding that the
correct inquiry is whether the policy in question had a disproportionate impact on minorities in the
total group to which the policy was applied).
505. Cf Ragin v. New York Times Co., 923 F.2d 995 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 81
(1991). Ragin supports the use of nontraditional tests to measure discriminatory effects. The case
involved a discriminatory advertising claim, involving potential customers, under § 3604(c) of the
Act. The Second Circuit held that the statute prohibited all ads indicating a racial preference
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tence and/or extent of a disparate impact on the availability of
housing information to minorities requires analyzing three fac-
tors."' First, the court should determine what constitutes "normal"
marketing of a property for a particular defendant, and also what
constitutes the defendant realtor's normal customer pool.50 7 Second,
the court should determine whether the use of normal marketing
channels or the extent of their use was curtailed with respect to the
property in question.508 Finally, if a decrease in normal marketing is
shown, the court must determine if and to what degree the normal
customer pool was deprived of information about the properties be-
cause of the decrease.509
This factor essentially requires the court to calculate the extent
black demand for the properties was reduced as a result of the de-
"whatever the advertiser's intent." Id. at 1000. The court held that the test for liability was
whether "an ordinary reader would understand the ad as suggesting a racial preference." Id. at
1002.
506. See infra text accompanying notes 507-09. The court must first determine that there is a
need for a special outreach program. The predicate for a special outreach effort is a determination
that a group is unlikely to apply because of past discrimination or current real estate practices.
Fair Housing Hearings, supra note 15, at 177 (statement of Alexander Polikoff); see supra notes
323-26 (discussing HUD's directive on how to formulate an affirmative marketing plan). Calculat-
ing which groups are least likely to apply may be accomplished at least in part by measuring past
demand for properties in the area.
507. Realtors have widely varying marketing strategies, depending on their size and budget,
degree of establishment in the community, as well as general economic activity. DAVID BLOCK, A
GUIDE TO EFFECTIVE REAL ESTATE ADVERTISING (1981). The most widely used media is the
classified ads, which have been "the backbone of real estate advertising for generations." BRUCE
W. MARCUS, MARKETING PROFESSIONAL SERVICES IN REAL ESTATE: ADVERTISING, PROMOTION,
PUBLIC RELATIONS 35 (Realtors Nat'l Marketing Inst. ed., 1981).
Other types of marketing media include metropolitan newspapers, suburban newspapers, penny
savers, direct mail flyers, billboards, and for-sale signs, among others. Id. at 158. It is possible to
estimate the potential customer pool from analyzing the type of media used. Factors for analysis
include the circulation of the media, the demographics of the readership, the day of the week
advertised and the size and frequency of the ads. Id. at 55-56, 161.
508. Potential measuring sticks include analyzing whether the frequency of classified ads was
decreased, or whether less flyers identifying the property were mailed out than usual. However, it
is important to determine what media has the greatest reach, and therefore the greatest ability to
affect the normal customer pool if deprived. For instance, for-sale signs "are one of the most
effective and least expensive types of advertising". BLOCK. supra note 507, at 162-66. If homes in
the area are often sold by word of mouth or to casual passersby, removal of for-sale signs could
have a profound effect on the flow of information to the normal customer pool. Id.; cf. Andrew
Fegelman, City Segregation Moves to Suburbs; Blacks Frozen Out of Some Areas, CHI. TRIB,
Feb. 27, 1991, §2, at 4 (reporting that many black home-seekers use informal networks like talk-,
ing to friends and relatives, as opposed to normal marketing channels).
509. This. factor requires prior analysis of the racial makeup of normal customer traffic for
properties in the area. See infra note 575 (noting that the National Association of Realtors en-
courages brokers to compile racial data on homeseeker traffic).
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crease in normal marketing efforts.510 The method approved by
Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington51 for measur-
ing disparate impact, whether the action adversely affected a
greater percentage of blacks than whites, 5 12 is ill-suited for use in
this situation. The affirmative marketing plan by its very nature is
designed to positively affect whites; thus, there is no way to compare
any adverse effect between the races. 1 ' A better formula can be
derived from the Title VII "minority underrepresentation" test,
which compares the black population on a particular job site with
the black population in the available labor pool.514 Using this
formula, courts must compare the amount of black homeseeker traf-
fic for the affirmatively marketed property to normal black traffic
for similarly situated properties within the targeted area.51 5 Utiliz-
ing the precedent of Southend Neighborhood Improvement Ass'n v.
County of St. Clair,5"' a court should find a prima facie case of
discriminatory effect only when the reduction in the flow of housing
information towards the normal customer pool results in a signifi-
cant decrease in black traffic attracted to the property. " 7 Addition-
ally, the defendant realtor may have a business justification for any
evident decrease or alteration in normal marketing activities.518
Therefore, a court will not be able to accurately determine decreases
510. However, "most advertising . . . is difficult to relate directly to results." MARCUS, supra
note 507, at 35. Other considerations, such as the economic climate, or the price and condition of
a particular property, may affect the amount of customers attracted to the property independent
of any decrease in the flow of information about the property.
511. 844 F.2d 926 (2d Cir.), afid, 488 U.S. 15 (1988).
512. Id. at 938. See supra notes 197-99 (discussing the Huntington business necessity defense).
513. The same logic holds true for the comparison of absolute numbers done in Metropolitan
Housing Development Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1291 (7th Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1025 (1978). The special outreach efforts are implemented to in-
crease the absolute numbers of whites who are informed of the property, any comparison of traffic
between black and white buyers would be meaningless in terms of measuring disparate impact.
514. See Mineberg, supra note 147, at 164-66 (examining various statistical models for mea-
suring whether a prima facie case of disparate impact has been established).
515. The premise behind this test is that with a decrease in normal marketing, a lesser number
of minorities will have access to information about the availability of the property. This logically
should translate into a lesser black demand for the property. The black traffic is then compared to
black traffic for normally marketed properties of similar characteristics in areas where the home
traffic is predominantly black. If the absolute number of blacks visiting the affirmatively marketed
property is significantly lower than the number visiting the control property, this indicates that the
reduced numbers correlate with the reduction in normal marketing.
516. 743 F.2d 1207 (7th Cir. 1984).
517. Id. at 1209-10 (holding that Title VIII prohibits both direct discrimination and practices
with significant discriminatory effects).
518. See supra notes 197-99, 211 (discussing the business necessity defense to discriminatory
effects claims).
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with respect to isolated properties. Courts should generally find vio-
lations only with respect to marketing decreases resulting from ag-
gregated affirmative marketing of properties. 519
When looking at isolated instances of affirmative marketing, it is
difficult to conceive how one could accurately measure any discrimi-
natory effect caused by a decrease in normal marketing activities.
However, the test has utility when it is used to examine large-scale
affirmative marketing efforts, such as the efforts in Oak Park, Illi-
nois, or Shaker Heights, Ohio. Both of these programs involve the
cooperation of real estate brokers. 520 These efforts are also operated
by agencies and centers that, unlike the housing center in Steptoe v.
Beverly Area Planning Ass'n, have substantial control over the ac-
tual provision of housing in the community.521 This creates a greater
danger that reverse steering, or neutral actions with a disparate im-
pact on the availability of housing for minorities, will occur.52 2 The
proposed test provides a framework for monitoring this danger.
5. The Affirmative Marketing Plan and its Effect on'the Legal,
Social and Political Tensions Created by Race-Conscious Integra-
tion Activities
In addition to the legal problems created by large scale affirma-
tive marketing efforts, these programs also exacerbate political and
racial tensions between blacks and whites. Some sociologists claim
the only way to attack resegregation is on a regional scale.52 3 But
since one purpose of affirmative marketing is to disperse blacks
throughout mixed communities,52 ' if affirmative marketing becomes
519. Cf Ragin v. New York Times Co., 923 F.2d 995, 1002 (2d Cir.) (ruling that isolated
instances of ads suggesting a racial preference is not enough to constitute a violation of the Act),
cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 81 (1991).
520. Fair Housing Hearings, supra note 15, at 113 (statement of Winston H. Richie) (stating
that the largest private realtor in Ohio is cooperating with efforts to maintain stable integration in
Shaker Heights and other suburbs of Cleveland); Firstman, supra note 101, at 7 (noting that in
both Oak Park and Shaker Heights, the real estate industry, once a bitter enemy of integration,
has evolved into a cooperative ally). Firstman further notes that brokers in Shaker Heights are
paid a bonus if they sell a house to a buyer whose race is underrepresented in the community. Id.
521. See BERRY, supra note 1, at 277-303 (discussing operation of the Oak Park Housing
Center); Wilkerson, supra note 103, at AI (discussing generally the cooperative public and private
efforts to maintain integration in Shaker Heights, Ohio).
522. This is especially true where parties with control over the housing transaction process are
provided financial incentives for engaging in pro-integration practices. See Firstman, supra note
101, at 7 (discussing bonuses paid to brokers making pro-integrative sales).
523. E.g., Fegelman, supra note 508, at 4.
524. Firstman, supra note 101, at 7.
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pervasive in society, blacks will be constrained to live in white domi-
nated communities. 525 This will necessarily dilute black political
power, and inflame racial tensions between blacks and whites. 56
Apart from any legal or political conflicts, detractors also argue
that the Park Forest affirmative marketing program creates racial
tension by reinforcing stereotypes about blacks. These programs are
usually instituted to combat the threat of tipping, which involves a
rapid all-white to all-black turnover in a neighborhood or commu-
nity.527 Thus, affirmative marketing concentrates on keeping whites
from moving out.528 Opponents argue that this mentality stigmatizes
blacks by intimating that blacks bring in crime and reduce property
values.529 However, the nature of affirmative marketing is less likely
to stigmatize minorities than other race-conscious strategies. Affirm-
ative marketing does not involve face-to-face customer contact, it
instead reaches out to draw in potential,, as yet unidentified custom-
ers. The plan is designed to stimulate multiracial demand for a
property, and it does not contemplate any desired racial makeup in
the community. 5 0 Any stigma carried by this technique will thus be
somewhat attenuated.
In contrast, housing counseling involves direct customer contact,
and the message that certain racial groups are preferred in certain
areas is reinforced directly to the customer. The use of financial in-
centives creates even more social and racial conflict. Financial in-
centives are usually based on a certain targeted racial composition
in the community.5"' Thus, there exists a subtle message that blacks
are welcome, but not too many of them.532 Opponents argue that
525. Note, supra note 105, at 954-55.
526. See supra notes 127-30 and accompanying text (discussing the political tensions created
by race-conscious integration programs).
527. See supra notes 114-16 and accompanying text (defining racial tipping).
528. Note, supra note 105, at 955.
529. Firstman, supra note 101, at 7 (examining opposition to affirmative marketing in Park
Forest, Illinois); see supra notes 124-26 (discussing the social tension created by race-conscious
integration programs). But cf. Comment, Tipping the Scales of Justice: A Race-Conscious Rem-
edy for Neighborhood Transition, 90 YALE l.J 377, 398-99 (1980) (asserting that the long-term
benefits interracial housing would provide to blacks outweighs any stigma associated with these
programs).
530. South-Suburban Hous. Ctr. v. Greater S. Suburban Bd. of Realtors, 713 F. Supp. 1068,
1085 (N.D. III. 1988), affd in part, rev'd in part, 935 F.2d 868 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112
S. Ct. 971 (1992).
531. See generally Thomas, supra note 285 (discussing eligibility requirements for pro-integra-
tive subsidized loans).
532. Housing Ruling, supra note 312, at I.
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rewarding whites for moving into a community and blacks for mov-
ing out sends the powerful message that the community will do any-
thing to get whites to move in. They assert the city is essentially
bribing whites to live next to blacks.533 This reinforces the stereo-
type that blacks are inferior to whites.
However, the decision in South-Suburban Housing Center implies
that the racial and political tensions created by race-conscious pro-
grams must be subordinated to the integration goal of the Fair
Housing Act, unless the programs intentionally discriminate against
certain racial groups, or have a discriminatory effect on them. The
sponsors of the Fair Housing Act recognized that an integrated soci-
ety is a stable society.534 Additionally, the Kerner Commission noted
that segregated living patterns perpetuate black inequality.5 36 The
implication behind the integration goal of the Fair Housing Act is
that only through sustained, stable integration will blacks receive
social acceptance and political empowerment. Affirmative marketing
programs like the one in South-Suburban Housing Center provide
an effective mechanism for reaching this goal.
6. A Caveat for For-Profit Affirmative Marketing Programs
Affirmative marketing becomes increasingly effective as efforts
are coordinated on a large scale.5 3  The use of private, for-profit
realtors, who directly control the housing transaction process, also
enhances the effectiveness of affirmative marketing. The realtor's
ready and direct access to the marketplace provides a useful mecha-
nism for fulfilling the purpose of affirmative marketing-stimulating
multiracial demand for housing.5 37 However, realtors should only
play a supporting role in the affirmative marketing process, like the
role played by Century 21 in the effort by the South-Suburban
Housing Center. Nonprofit fair housing agencies or local govern-
ments should be the central participant.
The reason for requiring agency participation is that realtors, al-
though they may favor the use of special outreach efforts as an
533. Wilkerson, supra note 103, at Al.
534. See supra note 65 (noting the statement of Senator Mondale).
535. See supra note 33 and accompanying text (discussing Kerner Commission report).
536. See infra notes 636-41 and accompanying text (discussing the community-wide affirmative
marketing efforts in Oak Park, Illinois, and Shaker Heights, Ohio).
537. South-Suburban Hous. Ctr. v. Greater S. Suburban Bd. of Realtors, 935 F.2d 868, 884
(7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 971 (1992).
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ideal, are primarily motivated by economics.5 38 The economic moti-
vation can easily conflict with the equal housing opportunity goal of
the fair Housing Act when marketing expenditures are analyzed.
The court in South-Suburban Housing Center held that the Hous-
ing Center's affirmative marketing plan was legal, because it di-
rected additional information at certain groups but did not lessen
the use of normal marketing channels. 39 Thus, the broker is re-
quired to spend additional funds to successfully thread the tension
between the Act's dual purposes of promoting integration and
preventing discrimination. This may work for isolated affirmative
marketing efforts, but when conducted on a widespread and continu-
ing basis, it will likely lead the broker to supplant normal marketing
activities in order to financially accommodate the affirmative adver-
tising costs. This lessening of normal marketing efforts, even if not
purposeful, will reduce the availability of housing information to mi-
norities, 540 and may deny or make unavailable housing in violation
of section 3604(a) of the Act.
The solution to this legal dilemma is to have nonprofit housing
centers financially support the special outreach efforts conducted by
the private realtors. Most housing centers are supported by various
corporations and grants these. These funds can be appropriated to
reimburse the realtors for their additional expenditures. This will
ensure that maximum demand is stimulated, and that there is addi-
tional traffic attracted to the property, not substitute traffic. Utiliz-
ing this method of financing special outreach efforts will reduce the
liability exposure of realtors, and still provide the unique skills real-
tors can bring to the affirmative marketing process. This ultimately
will encourage more realtors to participate.
In conclusion, the Seventh Circuit correctly concluded that the
Housing Center's affirmative marketing program did not violate the
Fair Housing Act. No evidence suggested that normal marketing
activities were lessened to accommodate the special outreach efforts.
However, the Seventh Circuit's reasoning failed to distinguish the
inherent difference between nonprofit fair housing agency use of af-
firmative marketing as opposed to its use by for-profit realtors. Fu-
538. Id. (reasoning that affirmative marketing may be an effective selling tool because the of
the additional competition created for the property).
539. Id.
540. Because most special outreach programs are directed at whites, lessening normal market-
ing will mean lessening the flow of information to black homebuyers. See supra notes 114-19
(discussing tipping).
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ture courts must take into account the possibility that discrimina-
tory effects against minority access to housing information may
result when the entity providing the affirmative marketing services
also controls the housing transaction process.
B. Denial of Access to the Multiple Listing Service
The Seventh Circuit implied that a multiple listing service may
treat access for one property differently than for another, depending
on how the property is marketed. If a realtor does not market a
property in a color-blind fashion, the multiple listing service may
exclude it, even if the marketing method is permitted by the Fair
Housing Act.54 The multiple listing service need only assert a philo-
sophical disagreement with affirmative action in order to be pro-
tected from liability under the Act.542 Through its ruling, the Sev-
enth Circuit may have unwittingly made itself a partner to the
perpetuation of segregation. The multiple listing service is a "vehicle
for maintaining segregation,"54 3 and some realtor boards may assert
a "philosophical disagreement" as a pretext for continuing segrega-
tive practices. In addition, in some urban areas an overwhelming
amount of housing transactions involve the use of the multiple list-
ing service.544 Thus, without access to the multiple listing service, an
affirmative marketing effort is unable to fulfill its purpose of stimu-
lating a multiracial demand for housing.545
1. Brokerage Service Discrimination Under Section 3606
The Seventh Circuit observed that the issue of whether the Board
restricted access to its multiple listing service "on account of race"
was an issue of first impression.54 " In analyzing this issue, the Sev-
541. South-Suburban Hous. Or., 935 F.2d at 886.
542. Id.
543. See Home Values Don't Take Flight in Integrated Areas, Study Says, CHI. TRIB., Oct.
17. 1986, § 2, at 6 (reporting commentary of fair housing experts).
544. See United States v. Realty Multi-List, Inc., 629 F.2d 1351, 1357 (5th Cir. 1980) (noting
that the sole multiple listing service in the relevant county had more than 4300 listings and $50
million in sales); Fair Housing Council of Bergen County, Inc. v. Eastern Bergen County Multiple
Listing Serv., Inc., 422 F. Supp. 1071, 1075 (D.N.J. 1976) (noting that 50% of relevant home
sales involved use of the multiple listing service).
545. See South-Suburban Hous. Or., 935 F.2d at 884 (describing intended effect of affirma-
tive marketing); see also United States v. Realty Multi-List, Inc., 629 F.2d 1351, 1356, 1368-69
(5th Cir. 1980) (describing how use of the service benefits both the buyer and seller by making
real estate a more liquid commodity).
546. South-Suburban Hous. Ctr., 935 F.2d at 885.
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enth Circuit's reasoning closely followed established Title VII af-
firmative action doctrine, which holds that private employers do not
have a duty to integrate their workforce. 547 In South-Suburban
Housing Center, the Seventh Circuit analogized that, in the housing
sector, private realtors are not required to cooperate with the affirm-
ative action efforts of another realtor. 548 In contrast, when analyzing
the legality of the affirmative marketing plan itself, the Seventh Cir-
cuit appeared to distance itself from a rigid adherence to the Title
VII/Title VIII analogy.549 The Seventh 'Circuit correctly held that
private entities should not be required to adopt affirmative sales
practices. Statutory construction and prior court interpretations of
the Act show that under Title VIII, only certain public entities have
an affirmative mandate to integrate.550 Also, prior courts have prop-
erly recognized that imposing a duty to integrate on private entities
would expose them to an unacceptable liability risk for housing pat-
terns beyond their control. 551 However, in holding that to compel
the Board to list the properties would force it to cooperate in affirm-
ative action efforts, the Seventh Circuit defined cooperation much
too broadly. This definition does- not comport with the liberal con-
struction given the Fair Housing Act by the Supreme Court.552 In
Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. v. Village of Arlington
Heights,553 the Seventh Circuit looked to the Supreme Court's Traf-
ficante mandate that courts give a broad construction to the lan-
guage of Title VIII, and concluded that close cases should be de-
cided in favor of integrated housing. 5 4 Under this mandate, the
Seventh Circuit should have defined what constitutes cooperation
more narrowly, so that the private right to remain color-blind and
the affirmative marketing plan at issue could have been interpreted
as congruent with each other.
The multiple listing service issue was argued under an intentional
discrimination theory.5 55 However, the Seventh Circuit failed to ap-
547. International Assoc. of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 515 (1986).
548. South-Suburban Hous. Or., 935 F.2d at 886.
549. See supra notes 450-64 and accompanying text.
550. See supra notes 67-69 and accompanying text.
551. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
552. See Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 209 (1972) (reasoning that
congressional policy can be carried out only by a broad and generous construction of the language
of the Fair Housing Act while remaining within constitutional limits).
553. 558 F.2d 1283 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1025 (1978).
554. Id. at 1294.
555. South-Suburban Hous. Ctr. v. Greater S. Suburban Bd..of Realtors, 935 F.2d 868, 885
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ply the disparate treatment standard of review to the facts. This
standard of review was articulated earlier in the South-Suburban
Housing Center opinion, when the court analyzed the legality of the
affirmative marketing plan itself. Quoting Village of Bellwood v.
Dwivedi,556 the Seventh Circuit held disparate treatment meant
treating a person differently because of race, implying consciousness
of race and having a purpose to use race as a decision-making
tool.557 But the court did not explicitly state whether removing the
Apache Street listings involved a purpose to use race as a decision-
making tool. The court only stated that they could not "fathom"
how the facts could constitute illegal discrimination. 558 Actually, the
Board did use race as a decision-making tool. In providing access to
its multiple listing service, it treated properties promoted by an af-
firmative racial marketing strategy less favorably than those mar-
keted traditionally.559 In particular, the Board objected to marketing
that made a special effort to interest additional white homebuyers in
the property.56
The Seventh Circuit holding that a color-blind marketing strategy
cannot constitute discrimination on account of race under section
3606 appears to set up the use of color-blind marketing policies as a
defense to actions that treat persons differently because of race.
Under the disparate treatment standard of review, a defendant may
rebut a prima facie case of disparate treatment by articulating a
legitimate and supportable reason for his actions, as long as it is not
(7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 971 (1992).
556. 895 F.2d 1521 (7th Cir. 1990).
557. South-Suburban Hous. Cir., 935 F.2d at 888 (quoting Village of Bellwood v. Dwivedi,
895 F.2d 1521, 1529-30 (7th Cir. 1990)).
558. Id. at 884.
559. The district court held that the decision by the Board to limit multiple listing service
access was not motivated by racial considerations but by a strong philosophical disagreement with
the marketing plan. South-Suburban Hous. Ctr. v. Greater S. Suburban Bd. of Realtors, 713 F.
Supp. 1068, 1079-80 (N.D. Ill. 1988), affid in part and rev'd in part, 935 F.2d 868 (7th Cir.
1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 971 (1992). This reasoning is also flawed, as the philosophical
disagreement was itself motivated by racial considerations. See supra notes 124-35 (discussing
various political and theoretical objections to the use of race-conscious programs).
560. Contrast this situation with one where a multiple listing service that has adopted a color-
blind marketing scheme denies access to properties in predominantly white neighborhoods because
it objects to special outreach efforts to black homebuyers. This action might violate the Fair Hous-
ing Act by perpetuating segregation. See Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington
Heights, 558 F.2d 1281, 1289-90 (7th Cir. 1977) (holding that neutral conduct that has the effect
of perpetuating segregation and preventing interracial association will be considered invidious dis-
crimination), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1025 (1978).
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a mere pretext for discrimination. 51  No evidence showed that the
philosophical disagreement with affirmative action was only a pre-
text for discrimination. However, the right to adopt a color-blind
marketing policy is bound up with the precept that private entities
do not have a duty to integrate-and do not have to cooperate with
the integration activities of another person. 5 2 Thus, using a color-
blind marketing strategy as a defense to disparate treatment is sup-
portable only where the defendant's discriminatory actions were
taken to avoid cooperating in another party's affirmative action ef-
forts. Listing the Apache Street Properties in the multiple listing
service did not require the Board of Realtors to cooperate in the
Housing Center's affirmative marketing plan. 1s Therefore, asserting
a philosophical disagreement with affirmative action did not legiti-
mately rebut the inference of disparate treatment created by the
Board's removal of the listings from its multiple listing service.
The district court explicitly ruled that listing the Apache Street
properties in the multiple listing service did not require the Board to
cooperate in any of the Housing Center's affirmative marketing ac-
tivities.5"4 The Housing Center was solely responsible for all out-
reach activities; all the Board had to do was list the properties in its
multiple listing service pursuant to its previous contract with Cen-
tury 21.565 Other brokers subscribing to the multiple listing service
were free to ignore the property and its affirmative marketing ef-
forts."6 ' Although the Board had a deep philosophical disagreement
with the Housing Center's affirmative marketing activities, listing
the properties in the multiple listing service did not compel it to
adopt or conduct activities opposed to its philosophical bent, or
561. See supra notes 160-64 (discussing defenses to intentional discrimination claims).
562. See supra notes 218-20, 236 and accompanying text (discussing integration duties of pri-
vate employers and housing suppliers).
563. See infra notes 564-67 and accompanying text (discussing why listing the properties did
not constitute forced cooperation with the Housing Center).
564. South-Suburban Hous. Ctr. v. Greater S. Suburban Bd. of Realtors, 713 F. Supp. 1068,
1077 (N.D. Ill. 1988), affd in part and rev'd in part, 935 F.2d 868 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied,
112 S. Ct. 971 (1992). Realtors showing the Apache Street properties were required to list the
race of the customers shown the houses. South-Suburban Hous. Ctr. v. Greater S. Suburban Bd.
of Realtors, 935 F.2d 868, 873 (7th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 971 (1992). This might be
construed as requiring cooperation. But see South-Suburban Hous. Ctr., 713 F. Supp. at 1097
(noting that the National Association of Realtors strongly encourages data collection by realtors).
565. South-Suburban Hous. Ctr., 713 F. Supp. at 1097. There was no reference in the listing
to affirmative marketing or special outreach. Id. at 1077.
566. Id. at 1077.
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which furthered the plaintiff's affirmative marketing efforts."6 7 The
special outreach activities undertaken by the Housing Center and
Century 21 did not utilize the multiple listing service. Listing the
Apache Street properties in the multiple listing service merely facili-
tated the effective use of normal, color-blind marketing channels. 56 8
Title VII precedent also supports the position that what consti-
tutes cooperation should be narrowly construed. Although private
employers may not be required to adopt affirmative action programs
under Title VII, 56 9 the Supreme Court has held that a voluntary
agreement between two parties that peripherally affects a third
party does not require the third party's consent to become opera-
tive."' In International Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Cleve-
land,571 the Supreme Court ruled that an affirmative action consent
decree entered into between the city and a minority firefighters or-
ganization that altered previous agency hiring practices did not re-
quire prior consent from the firefighters union. 572 The majority rea-
soned that it imposed no legal duties or obligations on the union,
and did not bind it to any particular conduct.57 a
The effect of the consent decree in Firefighters on third-party re-
sponsibilities closely parallels the effect of the Housing Center-Cen-
tury 21 affirmative marketing program. Like the consent decree, the
Housing Center's affirmative marketing plan imposed no legal du-
ties or risk of liability on the Board. 4 It also did not compel the
567. See id. at 1080 (noting that, if anything, denying use of the multiple listing service would
make it more difficult to sell the homes to blacks). Therefore, denying multiple listing service
access would not contravene the realtors' color-blind marketing policy, and might actually impede
its effectiveness.
568. See Fair Hous. Council of Bergen County, Inc. v. Eastern Bergen County Multiple Listing
Serv., Inc., 422 F. Supp. 1071, 1074-75 (D.N.J. 1976) (explaining how the multiple listing has a
pervasive influence on the housing market, noting that one-half of all transactions in area involved
use of the listing service).
569. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) (1988); Local 28, Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n v. EEOC, 478
U.S. 421, 479 (1986); United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 223 (1979).
570. Local no. 93, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 528-29 (1986);
cf Denton v. Int'l Bhd. of Boilermakers, 630 F. Supp. 55 (M.D. Mass. 1986) (ruling that a union
disagreement with a company's affirmative hiring program did not justify refusing to let blacks
hired under the program take a promotional exam, whereas whites with less experience were
allowed).
571. 478 U.S. 501 (1986).
572. Id. at 528-29.
573. Id. at 529.
574. South-Suburban Hous. Ctr. v. Greater S. Suburban Bd. of Realtors, 713 F. Supp. 1068,
1077 (N.D. 111. 1988), affd in part and rev'd in part. 935 F.2d 868 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied,
112 S. Ct. 971 (1992) (noting that marketing obligations imposed on the multiple listing service
were identical to normally marketed properties).
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Board to perform any particular activities with respect to the
Apache Street properties.575 Like, the consent decree, requiring the
Board to list the Apache Street properties would only prevent it
from thwarting the effectiveness of the Housing Center-Century 21
agreement.5  Concededly, the consent decree is not perfectly analo-
gous to the private contractual arrangement entered into by the
Housing Center and Century 21, because it grew out of litigation
and allowed the third party to air objections to it before it was
adopted. 5 " But although the consent decree is not directly on point,
Firefighters is a Title VII affirmative action precedent, and Title
VII reasoning is routinely used to interpret the legality of actions
taken under the Fair Housing Act.5 78 As stated previously, courts
require that Title VIII be given a generous construction to effectu-
ate its purposes, which includes: promoting integrated housing. 79
Thus, Firefighters supports the view that a narrow construction of
what constitutes cooperation will most effectively further the inte-
gration goal of the Fair Housing Act without unduly trammelling
private rights.
In conclusion, South-Suburban Housing Center should be inter-
preted as allowing a private entity to withhold services from a sec-
ond realtor only if the services would directly support specific af-
firmative action efforts undertaken by the second realtor.580 The key
575. Id. The affirmative marketing plan did require Century 21 to provide a racial breakdown
of customers shown the house by other brokers that were part of the multiple listing service. This
did not require the Board or other realtors to assist the Housing Center and Century 21 in its
affirmative marketing activities; the National Association of Realtors, as part of its HUD-NAR
VAMA, "strongly urges local boards and Realtors to collect and maintain data on the race of
homeseekers served." South-Suburban Hous. Ctr., 713 F. Supp. at 1097; cf. Fair Housing Hear-
ings, supra note 15, at 26 (Polikoff stating that.gathering racial data is essential to any technique
used to further the purposes of the Fair Housing Act).
576. Firefighters noted that valid claims related to the consent decree could still be litigated by
nonconsenting intervenors. Firefighters, 478 U.S. at,529-30. Since the Board did not have any
valid legal objection to the affirmative marketing program, it would not be able to block the mar-
keting efforts merely by withholding its consent to them.
577. Id. at 529. In contrast, the Board of Realtors did not have an opportunity to object before
the special outreach program was implemented.
578. See supra notes 142-47 and accompanying text (discussing the evolution of the Title VII
standard of review).
579. See supra note 66, text accompanying note 554 (discussing the liberal construction given
to the Fair Housing Act).
580. These services would include making references in the multiple listing to the property's
being affirmatively marketed. See South-Suburban Hous. Ctr. v. Greater S. Suburban Bd. of
Realtors, 713 F. Supp. 1068, 1077 (N.D. Ill. 1988), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 935 F.2d 868
(7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 971 (1992) (noting that the Apache Street listing con-
tained exactly the kind of information published about all the other homes).
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issue is whether the broker services provide an essential vehicle for
the special outreach efforts.581 Providing services that only support a
realtor's traditional activities should not be interpreted as constitut-
ing cooperation with affirmative action efforts. Thus, a realtor or-
ganization that withholds traditional brokerage services from a bro-
ker because of the broker's affirmative marketing efforts would
discriminate on account of race in violation of section 3606 of the
Act.
2. Interference with Housing Rights Under Section 3617
Like section 3606, section 3617 presents relatively uncharted ter-
ritory under the Fair Housing Act. South-Suburban Housing
Center presents the first "reverse" interference case under section
3617, which prohibits interfering with housing rights protected
under sections 3603-3606 of the Fair Housing Act.582 South-Subur-
ban Housing Center involved a claim that the Board of Realtor's
unlawfully interfered with the Housing Center on account of its
having aided or encouraged white homebuyers in the exercise of
their housing rights.583
The Seventh Circuit held that under the factual circumstances of
South-Suburban Housing Center, a section 3617 claim would not be
successful if the plan did not also violate the prohibition against bro-
kerage service discrimination contained in section 3606.584 This rul-
ing does not comport with section 3617 precedent.585 A number of
courts have held that a section 3617 interference claim violation
may occur without a simultaneous violation of another section of the
Fair Housing Act, especially when the defendant does not interfere
directly with the plaintiff's exercise of housing rights, but on ac-
count of having exercised them. 586
581. See id. (noting that the Housing Center did not place references in the multiple listing
service publication about special outreach efforts connected with the property). That type of refer-
ence would make the multiple listing service a vehicle for the Housing Center's affirmative mar-
keting efforts).
582. 42 U.S.C. § 3617 (1988) (prohibiting interference with "any right granted or protected by
3603, 3604, 3605, or 3606 of this title"); see supra notes 47-54 and accompanying text (discussing
the scope of § 3617).
583. South-Suburban Hous. Ctr. v. Greater S. Suburban Bd. of Realtors, 935 F.2d 868, 885-87
(7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 971 (1992).
584. Id. at 886.
585. See supra note 57 (explaining the different legal standards that apply depending on
whether the interference occurred during an attempt to exercise a protected right or afterwards).
586. E.g.. Smith v. Stechel, 510 F.2d 1162, 1164 (9th Cir. 1975); Stirgus v. Benoit, 720 F.
1356 [Vol. 41:1271
1992] RACE-BASED REAL ESTATE MARKETING 1357
The Seventh Circuit relied on a footnote in Metropolitan Housing
Development Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights5 87 to support its
ruling that where the same conduct is alleged to have violated both
sections 3606 and 3617, the ruling on the section 3606 claim is dis-
positive of the section 3617 claim.588 The Arlington Heights foot-
note stated that under the circumstances of that case, where the
village had voted not to rezone land in order to permit a planned
low-income housing development, the village's conduct could consti-
tute interference with protected housing rights only if it also denied
or otherwise made housing unavailable under section 3604(a). 589
The South-Suburban Housing Center court stated that "[t]he same
reasoning is apropos here." 590 However, the court did not explain
why the present factual circumstances justified the same standard as
that in Arlington Heights. Remember, Arlington Heights involved
an exclusionary zoning claim and the alleged interference by the
Village in failing to rezone was alleged to simultaneously make
housing unavailable to minorities.59 ' In contrast, the interference in
South-Suburban Housing Center came after a housing right had al-
ready been exercised. Thus, the recent decision in Stackhouse v.
DeSitter 592 appears more closely analogous to the situation in
South-Suburban Housing Center.
Stackhouse v. DeSitter involved the firebombing of a car belong-
ing to a black home buyer who had recently moved into an all-white
Chicago neighborhood.593 In ruling that this conduct violated section
3617, the district court ruled that a Section 3617 violation may be
established in the absence of another substantive violation of the
Act. 594 Otherwise, the district court said, section 3617 would be ren-
dered superfluous. 595 It noted that section 3617 prohibited three sep-
arate actions: interfering with a person in the exercise of his housing
rights, interfering on account of his having exercised or enjoyed a
Supp. 119, 123 (N.D. II1. 1989); Stackhouse v. DeSit*ter, 620 F. Supp. 208, 211 (N.D. Ill. 1985).
587. 558 F.2d 1283 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1025 (1978).
588. South-Suburban Hous. Cti., 935 F.2d at 887-88 (citing Metropolitan Hous. Dcv. Corp. v.
Village of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283,1288 n.5 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
1025 (1978)).
589. Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d at 1288 n.5.
590. South-Suburban Hous. Ctr., 935 F.2d at 886.
591. Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d at 1288.
592. 620 F. Supp. 208 (N.D. 111. 1985).
593. Id. at 211.
594. Id. at 210-11.
595. Id. at 210.
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right, or interfering on account of his aiding or encouraging another
in his housing rights.59 The Stackhouse court indicated that only
where conduct is alleged to directly interfere with contemporaneous
efforts to exercise housing rights will the validity of a section 3617
violation depend on whether the conduct also violates another sub-
stantive prohibition of the Fair Housing Act.5"7
Like the defendant in Stackhouse, the Board of Realtors did not
directly interfere with the Housing Center in the exercise or enjoy-
ment of any housing rights. Instead, the realtors interfered after the
Center had aided and encouraged white homebuyers in the exercise
of their housing rights by making special outreach efforts to
them.598 The Seventh Circuit is correct that the multiple listing ser-
vice denial did not interfere with the Housing Center's contempora-
neous efforts to make special outreach efforts to whites.599 Those
efforts were made independent of the multiple listing service. The
interference came in the form of denying normal marketing chan-
nels to Century 21 after Century 21 implemented an affirmative
marketing plan to encourage whites in the exercise of their housing
rights. This interfered with the ability of the Housing Center to sell
the properties.6 00 Thus, the realtors' interference did not prevent the
Housing Centei and Century 21 from aiding white homebuyers in
596. Id. at 210-11.
597. Id. at 211 (noting that the interference came after the plaintiff had already exercised his
right to live in an integrated neighborhood); accord Seaphus v. Lilly, 691 F. Supp. 127, 138-39
(N.D. Ill. 1988) (approving reasoning in Stackhouse).
598. South-Suburban Hous. Ctr. v. Greater S. Suburban Bd. of Realtors, 935 F.2d 868, 874
(7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 971 (1992) (noting that the denial of the multiple listing
service access came after the Housing Center had encouraged whites to exercise their housing
rights by making special outreach efforts to them); Stackhouse, 620 F. Supp. at 211 (noting that
defendants interfered on account of plaintiff having enjoyed or exercised a housing right).
599. South-Suburban Hous. Ctr., 935 F.2d at 884. The Seventh Circuit held that the Housing
Center had "failed to demonstrate interference with the aiding or encouraging of other persons in
the exercise of rights under the Fair Housing Act." Id. at 886 (emphasis added). This statement
incorrectly states both the law and plaintiffs claim. The Housing Center did not allege contempo-
raneous interference with the aiding of others, but on account of its aiding and encouraging of
others. Petitioner's Opening Brief at 42-43, South-Suburban Hous. Ctr. v. Greater S. Suburban
Bd. of Realtors (7th Cir. 1991) (Nos. 89-2122, 89-2177), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 971 (1992).
This interference does not necessarily have to be directed at thwarting the efforts of encourage-
ment, but can also constitute a retaliatory response tangential to plaintiffs' efforts. See
Stackhouse, 620 F. Supp. at 209 (stating that the firebombing not done to thwart attempted
integrative move; move had been made already; action taken in retaliation for the integrative
move, in hopes of deterring future exercise of housing rights); see also Meadows v. Edgewo6d
Mgmt. Corp., 432 F. Supp. 334 (W.D. Va. 1977) (noting real estate employee disciplined for
refusing to discriminate against minorities); SCHWEMIM, supra note 15, § 20.2(4), at 20-11 to 20-
12 (discussing independent grounds for § 3617 liability).
600. See supra note 45 (discussing how the multiple listing service is an effective selling tool).
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the exercise of their housing rights;601 it came in response, or even
retaliation, for aiding them.
In South-Suburban Housing Center, the court improperly
equated interference and discrimination as legitimate, permissible
non-cooperation. Future courts facing this issue should heed the rea-
soning in Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. v. Village of
Arlington Heights, 0 2 which stated that "if the defendant is a pri-
vate individual or a group of private individuals seeking to protect
private rights, the courts cannot be overly solicitous when the effect
is to perpetuate segregation. '6 0 3  In South-Suburban Housing
Center, the Board was seeking to protect the private rights associ-
ated with color-blind adherence to the Fair Housing Act. 0 4 If the
Board were repeatedly to deny multiple listing service access to bro-
kers who affirmatively market properties, this could have a discrimi-
natory effect on the availability of housing information to minori-
ties.605 Because use of the multiple listing service is critical to
effective home sales,606 restricting access to the service may force
the broker to abandon the special outreach efforts in order to regain
access.60 7 This allows a realty organization to use the marketing ad-
vantage of the multiple listing service to force individual brokers to
adhere to a race-neutral marketing policy, a policy which unfortu-
nately tends to perpetuate segregation. 60 8 Future courts, when at-
601. Preventing direct exercise of housing rights in this case would have involved denying
South-Suburban Housing Center advertising space in the Southtown Economist newspaper, or
refusing to allow the Housing Center to post flyers for the properties in factories employing mostly
white workers.
602. 558 F.2d 1283 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1025 (1978).
603. Id. at 1293.
604. South-Suburban Hous. Ctr. v. Greater S. Suburban Bd. of Realtors, 713 F. Supp. 1068,
1080 (N.D. Ill. 1988), affd in part and rev'd in part, 935 F.2d 868 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied,
112 S. Ct. 971 (1992).
605. See id. (noting that cooperating brokers in the service had no affirmative marketing obli-
gations themselves, and also knew the racial makeup of Apache Street and the fact that there was
little white demand).
606. See supra notes 536-37 (discussing the marketing power associated with cooperative list-
ing between brokers).
607. South-Suburban Hous. Ctr. v. Greater S. Suburban Bd. of Realtors, 935 F.2d 868, 884
n. 13 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 971 (1992) (observing that evidence showed that as
a result of the litigation involving the affirmative marketing plan, Century 21 was forced to aban-
don the special outreach provisions and market the property normally).
608. See Otero v. New York City Hous. Auth., 484 F.2d 1122, 1133 (2d Cir. 1973) (noting
race-conscious strategy was essential to avoid resegregation); Wilkerson, supra note 103, at 7
(quoting Donald Demarco, Shaker Heights Housing Director, as stating "integration does not just
happen . . . .Color blind or race neutral efforts simply do not work. They almost always result in
resegregation."); supra notes 105-06 (noting that successful integration requires conscious efforts
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tempting to promote the integration goal of the Fair Housing Act,
should give little deference to the exercise of these types of private
rights.6"9
IV. 'IMPACT
The Seventh Circuit's ruling that affirmative marketing plans are
legal " 'removes a cloud that the real estate industry has dragged
over this concept.' "610 Affirmative marketing involves both housing
counseling and targeted advertising efforts. 1' The likely effect of
South-Suburban Housing Center will be to increase the perception
that race-conscious programs in general are legitimate ways of pro-
moting integration. This in turn will lead to increased use of such
programs, and in particular, lead to increased use of racially
targeted marketing by private groups in an effort to attract persons
to residential areas where their racial group is underrepresented.
Overall, South-Suburban Housing Center will not dramatically
increase the use of these plans. Thousands of affirmative marketing
plans were already in place prior to this ruling, most operating with-
out legal challenge.612 This indicates most people did not perceive
them to be discriminatory. However, the reasoning of the court is
likely to further reduce challenges to them. 13 The Seventh Circuit
required proof of discriminatory motive in order to prove an affirma-
tive marketing plan constituted illegal steering under the Act."1 4
This standard is very hard to meet because overt racial animus has
largely disappeared in the housing industry.6 15
to maintain integration).
609. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1293 (7th
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1025 (1978).
610. Shnay & Campbell, supra note 313, at I (quoting Alexander Polikoff). Polikoffs state-
ment came after the Supreme Court's decision to deny the Board of Realtors' petition for writ of
certiorari. Id.
611. Fair Housing Hearings, supra note 15, at 54-55 (testimony of Alexander Polikofl).
612. See SCHWEMM, supra note 15, § 11.2(2)(b), at 11-10.
613. The decision in South-Suburban Housing Center did not reduce criticism of the Housing
Center's housing integration efforts. Political and philosophical disagreement with these plans still
remains strong. Civil Rights leaders assert that the decision raises "disturbing" questions about
how a community may determine its ideal or acceptable racial composition. Shnay & Campbell,
supra note 313, at 8. Opponents of affirmative marketing argue that the term affirmative action is
misleading because there is a " 'connotation there that African-Americans are spoilers in a com-
munity and that European-Americans are needed to keep a community stable.'" Id. (quoting
Delores Whiters, president, NAACP-Far South Suburban Branch).
614. South-Suburban Hous. Ctr. v. Greater S. Suburban Bd. of Realtors, 935 F.2d 868, 883-84
(7th Cir. 1991), ceri. denied, 112 S. Ct. 971 (1992).
615. Metropolitan Hous. & Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1281, 1288
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The types of plans most likely to increase as a result of South-
Suburban Housing Center are the large-scale cooperative efforts be-
tween government, nonprofit fair housing agencies, and/or for-orofit
realtors. The Seventh Circuit explicitly endorsed such efforts as pro-
moting robust, multiracial competition for housing.6 16 Oak Park, Il-
linois, and Shaker Heights, Ohio, have shown that maintaining sta-
ble integration on a long-term basis is possible through joint
cooperation between government and private groups. Oak Park, ad-
joining a virtually all-black neighborhood of Chicago, has success-
fully combatted the threat of tipping. Its minority population has
risen from 11% in 1980 to only 18% in 1990.17 Similarly, Shaker
Heights, adjacent to a Cleveland ghetto, has seen its minority popu-
lation remain stable at 24-30% over the last ten years.6 1 8 South-
Suburban Housing Center removes the legal uncertainty surround-
ing these large-scale efforts, and may provide the impetus for other
municipalities and regions to become fair housing pioneers. Non-
profit fair housing agencies, for instance, no longer have to worry
about funding expensive challenges to litigation in addition to fund-
ing fair housing strategies.
South-Suburban Housing Center does not, however, guarantee
that stable integration will result from the use of affirmative mar-
keting efforts. South-Suburban Housing Center dealt with compre-
hensive efforts to stabilize integration in Park Forest, a community
containing neighborhoods with a single-family character. This type
of neighborhood, populated largely by homeowners as opposed to
renters, is an asset in maintaining integration, since there is less
population transition.61 9 Park Forest still saw its black population
rise from 12% to 25% from 1980 to 1990.620
(7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 .U.S. 1025 (1978).
616. South-Suburban Hous. Ctr., 935 F.2d at 884.
617. Chicagoland Census Report (Cook County), supra note 2, at 8.
618. YALE CONFERENCE, supra note 100, at 91 (statement of Donald DeMarco); see also Fair
Housing Hearings, supra note 15, at 103-04 (statement of Winston H. Richie) (stating that
through the use of race-conscious housing techniques, the Cleveland area inner-ring suburbs of
Shaker Heights, Cleveland Heights and University Heights have enjoyed a stable racial mixture
for over twenty years).
619. BERRY, supra note 1, at 238. An example of the difference is culled by comparing the
Chicago neighborhoods of Beverly and South Shore. Beverly, where 90% of the residences are
single family, has experienced a relatively stable racial mix in the last 20 years. In contrast, South
Shore, where 77% of all residences are apartments, experienced rapid resegregation over a five-
year span in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Id.
620. Chicagoland Census Report (Cook County), supra note 2, at 8. In contrast, the neighbor-
ing municipality of University Park, which also attempted integration efforts, saw its black popu-
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Another important factor in maintaining successful integration is
the education level, income level, and sense of community of the
population. 21 Thus, not every area is amenable to race-conscious
housing techniques, although Oak Park has proved that maintaining
stable integration in areas with a high concentration of rental units
is possible. 22 The success of both Oak Park and Shaker Heights is
due to certain positive characteristics they have in common. Both
are solidly middle class communities with good school systems,623
and neither community has public housing.62 The high level of so-
cial and community services provided by the communities acts as a
buffer to tipping. 25 By contrast, in racially transitional communities
without integration plans, resegregation can happen with alarming
quickness.626
The decision in South-Suburban Housing Center does present
problems for for-profit groups wishing to engage in affirmative mar-
keting activities. The Seventh Circuit's ruling that one realtor does
not have to cooperate with another realtor's affirmative marketing
plan will limit the number of private realtors and home sellers will-
ing to engage in direct affirmative marketing measures, particularly
in metropolitan areas. Property sales in metropolitan areas depend
heavily on the use of the multiple listing service.627 Without listing
service access, the market exposure of the property is reduced and it
will likely take longer to sell. 28 Thus, in an area of strong realtor
resistance to race-based housing strategies, there is a strong eco-
nomic motive on the part of both realtors and home sellers to avoid
affirmative marketing plans in order to retain access to the multiple
lation jump from 42% to over 80% from 1980 to 1990. Id.; see also supra notes 336-38 (discuss-
ing attempt by University Park to require all realtors operating within the village to undertake
integration efforts).
621. BERRY, supra note 1, at 239-40.
622. See supra note 287 (discussing the Oak Park Housing Center).
623. Firstman, supra note 101, at 7-8.
624. Id.
625. See supra notes 137-39 (discussing tipping criteria in general and, in particular, stating
that the level of services in a community directly correlates with its tipping point).
626. See Chicagoland Census Report (Cook County), supra note 2, at 8. (noting that the Vil-
lage of Bellwood, near Oak Park, saw its black population jump from 35% to 75% from 1980 to
1990).
627. See Wheatley Heights Neighborhood Coalition v. Jenna Resales Co., 447 F. Supp. 838,
841-42 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) (noting that the multiple listing service concept is an effective tool for
promoting integrated housing by providing a means of widely circulating home listings); supra
notes 45,543-45 (discussing the influence of the multiple listing service on the urban mar-
ketplace).
628. Wheatley Heights, 447 F. Supp. at 841-42.
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listing service. The lack of realtor participation in affirmative mar-
keting will reduce the impact South-Suburban Housing Center will
have on the effectiveness of pro-'integration measures, since realtors'
direct control over the housifig transaction process gives them
greater influence over shaping racial patterns.629 The reluctance of
individual brokers to utilize affirmative marketing tools depends on
the position that the large realtor networks and organizations take
regarding race-conscious marketing. Not all realtor networks oppose
affirmative marketing as vociferously as the Greater South Subur-
ban Board of Realtors. For example, the largest real-estate company
in Ohio (Realty One) has begun to implement pro-integration tac-
tics. 30 In addition, in most areas there is not a single dominant mul-
tiple listing service that controls the distribution of housing informa-
tion, and in many cases multiple listing services compete with each
other for business.6 s
Fortunately, the South-Suburban Housing Center affirmative
marketing plan is not the only method of maintaining stable integra-
tion. Housing counseling programs like the one in Steptoe v. Beverly
Area Planning Ass'n have proved successful in promoting nontradi-
tional moves, without raising the issue of compelling cooperation
from other parties.63 2 House counseling is not directly involved in
the real estate market, so unlike the Housing Center plan, this type
of program does not seek to directly influence real estate transac-
tions.6 33 The information house-counseling programs distribute to
interested parties is culled predominantly from public sources, such
as real estate advertisements.63 ' Counseling programs like these will
continue to grow, especially since they do not raise the specter of
causing properties to lose access to the multiple listing service, the
629. See supra notes 342-44 and accompanying text (discussing for-profit versus nonprofit fair
housing efforts).
630. Fair Housing Hearings, supra note 15, at 50-51 (statement of Winston H. Richie). Richie
argues that with universal approval of affirmative marketing tactics among realtors in an area,
another selling tool is created. Property values (and commissions) increase as demand for each
property rises. Id. at 54-55 (statement of Winston H. Richie).
631. See Blake v. H-F Group Multiple Listing Serv., 345 N.E.2d 18, 22-23 (Il. 1976) (noting
that during the 1970s, at least three multiple listing services were operating in the south suburban
area of Chicago).
632. See BERRY, supra note 1, at 231-52 (discussing the successful efforts to prevent racial
transition in the Chicago neighborhood of Beverly-Morgan Park, and noting that it requires a
permanent, continuing effort to maintain racial balance).
633. See supra note 343 (discussing how private realtor affirmative marketing, unlike nonprofit
efforts, can make housing "unavailable" on the basis of race).
634. BERRY, supra note I, at 231-52.
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dominant marketing mechanism in many urban areas.
Although the court did not explicitly distinguish between public
and private affirmative marketing efforts, in South-Suburban Hous-
ing Center, the court's ruling that realtors are bound only to color-
blind marketing practices indicates that ordinances requiring real-
tors to engage in special outreach efforts will likely be invalidated. 63 5
This can impede integration efforts because the wider the scale an
affirmative marketing program operates on, the more successful it
will be in maintaining racial balance. 36
Another impact of the South-Suburban Housing Center decision
will be to encourage more use of pro-integration financial incen-
tives.6 37 This race-conscious method has been subject to little overt
controversy so far.6 38 Pro-integration financial incentives are attrac-
tive because they directly counter the economic fear that influences
many people to make segregative choices.6 39 By providing positive
economic influences, such as mortgage assistance or rehabilitation
subsidies, to landlords willing to promote integrated housing, com-
munities encourage stable integration and prevent white flight. 640
For instance, through the use of subsidized pro-integration loans in
the predominantly black Lomond neighborhood of Shaker Heights
from 1984 to 1988, sales to white homebuyers increased from 49%
to 69% .41 The reasoning in South-Suburban Housing Center could
make these incentives even more attractive. The Seventh Circuit ex-
plicitly upheld affirmative action efforts designed solely to maintain
racial balance in housing. 2 It abandoned any analogy to the Title
635. See supra notes 335-37 (describing Park Forest South mandatory integration ordinance).
636. See CIVIL RIGHTS COMMISSION, supra note 74, at 63 (arguing that a patchwork of ordi-
nances (or private efforts) will not achieve lasting results).
637. See supra notes 283-304 (discussing generally pro-integration incentives).
638. See supra note 291 (discussing the scarcity of litigation or comment regarding pro-inte-
gration financial incentives).
639. See MILGRAM. supra note 288, at 99-100 (noting that much of white prejudice is based on
the fear that property values will decline and property crime will rise as blacks move into a for-
merly segregated neighborhood).
640. See supra notes 284-305 and accompanying text (discussing pro-integration incentives);
see also 87 Op. Ohio Att'y Gen. 095 (1987), reprinted in FAIR HOUSING-FAIR LENDING: EQUAL
HOUSING OPPORTUNITY, at PH 23,003. The Ohio Attorney General approved a temporary three
month plan where the state finance agency could set aside 10% of its funds to promote integration
by making low-interest loans available for cross-purchasers in segregated areas. The only eligibil-
ity requirement was racially neutral, a desire to live in an integrated environment. Id. at PH
23,008. The plan was officially designed to alleviate manifest racial imbalance, not to maintain
integration. Id. at PH 23,010.
641. Firstman, supra note 101, at 7.
642. South-Suburban Hous. Ctr. v. Greater S. Suburban Bd. of Realtors, 935 F.2d 868, 883-84
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VII maxim that affirmative action shall not be used to maintain ra-
cial balance in the workforce.6 43 Agencies that were formerly care-
ful to point out that their financial incentive programs were only
temporary may now be able to implement a continuing plan without
fear of liability under Title VIII.
However, South-Suburban Housing Center will not afford these
incentive programs protection to the extent it protects affirmative
marketing measures. South-Suburban Housing Center dealt with
the availability of housing information to potential customers. In
contrast, financial incentives involve concrete sums of money and
their availability to identifiable customers. 45 Measuring discrimina-
tory effect is much easier with financial incentives than with housing
information. The reality is whites have much easier access to this
money. There is economic disparity between blacks and whites, and
in Shaker Heights many blacks cannot afford to buy homes in all-
white areas, even when subsidized loans are available. 4 Conversely,
integrated housing tends to be the most affordable. 47 Thus, ninety
percent of all the pro-integration loans go to whites. 48 Thus, even
though the plan is facially neutral, the disparity in access to the
loans between blacks and whites may create a discriminatory effect
in violation of the Fair Housing Act.649
In sum, the South-Suburban Housing Center decision has stepped
into the shoes long unfilled by HUD: setting policy and interpreting
the Act's application to private race-conscious housing programs.
Unlike Title VII, which has extremely detailed regulations inter-
preting the statute's provisions, the regulations promulgated under
Title VIII are very general; HUD has largely taken a hands-off ap-
proach to formal regulations governing affirmative action housing
(7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 971 (1992).
643. Local 28, Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 479 (1986).
644. See supra note 632 (noting that the Ohio Attorney General approved a statewide mort-
gage-incentive program on the basis that it was temporary in duration and designed to achieve
integration); see also Thomas, supra note 285 (noting that a Wisconsin mortgage incentive plan
was instituted not to maintain integration, but to desegregate schools).
645. See supra note 289 and accompanying text.
646. Wilkerson, supra note 103, at Al.
647. Id.; see also Firstman, supra note 101, at 7 (noting the economic disparity in Oak Park,
where 80% of the black population lives in the apartment buildings comprising half the housing
stock).
648. Wilkerson, supra note 101, at A7.
649. See supra notes 297-303 (discussing criticism of financial incentives as an integration
tool).
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practices under the Act.65° For instance, while waiting for Congres-
sional direction, HUD has remained neutral on the use of financial
incentives,6 51 and has published no specific regulations regarding
private affirmative marketing efforts. 52 South-Suburban Housing
Center has stepped in to fill the congressional and regulatory void
regarding race-conscious integration programs. The reasoning of the
Seventh Circuit is sometimes incomplete, and its decision regarding
multiple listing service access dilutes its endorsement of race-con-
scious housing strategies and the effectiveness of coordinated for-
profit/nonprofit ventures. But on the whole, South-Suburban Hous-
ing Center provides welcome certainty to groups involved in promot-
ing the integration goal of the Fair Housing Act. It explicitly states
that special outreach efforts by private groups to certain racial
groups does not constitute discrimination. The lasting impact is that
private entities can continue to expand affirmative marketing efforts
without fear of liability.
V. CONCLUSION
Affirmative marketing techniques have proved effective in pro-
moting integrated housing,, particularly when used in conjunction
with antidiscrimination and community enhancement programs.
Their use has also become a growing legal issue under the Fair
Housing Act. Most of the prior litigation involving race-conscious
housing programs involved the legality of housing quotas. But with
most courts holding that quotas impermissibly promote integration
at the expense of limiting minority access to housing, affirmative
marketing techniques, long operating with little scrutiny, have
moved into the legal "spotlight."
South-Suburban Housing Center is the first federal appellate de-
cision to directly address the legality of private race-conscious af-
firmative marketing techniques. The scarcity of prior litigation over
these programs, and the refusal by the Supreme Court to hear the
Board of Realtor's appeal, 6 53 indicates that future courts interpret-
ing the legality of affirmative marketing programs under the Act
650. See SCIiWCMM, supra note 15, § 10.4; see also 24 C.F.R. §§ 100.50 to 100.135 (1991)
(describing certain practices that are illegal under the Fair Housing Act).
651. See supra notes 300-03 and accompanying text (discussing the HUD position on financial
incentives).
652. See supra note 339 (discussing the HUD position on affirmative marketing).
653. 112 S. Ct. 971 (1992), denying cert. to 935 F.2d 868 (7th Cir. 1991).
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will accord South-Suburban Housing Center significant precedental
value. This will enable most plans to operate free from the threat of
liability. However, future courts should scrutinize carefully the
mechanics of affirmative marketing plans operated by for-profit
realtors. The economic motivations of realtors pose some danger
that affirmative marketing could cross the line into reverse steering.
The Seventh Circuit's decision also creates an uncertain future
for affirmative marketing by private realtors. Although the Seventh
Circuit endorsed the use of affirmative marketing by private for-
profit realtors, it also allowed other real estate organizations that
disagreed philosophically with these methods to thwart their effec-
tiveness. Specifically, South-Suburban Housing Center allows other
realtors to refuse to cooperate with the realtors' normal marketing
activities directed at the properties. Catering to philosophical differ-
ences in this manner threatens to make these integration techniques
"otherwise unavailable" to real estate brokers. Future courts analyz-
ing this issue should carefully scrutinize whether one realtor's af-
firmative action efforts compel another realtor to act in a way con-
trary to its philosophy. If no actions are compelled, interference
with affirmative marketing efforts, like the limiting of multiple list-
ing service access in South-Suburban Housing Center, should be
ruled illegal under the Fair Housing Act.
Mark. W. Zimmerman
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